

Regionalist parties in Spain: What do they all stand for? An analysis of programmatic preferences along the left-right and centre-periphery dimensions

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Abstract

This chapter addresses the comparative analysis of the programmatic proposals of regionalist parties in sub-state elections. Specifically, it raises questions about (1) the relative weight given to the left-right and the centre-periphery dimensions; (2) the position of regionalist parties along the left-right scale and (3) their priorities in the territorial agenda – nation building or devolution of policies –. Our primary aim in this chapter is to analyze how regionalist parties make strategic use of the two main cleavages of political competition according to the political, social and economic regional context. The empirical evidence comes from quantitative content analysis of the election manifestos of all Spanish regionalist parties represented in regional parliaments between 2011 to 2012. Additionally, we assess the evolution of the programmatic positions and preferences of two of them, *Convergència i Unió* (CIU) and *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV) from 1980 to 2012, in order to offer a more dynamic picture. The data comes from the *Regional Manifestos Project* (RMP), an adaptation of the *Manifesto Project's* methodology to multi-level politics.

1. Introduction

Fewer and fewer scholars maintain that regionalist parties are niche parties, in other words, parties that compete in only one political dimension, which, in this case, is the centre-periphery dimension (Meguid, 2008; Jensen and Spoon, 2010). Several studies have demonstrated the multidimensional and strategic nature of regionalist parties' stances, which do not address centre-periphery issues exclusively but also cover other issues, above all the ones that revolve around the left-right axis (De Winter, 1998; Massetti, 2009; Alonso et al., 2015). Different scholars have provided qualitative empirical evidence about the different positions that

regionalist parties maintain along the centre-periphery dimension, that range from political autonomy to secession, and from left to right along the socio-economic dimension (De Winter and Türsan, 1998; Masseti, 2009). We also know that, as with any other vote-maximising parties, the positions of regionalist parties in both dimensions are dynamic and flexible, as they change according to circumstances (Lynch, 2009; Elias and Tronconi, 2011). Even the most radical regionalist party may put momentarily aside the aim of independence for strategic reasons by placing greater emphasis on the left-right dimension. However, we still understand little about the way in which these two dimensions of competition are combined and played about, in terms of both saliency and position at the sub-state level. In large part, this poor understanding is due to the scarcity of quantitative data with which to measure multidimensional political spaces, particularly with respect to the centre-periphery dimension.

This chapter attempts to fill this gap by analysing how regionalist parties combine centre-periphery and left-right issues and strategize along the two dimensions of competition in order to attract voters. In this respect, we focus on three main questions:

- 1) **The niche party thesis and the position of the parties along the left-right scale:** Do regionalist parties neglect left-right issues? If they do not, which of the two dimensions of electoral competition, left-right and centre-periphery, dominates in the electoral manifestos of regionalist parties? Do they all assume a catch-all position, as would be expected from a niche party, or are they spread along the left-right scale?
- 2) **The nature of the pro-periphery agenda:** When it comes to their territorial goals, do regionalist parties mobilize issues of culture and language (appeals to identity) or do they, by contrast, prioritize the devolution of political authority to their respective regions?
- 3) **The relationship between the centre-periphery and the left-right dimensions:** Is there any relationship between the position that the party occupies on the left-right spectrum and its territorial preferences?

The empirical evidence discussed in this paper comes from the quantitative content analysis of election manifestos. The units of analysis are manifestos from relevant Spanish regionalist parties written for sub-state elections. A relevant regionalist party is defined as a one obtaining at least one seat at the regional parliament. This data enable us, first, to quantify the saliency of the centre-periphery dimension in relation to the left-right dimension, second, to examine the positions of parties in both dimensions simultaneously and, third, to precisely define the weight assigned to regional identity and competential demands within the pro-periphery programmatic proposals.

Two types of descriptive analysis are carried out, static and dynamic. First, we look at all the Spanish regionalist parties represented in sub-state parliaments after the 2011-2012 regional elections to compare their political programmatic preferences at time *t*. Second, we trace back the evolution of the political stances of the Catalan *Convergència i Unió* (CIU) and the Basque *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (EAJ-PNV) – the two most important regionalist parties in Spain in terms of votes, office and policy success – by selecting five points in time from 1980 to 2012.

The chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, we present a definition of regionalist parties as parties that develop multidimensional political competition strategies. Secondly, we introduce the methodology used to analyse the content of election manifestos. Thirdly, we present a descriptive analysis of the data. The final section of the article includes some concluding remarks.

2. Regionalist parties and multidimensional political competition

Those parties whose agenda is to defend the peripheral territory's distinctiveness inside the state constitute the peripheral party family (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983) and we will refer to the parties belonging to this category as *regionalist parties*. Regionalist parties, by definition, organize exclusively in their peripheral territory and present candidates to elections—state, regional, or local—exclusively within their territory. Regionalist parties only care about the rest of the state as far as this has an impact on the peripheral territory or on their electoral fortunes. They limit their appeals to the peripheral territory's electorate and tend to give priority to centre–periphery issues in their agendas, although this varies across parties and elections depending on the context. Their positions along the centre–periphery dimension are always on the periphery side, which means that their defence of pro-periphery issues is a consistent and clear one. However, their positions may vary widely according to the radicalism of their objectives and the salience of their pro-periphery preferences relative to other preferences outside this dimension (Alonso, 2012).

Despite arguments to the contrary (Rasmussen, 1991; Meguid, 2008) successful regionalist parties have not limited their appeals to territorial issues, as many past and recent examples have demonstrated (Fernández Albertos, 2002; De la Calle, 2005; Gómez Fortes et al, 2013). Regionalist parties have incentives to convey to the electorate their preferences with respect to other societal problems beyond the centre-periphery conflict because as parties that aspire to govern one day their respective peripheral territories they need to show that they are able to address all the problems that worry voters (De Winter et. al 2006; Dandoy and Sandri, 2008). The decision to emphasize or downplay territorial issues with respect to other types of issues,

such as socio-economic, religious, or left-libertarian issues, is a strategic one and depends on the structure of party competition in each particular context (Seiler, 2005).

According to early studies on the ideology of regionalist parties, left positions seem to be linked to centre-periphery radical positions. The more to the left a regionalist party is, the greater the likelihood that the party holds secessionist positions (De Winter, 1998). Later studies called into question this relationship on the basis of decentralised countries such as Italy or Belgium where secessionist parties happen to be right -and even radical right-wing parties (Alonso, 2012). A recent study that includes all the regionalist parties in the world concluded that ideology does indeed matter and left parties tend to be secessionist while centre- and right-wing parties tend to favour political autonomy within the state (Masseti, Schakel, 2014). In contrast, if we only analyse the situation in Eastern Europe, we find the inverse relationship. Conservative parties tend to be secessionist and left-wing parties are the ones most in favour of protecting the status quo (Zuber and Szosick, 2014). In our view, these contradicting findings confirm one empirical fact: the relationship between centre-periphery and left-right positions of regionalist parties is a complex one, and is context-dependent.

