

Nationalist parties and voting in the Balearic Islands

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1. Introduction

This chapter attempts to shed some new light on the electoral performance of nationalist parties in the Balearic Islands. The vote for this group of political actors, at least in Western Europe, has been traditionally explained by the role of a regional identity that is different from the dominant type of identity in the state in which that nationalist vote takes place (Perez-Nievas and Bonet 2006). It is not the purpose of this piece to question the validity of this explanation but to complement it by analysing the relevance of other potentially important factors that could explain the vote for these parties in the Balearic Islands. For this reason, I will briefly analyse the role played by other variables such as ideology and short-term evaluations.

One of the aims of this chapter is therefore to explore the relative weight of regional identities in determining the vote for parties whose main focus is not Spain in the Balearic Islands. The main alternative explanation I will look at will be based on spatial models of electoral behaviour. Ever since the path-breaking work of Anthony Downs (1957), this type of approach has been traditionally adopted in electoral studies. Researchers have adapted the spatial model to the analysis of political systems in which more than one type of national identity coexist by arguing that in such cases electoral competition takes place in a two-dimensional space: the classical left-right spectrum and an additional continuum on which one might place the electorate's preferences in terms of national identity. Spain is a country rich in such systems, and one of these systems is obviously the Balearic Islands.

Indeed, there are in Spain several regional party systems with features considerably different from the national party system (Vallés 1991). The difference is most frequently due to the impact of one or more parties that articulate a different (non-Spanish, or at least not primarily) type of identity. The most consolidated of such systems, where nationalist parties have controlled regional governments almost exclusively since the early 1980s, can be found in the Basque Country and Catalonia (Linz and Montero 1999). However, we also find important nationalist parties in Valencia, Navarra, Galicia, the Canary Islands, and, obviously, the Balearic Islands. In fact, the continuous presence that some of these parties have enjoyed in the Balearic Parliament has contributed to the configuration of a multiparty system of moderate pluralism in which: a) the number of parties is higher than two but still limited and b) the direction of the competition is centripetal (Sartori 1976). As a consequence

of the former, the major right-wing party (i.e., AP/PP) has been sometimes able to obtain a majority of seats and form single-party governments. The latter, in turn, can be explained by the presence of a small centrist nationalist party (i.e., UM) with which the two major ones on either side of the political spectrum (i.e., AP/PP and PSIB-PSOE) may form a coalition cabinet.

Combining insights from theories of national identity, spatial politics, and candidate-centred elections, this study provides the first comprehensive test of the determinants of the vote for nationalist parties in the Balearic Islands at the regional level. The findings indicate that voters with a stronger regional identity, that place them on the left of the ideological continuum, and that consider the Socialist regional prime ministers but not the Conservative ones to be trustworthy are more likely to vote for these parties. However, the results also indicate that the effect of some of these factors is no consistent over time. In so doing, they illustrate the importance of taking into account the dynamics present in the platforms of the parties and their coalitional strategies.

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2, I look at the evolution of the Balearic party system since the early 1980s by specially focusing on the electoral performance and policy proposals of the nationalist parties. In section 3, I develop a socio-demographic, ideological and political profile of the voters of nationalist parties in this region. In sections 4 and 5, I present the methods and data employed, and empirical evidence about the traits of nationalist voters in the Balearic Islands, respectively. Finally, section 6 concludes.

2. The Balearic party system and its nationalist parties

The Parliament of the Balearic Islands consists of a single house composed of 59 (54 in the first term) members directly elected by universal adult suffrage for a four-year term of office. Each of the archipelago's four main islands – Majorca, Minorca, Ibiza and Formentera - is an electoral district. Majorca elects 33 MPs, while Minorca, Ibiza and Formentera elect 13, 12 and 1, respectively. As in the system employed to elect the members of the Spanish Congress of Deputies, parties, federations, coalitions and electors' groups present closed lists of candidates; electors then cast a ballot for a single list; and seats in the three biggest constituencies are apportioned according to the D'Hondt method¹ among lists receiving at

¹ The candidate/list receiving more votes wins the seat in Formentera.

least five percent of all valid votes cast in the constituency, including blank ballots.² It should be pointed out that the Balearic electoral system favours the three small islands at the expense of Majorca. For example, in the 2011 regional election, each Minorca MP represented about 5,000 electors, but in Majorca the same figure rose to more than 17,000 electors. It should also be noted that the five percent barrier is relevant only in Majorca: in the remaining two multi-member districts (i.e., Minorca and Ibiza), the D'Hondt method and the low district magnitude create a *de facto* representation threshold which is higher than the barrier set forth by law.

