The radical populist right established itself as a family of parties in European democracies by politicizing cultural identities, as a reaction against the spread of post-materialist values in affluent European societies. They also channeling discontent with the dominant political parties of the most affected by the financial-economic crisis in 2008. Latin America did not have the levels of generalized prosperity and economic security that facilitated the spread of post-materialist values in European societies. Accordingly, the relative weakness of the quiet revolution in Latin America limited the opportunities for a radical populist right to capitalize a cultural backlash. However, while unfavorable structural conditions may constrain PRR parties in Latin America, it does not prevent them from emerging. Scholars have pointed out that the widespread unrest due to the perceived state of economy and corruption are electoral drivers for appeal of extreme right-wing outsiders. Recent studies have addressed these forces’ stances through discourse analysis. Additionally, in the last years, more liberal and secular trends, combined with movements defending the rights of women, sexual minorities and indigenous, have triggered a cultural backlash among conservatives and religious people that have created opportunities for populist mobilization among the Latin American right. This paper aims to identify the set of preferences that drive Latin-American PRR supporters. Specifically, we ask to what extent these voters endorse programmatically their agenda, or whether their support stems from political and economic dissatisfaction. I will rely on the CSES Module 5 survey which have gathered data for four Latin-American PRR leaders: Bolsonaro (Brazil), Alvarado (Costa Rica), Kast (Chile) and Manini Ríos (Uruguay).