This chapter argues that the economic situation of the region, the existence of a distinctive national identity and the characteristics of the party system impact the strategies and preferences of regionalist parties. Particular attention is given to the last point, the institutional setting. Specifically, we found that the effective number of regionalist parties in a region influences both the saliency of left-right issues and the positions of the parties along this dimension. Following the definitions by Montero, Liaras and Pérez-Nievas in this volume, we classify the Spanish regionalist parties according to their left-right position to assess whether the nationalist option within the regional party system is complete (there are both right- and left-wing options for nationalist voters) or truncated (either the left-wing or the right-wing character dominates among regionalist parties).

3. Measuring regionalist parties stances with manifesto data

The typologies classifying regionalist parties according to their positions along the centre-periphery and left-right dimensions (Tronconi, 2006; Van Houten, 2009) are largely based on empirical evidence of a qualitative nature. To our knowledge, the only comparative study that uses quantitative content analysis of regionalist parties' manifestos is Dandoy and Sandri's (2007). Their focus is on Belgian state-level elections; manifestos written for sub-state elections were not part of their analysis. Our analysis fills in this gap by providing empirical quantitative data from regional-level manifestos.

Why is it important to study election manifestos? Although few people read them, election manifestos offer a unique view of political parties' intentions and the image they choose to project to seek votes. A great deal of literature has been written on the advantages of using election manifestos as the main source to know political parties' positions (Alonso et al, 2012). We summarise these advantages as four: 1) Election manifestos are published by the parties' official bodies and represent the entire party's position, not that of one person or faction; 2) They are published regularly, for each election. This enables us to detect ideological shifts over time; 3) Manifestos cover issues in varying depths, which makes it possible to systematically compare the different parties' programmes; and 4) We have enough empirical evidence about the fact that the parties, once in office, keep most of their electoral pledges contained in their manifestos (Pomper, 1968; Budge et al., 1989; Naurin, 2009; Thomson et al., 2012; Artés, 2012).

3.1 Methodology: Regional Manifestos Project

The data used here comes from the Regional Manifestos Project (RMP), an adaptation to multi-level politics (i.e. manifestos written for regional elections) of the methodology developed by the Manifesto Project (MARPOR) to analyse state-level elections manifestos (Alonso et al, 2013). The adaptation consists of (a) creating sub-categories that capture regional-level policy preferences; and (b) introducing an additional two-digit code that captures the preferences regarding the territorial distribution of power. The two-digit territorial code, to be applied in each quasi-sentence, identifies the level of government – local, regional, national, European or international – and the preferences of parties regarding the distribution of powers (more or less authority to the addressed level of government in a given policy issue). The Annex provides further details.

After coding the manifestos, we compute the saliency of left-right and centre-periphery issues, as well as the position of regionalist parties in both dimensions of political competition. So far, the literature has mainly focused on approaching regionalist parties' strategies via the positions they occupy both on the left-right and centre-periphery axes (Gómez Reino, 2006; Massetti, 2012). In other words, they define strategies in spatial terms, as defined by Downs (1957). However, strategies can also be defined in terms of saliency (Budge and Farlie, 1983). The key prediction of the saliency theory of electoral competition is that parties compete by highlighting those issues which belong to them, those where the voters see the party as credible and capable and which have been key, election after election, to form the party's identity. In this theoretical model, programmatic changes are understood to be 'greater or lesser emphasis placed on issues the party has traditionally favoured while it also assumes some other new ones' (Klingemann,

Hofferbert et al., 1994: 24). Parties convey a shift in direction towards the centre or one end of the dimension of competition by changing the emphasis they place on the issues in their programmes. Rather than mutually exclusive, spatial and saliency theories can be conceived as compatible (Alonso, 2012; Rovny, 2013; Elias et al., 2015).

Besides the possibility of computing saliency and position, the data collected with our methodology also allow us to determine which kind of pro-periphery proposals are made. The centre-periphery cleavage is about political control over a – peripheral – territory (also called region, state, province, land...) inside the nation-state (Lipset and Rokkan, 1965) and political control can, in turn, take several forms: cultural, economic, administrative, institutional, constitutional. For this reason, the centre-periphery cleavage has a complex issue structure and draws together at least two distinct components: the *competential* and the *identitarian*. The identitarian component of the territorial dimension refers to the definition of the national community and the means for the protection and preservation of the national community's cultural distinctiveness and identity. In other words, it refers to the processes of nation-building and nation-preserving. In this sense, issue categories connected with the protection of languages, with calls to patriotism and/or nationalism, with the cultural assimilation of immigrants, etc. belong to the cultural component. The competential dimension deals with the distribution of competencies and resources between the state [the centre] and the peripheral territory. Therefore, it is composed by all those statements in the manifesto that claim for more authority/competencies to be devolved to the regional level or less authority to be left at the state level.

Concerning the left-right dimension, it includes social and economic issues. The social component distinguishes left- and right-wing parties by the social and moral values they defend (liberal versus conservative positions in abortion, social order, traditionalism, religion, etc.). The economic aspect distinguishes between parties that are favourable to the intervention of the government in the economy to reduce inequalities caused by the market and parties which prioritize a lean state and individual economic freedom. Parties on the right want less government intervention, lower taxes, less regulation and privatization of state assets. Parties on the left prefer an active role of the government in the economy, more regulation and higher taxes. These meanings are widely shared across time and place (Marks et al., 2006: 156-157).

Both the formulas to construct the left-right and the centre-periphery scales and a detailed list of the categories belonging to each dimension can be found in the annex.

3.2. Cases

Following a relevance criterion, we include in the first part of our analysis all regionalist parties which obtained at least one seat in the Spanish regional parliaments after the 2011-2012 regional elections. This has led to 15 regionalist parties in 10 Spanish *Comunidades Autónomas* or regions. In table 1 we show the parties selected, the election year and the electoral strength of each party (vote share and number of seats). The electoral support varies widely across regionalist parties, ranking from less than 2% of the votes for *Unión del Pueblo Leonés* (UPL) in the 2011 Castile and León parliamentary election to the 34,6% obtained by the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (EAJ-PNV) in 2012 Basque elections.

Table 1: Regionalist parties in the comparative analysis 2011-2012

Region	Party	Election Year	% Vote	Nº Seats
Aragon	Partido Aragonés (PAR)	2011	9,46	7
Aragon	Chunta Aragonesista (CHA)	2011	8,50	4
Balearic Islands	PSM-Iniciativa Verds-Entesa (PSM-IV-EXM)	2011	8,61	4
Balearic Islands	Partit Socialista de Menorca-Entesa Nacionalista	2011	0,89	1
Basque Country	Partido Nacionalista Vasco (EAJ-PNV)	2012	34,61	27
Basque Country	EH Bildu (EHB)	2012	25,00	21
Canary Islands	Coalición Canaria (CC)	2011	24,04	20
Canary Islands	Nueva Canarias (NC)	2011	8,82	3
Cantabria	Partido Regionalista de Cantabria (PRC)	2011	29,12	12
Castile and Leon	Unión del Pueblo Leonés (UPL)	2011	1,86	1
Catalonia	Convergència i Unió (CIU)	2012	30,70	50
Catalonia	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)	2012	13,70	21
Catalonia	Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP)	2012	3,47	3
Galicia	Alternativa Galega de Esquerda (AGE)	2012	13,91	9
Galicia	Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG)	2012	10,11	7
La Rioja	Partido Riojano (PR)	2011	5,33	2
Navarre	Unión del Pueblo Navarro (UPN)	2011	35,40	19
Navarre	Nafarroa Bai (NaBai)	2011	15,83	8
Navarre	Bildu	2011	13,63	7

(In red: still to code)

In the second part of the analysis we use data from *Convergència i Unió* (CIU) and *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (EAJ-PNV) in five different points of time since the first regional elections after the restoration of democracy in Spain: the Catalan parliamentary elections held in 1980, 1988, 1999, 2010 and 2012, and the parliamentary elections in the Basque Country held in 1980, 1990, 1998, 2009 and 2012.