Between the first free elections held in Spain in June 1977 and the most recent general elections of November 2011 there have been eleven general elections (to the Spanish Parliament) (1977, 1979, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2011) and eight regional elections (to the Balearic Parliament) (1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011) in the Islands. As can be seen in Table 1, only three political parties have managed to survive throughout the entire period and obtain seats in all the elections. These are AP/PP (*Alianza Popular/Partido Popular*, Popular Alliance/Popular Party), the PSIB-PSOE (*Partit Socialista de les Illes Balears-Partido Socialista Obrero Español*, Socialist Party of the Balearic Islands-Spanish Worker Socialist Party), and the PSM-EN (*Partit Socialista de Mallorca-Entesa Nacionalista*, Socialist Party of Majorca-Nationalist Agreement).³ Other two parties were present in the regional chamber in more than one term: UM (*Unió Mallorquina*, Majorcan Union) and the PCIB/EUIB (*Partit Comunista de les Illes Balears/Esquerra Unida de les Illes Balears*, Communist Party of the Balearic Islands/United Left of the Balearic Islands). I have grouped these different parties under two categories: *nationalist parties* versus *state-wide parties*. This, however, needs some explanation and qualification.

(Table 1 about here)

Starting with what I have labelled as state-wide parties, we find the regional branches of the three main Spanish parties: AP/PP, PSIB-PSOE and PCIB/EUIB. The first two have been the only parties that have managed to occupy the regional Presidency at some point of the current democratic period. AP/PP and PSIB-PSOE have been present in Balearic politics since 1983 while the PCIB/EUIB has failed to obtain representation in the regional Parliament in two occasions: 1983 and 2011. All of them have maintained some type of

² The legal threshold was of 3% in the first three regional elections, but the PP changed it in 1995 in order to prevent UM from entering the Parliament.

³ The *Partit Socialista de Menorca* (PSM, Socialist Party of Minorca) has also obtained representation in all the regional elections to date, but has run in coalition with other political forces in five out of eight occasions.

relationship with organisations at the state-wide level since 1977 (federal in the case of the left-wing parties). Yet, unlike their Catalan counterparts, the local branches of the PSOE and IU (*Izquierda Unida*, United Left) do not define the Balearic Islands as a nation. Despite this reluctance, Balearic nationalism has also permeated the PSIB and EUIB and we often find these two parties opposing the PP on issues connected with the nationalist dimension such as language politics.⁴

Turning now to nationalist parties, that will be the main object of study in this chapter, we find two political forces: PSM-EN and UM. These are parties whose organisational domain and action are exclusively limited to the Balearic Islands. Moreover, both parties consider that the decisions that affect the Balearic citizens should be mainly adopted at the subnational level. However, it is important to note that, contrary to what happens in other Spanish regions, there is not a unique nationalist feeling across the four islands (Saurina 2003). The overall lack of a Balearic identity has hampered the emergence of a strong nationalist in the Islands.

The PSM-EN has been the main left-wing nationalist party in the Balearic Islands throughout the current democratic period with vote shares that range in regional elections between 4.96% (in 1987) and 11.13% (in 1995).⁵ Table 2 shows the electoral performance of the PSM-EN at the regional level over time in more detail. Ideologically speaking, the party has increasingly adopted a more moderate stance (Sánchez i Picanyol 1998). The party currently defines itself as “democratic, nationalist, progressive and ecologist”, and “advocates the right of the people of Majorca to decide its own future” (PSM 2013: 1). The PSM emerged in December 1977 when a part of the PSI (*Partit Socialista de les Illes*, Socialist Party of the Islands) refused to join the PSOE. During the first three regional terms, the institutional representation of the PSM was exclusively confined to Majorca. In the 1995 elections, the PSM ran in coalition with the Socialist Party of Minorca (PSM, *Partit Socialista de Menorca*) and the Nationalist and Ecologist Agreement of Ibiza (ENE, *Entesa Nacionalista i Ecologista*), obtaining its best results ever in that occasion and winning, as a result, six seats in the regional Parliament (that is, five per Majorca and one per Minorca). In 1998, the party strengthened its alliance with these other progressive and nationalist parties by forming the PSM-EN. Although the PSM-EN has usually stayed in opposition, it participated in the regional centre-left governments led by Francesc Antich (PSIB-PSOE)

⁴ For example, Cosme Bonet’s (PSIB-PSOE, regional MP) statement about the main PP’s policy against the Catalan language at the regional level in the last term: <http://www.abc.es/agencias/noticia.asp?noticia=1686965>.