4. Results

4. 1. Regionalist parties in 2011/2012 regional elections: A comparative analysis

The central point of this chapter is to assess that regionalist parties give more or less saliency to their ‘nationalist/regionalist agenda’ depending on their electoral interests and the socio-economic and political circumstances of each region. In regions in which there are two relevant dimensions of competition, right-left and centre-periphery, political parties can display a wider and more versatile repertoire of electoral strategies to win votes – or to minimize electoral losses –. Among them, they can choose between emphasizing their position along the centre-periphery dimension or giving more relevance to the economic and social issues of the ideological cleavage. They can also strategically choose the particular position along the left-right scale and the concrete combination of competential and identitarian claims most suitable to each context of competition.

4.1.1. The relative weight of the centre-periphery dimension with respect to the right-left dimension: Are the Spanish regionalist parties ‘niche’ parties?

The relative relevance of territorial demands with respect to ideological proposals in each manifesto is measured as the ratio obtained dividing the percentage of quasi-sentences devoted to the categories belonging to the centre-periphery dimension by the percentage of quasi-sentences devoted to the left-right dimension. When this ratio equals 1 there is a relative balance between nationalist and ideological issues in a party’s manifesto. Values above 1 indicate more emphasis on the territorial dimension relative to the left-right one, while values below 1 mean the opposite, a higher relative saliency of the issues belonging to the left-right dimension. Results are shown in Figure 1.

First, the left-right dimension is more relevant relative to the centre-periphery dimension in all regionalist parties’ manifestos under analysis but three: *EH Bildu* (EHB), *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC) and especially *Unión del Pueblo Leonés* (UPL). However, in the case of the two former, the Basque EHB and the Catalan ERC, the ratio is only a few decimals above 1. Even if they give a lot of saliency to the territorial demands, they do not neglect left-right issues. The only niche party according to the ratio is UPL, which devotes 50 per cent more space of the manifestos to the recognition of the Leonese identity and autonomy than to the socio-economic agenda related with left-right issues¹. All in all, the data contradicts previous electoral studies

¹ UPL is the only Spanish regionalist party which aspires to establish a new autonomous community, made up of three provinces (León, Zamora and Salamanca), that currently belong to another region (Castile and Leon).


which have underestimated the weight of any dimension other than the centre-periphery one (Llerá et al, 2012; Leonisio and Strijbis, 2013). And it supports the findings of those scholars who have underlined the role of the economic context to explain the electoral strategies of regionalist parties even in regions characterised by a distinctive culture, identity and language, such as Catalonia and the Basque Country (Fernández Albertos, 2002; Pérez-Nievas and Fraile, 2000; Erk, 2005; Fabré and Swenden, 2013). In sum, these data speak against the niche party thesis and prove correct our intuition that regionalist parties do in fact engage in a two-dimensional strategy, competing in the territorial and the left-right dimensions simultaneously (Alonso et al., 2015).

Secondly, we can highlight that the ratio shows high variability between regionalist parties and ranges from 1.5 in the regional manifesto of UPL, the election program where the centre-periphery axis is more salient compared to the left-right one, to 0.07 in the manifesto of *Unión del Pueblo Navarro* (UPN). In the latter, there was barely space for centre-periphery proposals while the left-right dimension received a large amount of attention. This party, which acted as the regional branch of the *Partido Popular* (PP) in Navarra until 2011 regional parliamentary elections, looks more like a state-wide party than a regionalist one.

Apart from the above mentioned three parties that prioritize the proposals on the centre-periphery dimension, we can divide the remaining ones into three groups according to the differential weight they place on the proposals related to the left-right axis and on the claims to increase the regional authority or reinforcing and preserving their regional culture and identity.

The first group is formed by two new regionalist parties whose manifestos dedicate four times more references to the left-right dimension than to the centre-periphery one, *Candidatura d'Unitat Popular* (CUP) in Catalonia with a ratio of 0.24 and *Alternativa Galega de Esquerda* (AGE) in Galicia (0.26). The relevance they assign to proposals to improve the quality of democracy in their programmes (nearly 10 per cent of the quasi-sentences) is in tune with the public outcry against the political elite reflected in the surveys and the social protests that have taken place since 2011 after the so-called *15-M movement*. These are also the parties that place the greatest emphasis on sustainable development and environmental protection. Both parties believe that national sovereignty of the region is necessarily linked to social emancipation, overcoming capitalism, the improvement of democracy and the expansion of social rights (concerning AGE's discourse, see Gómez-Reino and Marcos in this volume).

Figure 1: Ratio between the saliency of left-right and territorial issues, 2011-2012



Source: Gómez, Braulio; Sonia Alonso and Laura Cabeza. Regional Manifestos Project [CSO2009-11241]. Programa Nacional de I+D+i, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Gobierno de España.

The second group is formed by regionalist parties which favour autonomy and compete in regions in where usually the debate on territorial status is not a priority on the political agenda. All of these parties place moderate importance on the centre-periphery dimension. Their ratios are between 0.34 and 0.75: *Partido Riojano*, *Partido Regionalista de Cantabria*, *Coalición Canaria* and the two Aragonese regionalist parties, *Chunta Aragonesista* and *Partido Aragonés*. The presence of the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* in this group is an exemption and may be related to the economic context and its political situation as opposition. The 2012 regional parliamentary elections in the Basque Country were run with the regional branch of the state-wide PSOE as incumbent party. Its economic performance was widely criticized even though the Basque economy itself was doing quite well compared to other regions in Spain. The regional unemployment rate was 16.6 per cent in the last quarter of 2012, the lowest in the country (and almost 10 points below the national rate), but had increased in more than 50 per cent since the start of the term. PNV sought the shortest way to attract voters, pushing the identity discourses into the background. He did it by concentrating most of his proposals on the issue that was closest to citizens' priorities: dealing with the economic crisis. Proof of this can be seen in the PNV electoral manifesto. Almost one third of all the sentences of its 262 page

long manifesto were devoted to economic issues (32 per cent), while the policies on nation-building and self-government took up just 11 per cent of the space. Left-right issues occupy 26 per cent of the manifesto.

The last group is constituted by those parties who show a relative equilibrium between their core regionalist goals and the socio-economic priorities related with the left-right dimension: *Convergència i Unió* (CIU) in Catalonia, *Bloque Nacionalista Galego* (BNG) in Galicia and the left-wing coalition *PSM-IniciativaVerds-Entesa* in Balearic Islands.


4.1.2. *The position of regionalist parties along the left-right dimension: Is there any trend?*

As we have seen in the previous section, although it is commonly assumed that the core goal of regionalist parties is the promotion of the peripheral territory's identity and the devolution of powers from the central state to the regions, none of the parties analyzed here neglect the left-right dimension. In this section we check for any pattern in the position of these parties in the ideological spectrum.

The position of parties along the left-right dimension is computed following the 'standard' procedure (Budge, 2013) employed by MARPOR, that is, by subtracting the percentages belonging to opposite categories. This positional scale orders the parties along a continuum from left to right, theoretically ranging from -100, for a manifesto exclusively dedicated to left-wing arguments, to 100, for a manifesto totally devoted to right-wing proposals. The results are shown in Figure 2.

Regionalist parties in Spain show heterogeneous preferences regarding socio-economic issues and can be found anywhere along the left-right dimension. *Alternativa Galega de Esquerda* (AGE) and the Catalan *Candidatura d'Unitat Popular* (CUP) stand out for their extreme left position (Figure 2). On the right side we find the *Partido Aragonésista* (PAR), the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV) and *Unión del Pueblo Navarro* (UPN), the former regional branch of the state-wide People's Party (PP) in Navarra. The three of them adopt a moderate right-wing position. There are not regionalist parties showing extreme right positions in their electoral programmes. The regionalist parties of Castile and León, Canary Islands, La Rioja and Cantabria (UPL, CC, PR and PRC), together with *Convergència i Unió* (CIU) in Catalonia, are located at the centre of the left-right dimension. The rest of the regionalist parties analyzed here adopt a left-wing programmatic position.

Figure 2: Programmatic position of regionalist parties along the left-right dimension, 2011-2012 (from -100 to 100)



Source: Gómez, Braulio; Sonia Alonso and Laura Cabeza. Regional Manifestos Project [CSO2009-11241]. Programa Nacional de I+D+i, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Gobierno de España.

By classifying the parties according to their ideology and the number of relevant regionalist parties in the regional party system, we find a common tendency (Table 2). In regions in which there is only one relevant regionalist party, those parties tend to adopt a centrist or moderate position on the left-right dimension. *Coalición Canaria* may be classified also in this group although in 2011 a split of this party, *Nueva Canarias*, also managed to get seats at the regional parliament. In regions in which there are two or even more regionalist options, they tend to show opposite positions, one party on the right and the other(s) on the left.

As previous literature suggests, this tendency is not particular of the Spanish case and can be broadly understood as the response to institutional incentives (Massetti, 2009). In party systems with only two state-wide parties, a regionalist party will have an incentive to place itself in a moderate left-right position (i.e. centre) to attract voters across the political spectrum. In other words, they would be ‘pushed into remaining «broad churches»’ (Massetti, 2009: 514).

Nevertheless, in a multiparty system in which there are more regionalist opponents, they would have an incentive to differentiate themselves by adopting different ideological positions.

Table 2: Classification of regionalist parties according to their programmatic ideology (parties' positions along the left-right scale in brackets)

	Extreme left	Left	Centre	Right
Two or more regionalist parties in the regional party system	GAL-AGE (-24.5) CAT-CUP (-26.6)	ARA-CHA (-14.1) GAL-BNG (-10.2) EUS-EHB (-8.3) CAT-ERC (-8.0) BAL-PSM (-7.0) NAV-NB (???)	CAT-CIU (-0.3)	ARA-PAR (12.8) EUS-PNV (7.6) BAL-UM (???) NAV-UPN (10.7)
One regionalist party in the regional party system	-	-	CAN-CC (-0.8) CYL-UPL (0) LRJ-PR (0) CAB-PRC (0.2)	-

Source: Gómez, Braulio; Sonia Alonso and Laura Cabeza. Regional Manifestos Project [CSO2009-11241]. Programa Nacional de I+D+i, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Gobierno de España.

According to table 2, *Convergència i Unió* (CIU) appears to be an exception to the rule. In 2012, as in all the previous elections, the main Catalan regionalist party was facing left-wing regionalist opponents, ERC and CUP, and nevertheless its ideological position was centrist and not right-wing as we could expect. The 2012 regional elections in Catalonia were run in a context of strong polarization on the centre-periphery axis (Orriols and Simón, in this volume). The centrist position of CIU on the left-right dimension in these elections may be interpreted as a strategy to attract nationalist voters from all the ideological spectrum, moderate or even left-wing ones. In this occasion, CIU might have differentiated itself with a movement in the territorial dimension rather than the ideological one.

The Galician regionalist parties constitute another exception to the general pattern described here, as long as both platforms, *Bloque Nacionalista Galego* (BNG) and *Alternativa Galega de Esquerda* (AGE), adopt a left or a extreme-left position. According to Massetti (2009), regionalist parties in scarcely industrialized societies have incentives to locate themselves in the left side of the scale and this can be applicable to Galicia. The ‘blend of nationalism and leftism’ (Gómez-Reino and Marcos, in this volume) seems to be an historical characteristic of the regionalist movement in this region.

In the introduction of this volume, Montero, Liaras and Pérez-Nievas come up with a classification of the regional party system based on whether the nationalist option is *complete* or

truncated. According to their definitions, a regional party system is *truncated* when the regionalist option(s) only cover(s) one side of the left-right dimension, either the left or the right, leaving nationalist voters of the other side of the political spectrum unrepresented. The system is *complete* under two situations: (a) when there are two regionalist parties each representing right- and left-wing options respectively, and (b) when a single regionalist party occupies all the left-right spectrum on a catch-all platform.

In table 3, and based on RMP data, we offer a classification of the Spanish regions under these categories. Galicia is truncated on the right due to the fact that the two regionalist parties are left- or extreme left-wing. Aragon, Basque Country and Catalonia are complete with two or more regionalist parties occupying different positions along the left-right dimension. Canary Islands, Castile and Leon, La Rioja and Cantabria are also complete but with one regionalist option occupying the centre of the left-right dimension. (in red, not coded manifestos yet).

Table 3: Type of nationalist option in the regional party system

Truncated	Galicia
Complete (two parties)	Aragon, Basque Country, Balearic Islands, Navarre and Catalonia
Complete (one party)	Canary Islands, Castile and Leon, La Rioja and Cantabria

Source: own classification according to RMP data based on the theoretical framework of Montero, Liaras and Pérez-Nievas in this volume.