⁵ Discrepancies between Tables 1 and 2 arise from the fact that the votes of the *Partit Socialista de Menorca* are not added to the total vote of the PSM-EN in the former.

from 1999 to 2003, and between 2007 and 2011. It also formed part of the centre-left coalition cabinets at the insular level in Majorca from 1995 to 2003, and between 2007 and 2011.⁶

(Table 2 about here)

The PSM-EN has tried to obtain representation in the Spanish Parliament by forming several different pre-electoral coalitions in the three last general elections. Despite these attempts, the party has not managed to obtain any seat at the national level.⁷ In the two last regional elections to date, the party has also run in coalition with other political forces. In 2007, the PSM-EN formed the *Bloc per Mallorca* (Bloc for Majorca) with EUIB, *Els Verds* (EV, Green Party) and *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC, Republican Left of Catalonia). Although the Bloc managed to obtain four MPs in Majorca (two were for the PSM) in that occasion, some members of the party that were against the decision of forming the Bloc left the party and constituted a new political option: *Entesa per Mallorca* (EM, Agreement for Majorca). The new party did not manage to obtain any seat in the only regional elections it contested on its own in 2007. On the eve of the 2011 regional elections, the Bloc collapsed and a new party called *Iniciativa Verds* (IV, Initiative Greens) formed by the Green Party and former United Left members emerged. The PSM-EN decided to form a pre-electoral coalition with this new party and *Entesa per Mallorca* that obtained three seats in the 2011 regional elections (including two for the PSM-EN). This coalition became a new party called *Més per Mallorca* (More for Majorca) in 2013. The aim of the new party is to constitute “a third different political space which would be left-wing, ecologist, nationalist, and radically democratic” (Més 2013: 1).

UM was an important player in Balearic politics until its demise in 2011 as a result of its centrist ideology, and it tried since the very beginning to emulate the success of *Convergència i Unió* (CiU) and the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV) in Catalonia and the Basque Country, respectively (Sánchez i Picanyol 1998). The party has its origin in the collapse of the *Unión de Centro de Democrático* (UCD, Union of the Democratic Centre) in the fall of 1982. On the eve of the founding regional elections in 1983, UM emerged as a moderate nationalist/regionalist party that, however, defined itself as liberal. This strategy worked out, and the newly branded party obtained its best results ever with 15.13% of the

⁶ In contrast, the evidence regarding the coalitions of the PSM-EN in European Parliament elections is more mixed, and comprises agreements with centre-right (like in 1994, 1999 and 2004) and centre-left (like in 1987, 1989 and 2009) nationalist parties from other parts of Spain.

⁷ In contrast, Pere Sampol (PSM-EN) was national Senator representing the regional Chamber between 2007 and 2011.

overall vote, and six seats in the regional Parliament. Table 3 shows the electoral performance of UM at the regional level over time in more detail. In the next elections, its vote shares have ranged between 9.04% (in 1987) and 5.31% (in 1995). Originally linked to the PDL (*Partido Demócrata Liberal*, Democratic Liberal Party), UM participated in the formation of the PRD (*Partido Reformista Democrático*, Democratic Reformist Party) in 1984. In 1993, it merged with the *Unió Independent de Mallorca* (UIM, Independent Union of Majorca) and *Convergència Balear* (CB, Balearic Convergence). Despite its institutional representation has always been confined to Majorca, UM forged alliances with *Independents per Menorca* (IM, Independents for Menorca) and *Unió de Centristes de Menorca* (UCM, Union of Centrists of Minorca) in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

(Table 3 about here)

As a centre-right liberal party, it supported the minority government of Gabriel Cañellas (AP/PP) between 1983 and 1987, and participated in the coalition government led by him from 1987 to 1991. This strategy became even deeper in the 1991 regional elections, when the party ran in coalition with the PP. As a consequence of all this process, UM's vote shares considerably declined. On the one hand, its most radical voters stopped supporting it. On the other, some of their leaders (and voters) felt attracted by the moderate regionalism advocated by the PP. Despite these desertions, UM continued its alliances with other political forces and, despite the PP had obtained a majority of seats in 2003, UM also voted the investiture of Jaume Matas as regional President. In contrast, UM supported the first centre-left coalition government at the regional level led by Francesc Antich (1999-2003), and participated in the second one (2007-2011). The historical leader of UM Maria Antònia Munar was in return elected President of Majorca with the votes of the left-wing parties and the PP between 1995 and 2003 and 2003 and 2007, respectively.

Following a number of political scandals, the party decided to disband in February 2011 and establish a new party called *Convergència per les Illes* (CI, Convergence for the Islands).⁸ The idea of initiating a new political project emerged in order to avoid “dragging a cross that is not ours”,⁹ and leave behind the many corruption cases that affected UM. In the only election the new party contested on its own in 2011, it failed to enter the regional and insular parliaments, but obtained representation in some municipalities with several mayors and about 60 local councilors. In November 2012, Convergence merged with three other

⁸ http://elpais.com/elpais/2011/02/28/actualidad/1298884643_850215.html.

⁹ Words of Josep Melià, last President of UM, (<http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/02/28/baleares/1298928038.html>.)