4.1.3. The type of regionalist option and the saliency of left-right issues

If we take seriously the expectation of the saliency theory according to which parties compete via selective issue emphasis rather than through direct confrontation (Dolezal et al. 2014), we can expect a similar pattern of relation between the effective number of parties in a region and the saliency they give to left-right issues. In other words, the type of party system (i.e. the presence of one or more regionalist parties) not only influences the position of the parties in the left-right scale, but also might influence the saliency of the issues belonging to this dimension. Specifically, we expect that in a *complete* party system with only one regionalist party, this party would give less weight to the socio-economic proposals given that it does not face the competition of other regionalist opponents. Nevertheless, if there are two or more regionalist options occupying different positions on the left-right scale, they would need to give more room to their ideological stances in order to attract different ideologically-driven nationalist voters, or even non nationalist voters from the same ideological side.

When there are two or more relevant regionalist parties but both are on the same side of the political spectrum (i.e. when the regionalist option is *truncated*), we could expect even a greater saliency of the socio-economic proposals. The logic behind this is that these regionalist parties would establish competition, not by confrontation on the ideological dimension, but by emphasizing left or right issues, as predicted by the saliency theory. They would need to do so in order to gain the issue ownership or the reputation of being more capable to represent the same group of ideologically-driven left-wing or right-wing voters that both parties attempt to appeal to.

The data suggest that whether there is only one or more regionalist parties on the region has a certain influence on the decision of regionalist parties to emphasize or downplay left-right socio-economic issues. The average saliency of left-right issues is below 13 per cent on the manifestos of regionalist parties which not face other regionalist opponents in the region. In the case of a regional party system with two or more parties adopting different ideologies, this value increases to 22 per cent. And in regions in which both parties adopt a similar position, although in this case we only have the Galician regionalist parties (BNG and AGE), the ideological dimension occupies an average of 34 per cent of the manifesto (Table 4).

One can argue that AGE in Galicia and CUP in Catalonia are extreme cases and can be classified in an additional category representing the '*new politics*'. The fact is that, as we have seen in the previous section with the ratio, these two regionalist parties give a lot of weight to the ideological factors related with their preferred socio-economic model and the regeneration of democracy, even much more than to their centre-periphery goals. Table 4 shows the average saliency of left-right issues by type of party system taking into account all regionalist parties and also excluding AGE and CUP. In both cases, our hypothesis about the relationship between the number of regionalist parties and the saliency of left-right issues seems to be confirmed. In regions with only one relevant regionalist party, this party tends to give less emphasis to the left-right dimension.

Table 4: Average saliency of left-right issues by type of party system, 2011-2012

	All regionalist parties	Excluding CUP & AGE
Regions with two or more regionalist parties on the same left-right position	34.0	20.8
Regions with two or more regionalist parties on different left-right positions	22.2	21.3
Regions with only one regionalist party	12.9	12.9

Differences are significant at the 0.05 level (ANOVA F-test).

4.1.3. *The relation between parties' and voters' positions on the left-right and the centre-periphery dimensions*

In addition to the type of regionalist option and the number of parties within the party system, we also consider other political contextual factors that may affect the programmatic positions of regionalist parties. In this section we address the political preferences of the regional constituency. We assume that there is no difference between regionalist and statewide parties in their predispositions to act strategically. The aim of regionalist parties is to win votes and, to do so, they would try to accurately approximate voters' preferences both in the centre-periphery and the left-right dimensions. We use data from the *Barómetro Autonómico II* (2829) and the different post-electoral surveys carried out by the Spanish *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (CIS) after the parliamentary elections of each region to assess whether the position of the regionalist parties coincides with the position of their respective voters.

The voters' position along the left-right dimension is measured as the mean value in a scale from 0 (left-wing) to 10 (right-wing) among those who voted for the party in the previous regional parliamentary elections (t-1). As EH Bildu, CUP and AGE didn't exist in t-1, we extract the voters' position of these parties at time point t. Table 5 shows the Pearson correlation between the parties' position (from -100 to 100) and the average voters' position. As expected, we find a very strong positive correlation (Table 5). This suggests that either regionalist parties adjust their ideological stances to the preferences of the voters or that voters choose the parties that are closer to them in the left-right dimension.

Table 5: Correlation between the position of parties and voters along the left-right dimension

		Parties' left-right position
Voters' left-right position	Pearson Correlation	.838**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
	N	15

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

In an analogous manner, we measure the voters' position along the centre-periphery dimension through a scale from 0 (maximum centralism) to 10 (maximum decentralization) included in the

CIS survey 2829². In the case of EH Bildu, CUP and AGE voters we must rely on data from the post-electoral surveys in which the scale was different: from 0 (minimum regional nationalism) to 10 (maximum regional nationalism). The correlation between the position of the regionalist parties along the centre-periphery dimension and the position of their respective voters is shown in Table 6³.

Table 6: Correlation between the position of parties and voters along the centre-periphery dimension

		Parties' centre-periphery position
Voters' centre-periphery position	Pearson Correlation	.549
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.034
	N	15

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

As expected, the correlation is, also in this case, positive and statistically significant (Table 6). Nevertheless the relation between the position of parties and voters along the centre-periphery dimension (0.549) is not as strong as the one along the left-right dimension (0.838). Beyond the preferences of the constituency, other regional contextual factors may be influencing the intensity and direction of the pro-peripheral proposals of regionalist parties. Alternatively, it could be that regionalist parties are selected because of their left-right position in that particular election, not their centre-periphery one. In what follows we will try to go into detail about the position of regionalist parties along the centre-periphery dimension.

4.1.5. The positions of regionalist parties along the territorial dimension and the nature of the pro-periphery agenda: identity or competencies?

In contrast to the positional spread of regionalist parties along the left-right dimension, their positions along the centre-periphery dimension are always on the pro-periphery side. Nevertheless, there are large differences regarding the quality and intensity of pro-periphery demands. According to our data, the pro-periphery position of regionalist parties ranges from 1.4 to 22.8, being *Unión del Pueblo Navarro* (UPN) the least, and *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC) the most, radical⁴ regionalist party (Figure 3). In general, the intensity of pro-

² The question is formulated as follows (P46): *A State could be territorially organized in several ways. If on a scale 0 represents 'maximum centralism' and 10 represents 'maximum decentralization', including the possibility of independence of the territories that wish so, in which position would you like to place the Spanish 'State of Autonomies'?*


³ To exclude EH Bildu, CUP and AGE it does not make any difference.

⁴ As long as regionalist parties are all on the same side of this dimension and they usually do not include pro-centre statements in the manifestos, position along territorial issues and their saliency are almost equivalent. Therefore, radicalism in the territorial dimension should be interpreted here as more intensity on the peripheral demands.

periphery demands seems to be related to the existence of a distinctive language and national identity in the region. Thus, political platforms in the historical nationalities, Catalonia (ERC and CIU), the Basque Country (EH Bildu) and Galicia (BNG) are amongst the most pro-peripheral, showing scores closer to or higher than 20, while in non-historical regions like Cantabria (PRC), La Rioja (PR) and Canarias (CC) the scores are far below 10.

Nevertheless, there are clear exceptions. For instance, *Alternativa Galega de Esquerda* (AGE), the Catalan *Candidatura d'Unitat Popular* (CUP) and the Basque *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV) show a lower score than would be expected from parties that we know are openly secessionist or, at least, have secessionist inclinations. The first two parties subsumed their pro-periphery demands into a wider project in which social policies, democracy and environmentalism were highly salient. On the other hand, the strategy of PNV in the 2012 Basque parliamentary elections was explicitly the moderation on the centre-periphery debate. The economic recovery took priority over the nationalist agenda for PNV's candidate Iñigo Urkullu, as he made explicit during the electoral campaign (Pérez-Nievas and Mata López in this volume).

Figure 3: Programmatic position of regionalist parties along the territorial dimension, 2011-2012 (from -100 to 100)



Source: Gómez, Braulio; Sonia Alonso and Laura Cabeza. Regional Manifestos Project [CSO2009-11241]. Programa Nacional de I+D+i, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Gobierno de España.

The same position along the centre-periphery dimension can be reached through different combinations of identitarian and competential preferences. According to our definition, the


identitarian component of the centre-periphery cleavage refers to the processes of nation-building and nation-preserving. Therefore, categories connected with the protection of vernacular languages, calls to patriotism and/or nationalism, cultural assimilation of immigrants, references to historic feats and traditions, the right to self-determination etc., belong to the identitarian component. The *competential* component of the territorial dimension refers to the distribution of political authority between the levels of government: general statements in favour of decentralization at the regional level, demands for the devolution of specific powers or competences, i.e. fiscal autonomy, region's political control over infrastructures or an autonomous police force, etc.

How do regionalist parties combine the competential and identitarian components of the centre-periphery dimension? Figure 4 shows the relative weight of both components with respect to the total number of peripheral demands in each manifesto. We can differentiate between three groups of parties. The first group places more emphasis on identity and nation-building policies (language, regional culture, outright demands for independence) than on competential demands. UPL, PSM, CUP, and specially, AGE and the two Basque regionalist parties, PNV and EH Bildu, belong to this group. The Basque Country is the Spanish autonomous community with the highest degree of self-government and the largest number of transferred competences, i.e. fiscal autonomy. This may explain why the main Basque regionalist party decides to privilege identitarian or cultural issues over devolution in all the elections, as section 4.2 will show.

The second group is the one that gives priority to competential issues rather than to identitarian nation-building policies. To this group belong *Partido Riojano* (PR), *Partido Regionalista de Cantabria* (PRC), *Coalición Canaria* (CC), *Partido Aragonésista* (PAR) and *Unión del Pueblo Navarro* (UPN). Parties that cannot mobilize the language issue (either because there is no distinct language or because its presence in the region is merely symbolic) will make up for this disadvantage by concentrating on the devolution of political competencies.

The third group is formed by regionalist parties that give equal -or very similar- weight to identity nation-building messages and to demands for further devolution: ERC, CIU, CHA and BNG. Common to three of these four parties are certain regional factors, such as the fact that Galicia and Catalonia are regions with medium levels of decentralization (they are not fiscally autonomous as the Basque Country) and that they are home to regional vernacular languages.

Figure 4: Identitarian versus competential issues inside the centre-periphery dimension, 2011-2012




Source: Gómez, Braulio; Sonia Alonso and Laura Cabeza. Regional Manifestos Project [CSO2009-11241]. Programa Nacional de I+D+i, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Gobierno de España.

Even when they are on the same side of the centre-periphery scale, it is clear that not all regionalist parties convey the same peripheral preferences or priorities. There is variation between regions and also within the same regional political system. Variation between regions can be understood as the influence of the social, economic or political context. What can explain the differential balance of identitarian and competential issues between regionalist parties of the same region? Figure 5 shows whether the type of peripheral demands is already linked with the ideology of parties.


Although the relationship is not very strong, the ideology of the parties seems to be connected to the preferences for competential or identitarian issues. Regionalist parties' right-wing positions are linked with demands for further devolution of powers from the state to the regions. Nevertheless, the more to the left a regionalist party is, the more it emphasises nation-building policies based on identity, such as the protection of the regional language or cultural or even secessionist demands.

Figure 5: The nature of territorial demands and the left-right position, 2011-2012

Position along the left-right dimension and saliency of **identitarian demands**



Position along the left-right dimension and saliency **competential demands**



4.2. The evolution of the programmatic preferences of CIU and PNV: A longitudinal analysis

So far, the absence of longitudinal data has limited our possibility to understand how parties change over time and how do they respond to short-term contextual factors. In this section we present for the first time detailed data that enables us to analyze the evolution of the programmatic proposals of CIU and PNV, the most successful regionalist parties in Spain. We consider that in order to understand the significant current shifts and trends that are taking place within the Catalan and the Basque scenarios, we have to look at the previous behaviour of the main regionalist parties. In this section we will present data from five points in time: 1980, 1988, 1999, 2010 and 2012 (CIU) and 1980, 1990, 1998, 2009 and 2012 (PNV)⁵.

After more than 30 years, ten parliamentary regional elections and a deep devolution process, *Convergència i Unió* (CIU) and *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV) maintain their hegemonic position in the historical regions of Catalonia and the Basque Country. They still register practically the same electoral support as in the first elections, nearly 30% of the vote share for CIU and around 35% for the Basque regionalists. Yet, both regionalist parties are currently implementing different strategies concerning their positions on the political status of their regions. CIU, together with the other Catalan regionalist parties, has temporarily decided to break away with the central government and unilaterally develop a self-determination agenda for Catalonia. The PNV has (also momentarily) postpone its pro-periphery goals and adopt a moderate position along the centre-periphery dimension, as we have shown in the previous section, giving priority to economic recovery after the crisis.


In this section we wonder if there is a linear trend towards radicalization or moderation of pro-periphery demands among these parties or, conversely, there have been ‘pendular’ shifts over time. We also intend to determine if the political differentiation between the PNV and CIU has increased over the last decades or if both parties have always implemented different strategies concerning the relative weight of centre-periphery and left-right issues in their regional manifestos. Finally, special attention is given to the regional economic situation. Some contextual factors, as the national identity and the party system inside a region, change very slowly. Nevertheless, the economic situation fluctuates more often. The longitudinal data allow us to test whether PNV and CIU react in a different or in a similar way to the situation of the regional economy.

⁵ Our aim is to enlarge our dataset in order to cover all the regional elections held in Spain since the restoration of democracy. Nevertheless, human codification of party manifestos is extremely time-consuming. This is especially true in the case of Catalonia and the Basque Country, where political parties tend to write exceptionally long manifestos, both in the national and regional elections.

4.2.1. Saliency and position along the left-right dimension

The evolution of the ratio between the saliency of left-right and centre-periphery issues in the regional manifestos of CIU and PNV is shown in Figure 6. Three findings can be highlighted. First, the programmatic agenda linked to the left-right dimension has always been more salient (or at least equally important) than the pro-periphery goals of both regionalist parties, except for the 1990 Basque parliamentary elections. As long as they enjoy a good reputation as competent political actors in managing the economy, it is reasonable that both parties show off their skills including a big share of left-right proposals in their electoral programmes.

Figure 6: Ratio between the saliency of left-right and territorial issues, 1980-2012



Source: Gómez, Braulio; Sonia Alonso and Laura Cabeza. Regional Manifestos Project [CSO2009-11241]. Programa Nacional de I+D+i, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Gobierno de España.


Second, both regionalist parties show a similar amount of variability over time. The ratio ranges from 0.4 to 1.2 for PNV and from 0.4 to 1 in CIU's manifesto. Therefore, the elasticity of their strategies is equivalent. They choose to focus on centre-periphery issues or to compete along the left-right dimension according to the specific political context in which the regional elections take place. In fact, the cycles in which they intensify their nationalist agenda do not coincide.

Third, if we exclude the first regional election held in 1980, PNV seems to show a decreasing emphasis on the centre-periphery demands with respect to left-right issues, while CIU's movements are more pendular over time.

If we turn the attention towards the position of both parties on the left-right dimension, we find that from the late 80s to the 2009-2010 elections, PNV and CIU have been portraying a similar

ideology, defending a moderate right-wing programme at the beginning of this period that turns gradually into a centrist one (Figure 7). The 2012 regional elections represented a shift in this trend. PNV experienced a dramatic move towards the right, while CIU opted for keeping a moderate position on the left-right scale.

Figure 7: Programmatic position of CIU and PNV along the left-right dimension




Source: Gómez, Braulio; Sonia Alonso and Laura Cabeza. Regional Manifestos Project [CSO2009-11241]. Programa Nacional de I+D+i, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Gobierno de España.

4.2.2. The strategies regarding the centre-periphery dimension

When analyzing the position of CIU and PNV along the centre-periphery dimension, it emerges the same picture that we have already seen through the saliency ratio in Figure 6. Here it is even clearer that the agenda related to pro-periphery goals has been drastically reduced in the manifestos of PNV (Figure 7). Specifically, in the 1980 Basque parliamentary election, 20 per cent of all the electoral proposals of PNV were related with the political status of the region and the Basque identity, while in the last elections they hardly reached 11 per cent, half the space.

The year in which the PNV was giving less emphasis to centre-periphery issues coincides with the one in which CIU's nationalist agenda was at the top of its programmatic priorities. In a period of only two years, the positional score of the Catalan regionalist party increased from 9.1 in 2010 regional elections to almost 20 in the last elections held in 2012.

Figure 8: Programmatic position of CIU and PNV along the centre-periphery dimension




Source: Gómez, Braulio; Sonia Alonso and Laura Cabeza. Regional Manifestos Project [CSO2009-11241]. Programa Nacional de I+D+i, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Gobierno de España.

Finally, we find a higher propensity to mobilize issues of regional culture and language by PNV. The identitarian component of PNV's pro-periphery demands fluctuated between 55 per cent in the 1990 elections to nearly 80 per cent in the last elections held in 2012 (Figure 9). This result is not surprising since the Basque Country is the Spanish region with the highest degree of self-government and number of transferred competences. Unlike Catalonia, the Basque Country is granted full fiscal autonomy as a result of the decentralization process set in motion in 1978 at the beginning of the Spanish transition to democracy. The Spanish Constitution protects the historical fiscal rights of the Basque territories ('fueros'), which means that the Basque Country (and Navarra) collect their own taxes and negotiate with the central government how much of their tax revenue will be allotted to the Spanish state.

CIU's strategy on the centre-periphery dimension has been more subtle and it has alternated between years in which nation-building policies were at the heart of the pro-periphery proposals and years in which the emphasis was placed on devolution of competencies. The manifesto in which the competential component took larger precedence over the identitarian one was the one released for the 1999 Catalan parliamentary elections: 76 per cent of all the pro-periphery proposals were devoted to claim for further devolution (Figure 9). This was the first Catalan elections held after José Maria Aznar (PP) took office as President of the Spanish government with the support of CIU and PNV.

Figure 9: Identitarian versus competential issues inside the territorial dimension



Source: Gómez, Braulio; Sonia Alonso and Laura Cabeza. Regional Manifestos Project [CSO2009-11241]. Programa Nacional de I+D+i, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Gobierno de España.

4.2.3. The influence of the economic context in the strategies of CIU and PNV

Finally, we wonder how CIU and PNV react to the regional economic context. Do they implement similar strategies under similar economic conditions? Since 1980, the regional economy in Catalonia and the Basque Country has experimented positive and negative cycles, as periods of economic expansion and contraction have played out over time. Table 7 shows the Pearson's correlation between the regional unemployment rate and both CIU's and PNV's left-right positions and the ratio among the left-right and the centre-periphery dimensions introduced in section 4.1.1.

Table 7: Correlation between the unemployment rate and the programmatic stances

	Unemployment rate	
	CIU	PNV
Left-right position	-0.835	0.215
Ratio left-right / centre-periphery saliency	0.288	-0.029

CIU and PNV do not exhibit the same behaviour in the face of a deterioration of the economic conditions in their respective regions. CIU seems to react to the rise of unemployment in Catalonia by placing more relative emphasis on the centre-periphery dimension and by adopting a more moderate position on the left-right scale. By contrast, the equilibrium between the two dimensions of competition in PNV's manifestos is not altered when the economy goes wrong in the Basque Country. This party reacts to the adverse economic conditions by moving towards the right in the ideological dimension, while their territorial stances remain stable. The differences between PNV and CIU have gained visibility in the 2012 regional parliamentary elections. PNV has postponed

the pro-periphery agenda to focus on the economic recovery, while the crisis has fuelled the pro-periphery demands of CIU.

Conclusion

First and foremost, our data confirm that the regionalist party family is highly heterogeneous in its pro-periphery positions. Regionalist parties adapt their regional manifestos to the regional context in which they compete. It also gives us some novel and suggestive clues about the relationship between left-right and centre-periphery positions.

We have found evidences of variation between and within regions, and also over time: a) Inter-regional variation (due to the social, economic and political context – existence of a distinctive language and regional culture, type of nationalist option and number of regionalist parties, etc.). Example: historical versus non-historical regions, complete versus truncated nationalist option; b) Variation between parties of the same region (ideology). Example: right- versus left-wing parties, differential behaviour of new parties as CUP and AGE; c) Variation of the same parties over time (short-term factors). Example: CIU and PNV adopting different strategies.

STILL TO BE COMPLETED

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ANNEX

1. RMP Classification scheme

Each quasi-sentences of a manifestos is coded by assigning to it one of the 76 policy categories or sub-categories (1.1) and one of the 20 territorial preferences (1.2). The two codes are divided by a low hyphen: XX_YYY or XX_YYYY.

1.1. Standard policy categories (three digits) and regional sub-categories (four digits):

Domain 1: External Relations	Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life
101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive	501 Environmental Protection: Positive
1017 Interregional Special Relationships: Positive	502 Culture: Positive
102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative	503 Equality: Positive
1027 Interregional Special Relationships: Negative	5032 Equal treatment of immigrants
103 Anti-Imperialism: Positive	504 Welfare State Expansion
104 Military: Positive	5042 Welfare for immigrants
105 Military: Negative	505 Welfare State Limitation
106 Peace: Positive	5051 Welfare limitations for immigrants
107 Internationalism: Positive	506 Education Expansion
108 European Integration: Positive	5062 Education Expansion for Immigrants
109 Internationalism: Negative	507 Education Limitation
110 European Integration: Negative	5071 Education Limitation for Immigrants
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy	Domain 6: Fabric of Society
201 Freedom and Human Rights: Positive	601 National Way of Life: Positive
202 Democracy: Positive	6015 Promotion and Protection of Vernacular Language(s)
2024 Representative Democracy: Positive	6016 Cultural links with Diaspora
2025 Participatory Democracy: Positive	6017 Bilingualism: Positive
203 Constitutionalism: Positive	602 National Way of Life: Negative
204 Constitutionalism: Negative	603 Traditional Morality: Positive
Domain 3: Political System	604 Traditional Morality: Negative
301 Decentralization: Positive	605 Law and Order: Positive
3012 Sub-state Finance: Positive	6051 Immigrants' negative impact on law and order
3013 Differential Treatment among Regions: Negative	606 Civic Mindedness: Positive
3014 Differential Treatment among Regions: Positive	607 Multiculturalism: Positive
302 Centralization: Positive	608 Multiculturalism: Negative
303 Governmental and Administrative	Domain 7: Social Groups
3031 Administration of Justice	701 Labour Groups: Positive
304 Political Corruption	702 Labour Groups: Negative
305 Political Authority: Positive	703 Agriculture: Positive
Domain 4: Economy	704 Middle Class and Professional Groups: Positive
401 Free Enterprise: Positive	705 Underprivileged Minority Groups: Positive
402 Incentives: Positive	7053 Immigrants: Positive
403 Market Regulation: Positive	7054 Diaspora: Positive
404 Economic Planning: Positive	706 Non-Economic Demographic Groups: Positive
405 Corporatism: Positive	
406 Protectionism: Positive	
407 Protectionism: Negative	000 No meaningful category applies
408 Economic Goals	
409 Keynesian Demand Management: Positive	
410 Productivity: Positive	
411 Technology and Infrastructure: Positive	
4111 Management of Natural Resources	
412 Controlled Economy: Positive	
413 Nationalisation: Positive	
414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive	
415 Marxist Analysis: Positive	
416 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive	

1.2. Territorial preferences: CXX

Codes	Meaning
10	Local level
11	Less authority for the local level
12	More authority for the local level
20	Regional level
21	Less authority for the regional level
22	More authority for the regional level
30	National level
31	Less authority for the national level
32	More authority for the regional level
80	European level
81	Less authority for the European level
82	More authority for the European level
90	International level
91	Less authority for the international level
92	More authority for the international level
01	In favour of subsidiary principle
02	In favour of clear (jurisdictional) distinction between levels (accountability)
03	In favour of shared authority between some levels, including explicit calls for cooperation or coordination between higher and lower levels (vertical cooperation).
09	More than one level addressed at the same time, all levels addressed at the same time.
00	No level of government

Detailed definitions of each code can be found in the RMP Codebook:

<http://www.regionalmanifestosproject.com/>

2. The RMP categories of the centre-periphery and the left-right dimensions

2.1. Left-right dimension (Based on Laver and Budge, 1992)

	Coding number	Definition
Left	CXX_103	Anti-imperialism (any level of government)
	CXX_105	Anti-militarism (any level of government)
	CXX_106	Pacifism (any level of government)
	CXX_107	Internationalism (any level of government)
	CXX_403	Market regulation (any level of government)
	CXX_404	Economic planning (any level of government)
	CXX_406	Protectionism: positive (any level of government)
	CXX_412	Controlled economy (any level of government)
	CXX_413	Nationalization of industries (any level of government)
	CXX_701	Support for labour groups, working class, trade unions
	CXX_202	Support for democracy (any level of government)
	CXX_2024	Improving representative democracy (any level of government)
	CXX_2025	Calls for participatory democracy (any level of government)
Right	CXX_104	Militarism: positive (any level of government)
	CXX_201	Freedom and individualism (any level of government)
	C30_203	Constitutionalism
	CXX_305	Political authority: positive (any level of government)
	CXX_401	Free enterprise (any level of government)
	CXX_402	Incentives (any level of government)
	CXX_407	Protectionism: negative (any level of government)
	CXX_414	Economic orthodoxy (any level of government)
	CXX_505	Welfare state limitation (any level of government)
	CXX_507	Limiting state expenditure on education (any level of government)
	CXX_603	Traditional morality: positive (any level of government)
	CXX_605	Law and order: positive (any level of government)
	CXX_606	Appeals for national solidarity (any level of government)

2.2. Centre-periphery dimension (Based on Alonso et. al, 2013)

	Coding number	Definition
Periphery	C22_YYY(Y)	All policy preference categories that come with a 22 code (i.e. more competencies/authority for the peripheral territory)
	C31_YYY(Y)	All policy preference categories that come with a 31 code (i.e. fewer competencies/authority for the central state)
	C20_601	Promotion of [regional] nation-building policies
	C20_6015	Promotion of [regional] nation language
	C20_6016	[Regional] cultural links with the Diaspora
	C20_608	[Regional] cultural assimilation of immigrants
	C30_602	Statements against state nationalism
	C20_301	General statements in favour of decentralization at the regional level
	C30_301	In favour of a federal o decentralization state
	C20_3013	In favour of a symmetrical decentralized state
	C20_3014	In favour of an asymmetrical decentralized state
	Centre	C32_YYY(Y)
C21_YYY(Y)		All policy preference categories that come with a 21 code (i.e. fewer competencies/authority for the peripheral territory)
C20_602		Statements against peripheral nationalism or regionalism.
C30_601		Promotion of [state] nation-building policies
C30_6015		Promotion of [state] nation language
C30_6016		[State] cultural links with the Diaspora
C20_608		[State] cultural assimilation of immigrants
C20_302		General statements against decentralization at the regional level
C30_302		In favour of centralisation or re-centralisation at the state level

2.3. The sub-components of the centre-periphery dimension

Identitarian issues	C20_601 + C20_6015 + C20_6016 + C20_608 + C22_601+ C22_6015 + C22_6016 + C30_602
Competential issues	C22_YYY(Y) - [C22_601+ C22_6015 + C22_6016] + C20_301 + C20_3013 + C20_3014 + C30_301

3. Operationalisation of saliency and position along the territorial and the left-right dimensions

	Territorial dimension	Left-right Dimension	Theoretical range
Saliency	$S_{cp} = \frac{P + C}{N}$	$S_{lr} = \frac{R + L}{N}$	From 0 to 100
Position	$P_{cp} = \frac{P - C}{N}$	$P_{lr} = \frac{R - L}{N}$	From -100 to 100

Where:

P = Number of quasi-sentences in a manifesto assigned to the ‘periphery’ categories

C = Number of quasi-sentences in a manifesto assigned to the ‘centre’ categories

R = Number of quasi-sentences in a manifesto assigned to the ‘right’ categories

L = Number of quasi-sentences in a manifesto assigned to the ‘left’ categories

N = Total number of quasi-sentences in a manifesto