Balearic regionalist and nationalist formations—*Lliga Regionalista de les Illes Balears*, *Unió Menorquina* and *Es Nou Partit*—to form *Proposta per les Illes* (PI, Proposal for the Islands). According to the documents of the new party, PI is a “balearist, catch-all and centrist party, which aims to promote the economic, social and institutional development of Majorca, Minorca, Ibiza and Formentera” (PI 2012: 1).

I will close this initial descriptive section by briefly examining vote transfers between parties over time and across tiers. From an aggregate perspective, there is near-uniform consensus on measuring electoral volatility using the well-known Pedersen Index (1979): $VT = \frac{1}{2} \sum |\Delta p_i|$, where Δp_i represents the change in the percentage of votes received by each party in time periods t and t_1 . If we calculate this index for all the regional elections held until 2011, we find that electoral volatility is relatively low in the Balearic Islands, with values that range from 5.3% in 2003 to 18.6% in 1991. From this limited information, we can conclude that the Balearic electorate is relatively stable. However, using this kind of information is not completely satisfactory because it enables us to capture only imperfectly the exact size of the exchange of voters. Moreover, it is not possible to disentangle with such data which precise vote transfers are taking place. These two main flaws force me to turn to individual data for my analysis.

By using surveys conducted by the Spanish Centre of Sociological Research (*Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* or CIS), Tables 4 and 5 display vote transfers between general and regional elections from 1986 onwards.¹⁰ Entries in the tables should be read as the proportion of voters of each nationalist party in the respective regional election that voted for that party or a different one in the previous general election. Although the validity of any conclusion is somehow limited because of the low number of cases in each cell, and the fact that PSM-EN and UM are not listed among the possible answers in some of the surveys, these preliminary data confirm that a considerable amount of nationalist voters in regional elections voted for a different party in the previous general election. On average, about five out of ten respondents that voted for the PSM-EN in regional elections did so in the previous general election as well. This figure is even lower in the case of UM (that is, three out of ten). It is by no means surprising that the main vote transfers take place within ideological blocs. In other words, significant portions of the PSM-EN electorate in the regional elections vote for the PSOE in the previous general election while an important group of UM voters in regional elections vote for AP/PP in the previous general election.

¹⁰ It has not been possible to obtain data for the electoral cycle 1982-83.

(Tables 4 and 5 about here)

Finally, Figures 1 and 2 show how regular differences in vote shares of nationalist parties can also be observed across electoral arenas in the Balearic Islands. More specifically, we see that nationalist parties in the Balearic Islands perform systematically better in regional elections than in national (either general or European) elections, with local elections somewhere in the middle although the pattern for the latter is far from clear. In other words, PSM-EN and UM's vote shares follow a similar pattern than the nationalist parties in Catalonia except in the 2004 general election, when the PSM-EN ran in coalition with United Left, ERC and the Green Party under the label of *Progressistes per les Illes Balears* (Progressists for the Balearic Islands). Hence, we cannot overlook the considerable variation that the vote shares between types of elections present in the case of the parties object of this study (i.e., PSM-EN and UM).

(Figures 1 and 2 about here)

3. The electoral behaviour of Balearic voters: Possible explanations

Taking into consideration the insights provided by previous works on the topic, the reasons for the vote for nationalist parties in the Balearic Islands are analysed here through the assessment of three groups of hypotheses. Specifically, the causal mechanisms that I intend to explore are the following: national identity, ideology and evaluation of the regional prime minister.

First of all, national identities have been a much studied topic in Spain, particularly in Catalonia, either at a descriptive level (Martinez-Herrera 2002; Montero and Torcal 1990) or as a predictor of vote for nationalist parties (Argelaguet 2006; Pérez-Nievas and Bonet 2006). According to Linz (1985), this is the concept that best represents the nationalist attitudes of respondents. This leads us to think that national identity could be a good explanatory factor of the vote for the parties that are the object of study here. The empirical evidence on the relationship between this variable and the vote for nationalist parties in other communities is considerable. For example, Argelaguet (2006) shows that those Catalans that consider themselves more Catalan than Spanish or only Catalan are more likely to vote either for CiU or for ERC, while the modal choice for those that consider themselves more Spanish than Catalan or only Spanish is the PSC-PSOE. Finally, those with a dual identity are divided almost equally between the PSC-PSOE (32.0%) and CiU (25.4%). Similarly, Pérez Nievas and Bonet (2006) provide consistent evidence of the positive impact that regional identity (in the case of ERC) and the advocacy of further devolution (in the case of CiU and ERC) have

on the propensity to vote for these two parties. In short, I put forward the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The more identified with the Balearic Islands the individual, the more likely to vote for a nationalist party (either PSM-EN or UM) rather than the PP.

Prospective models of electoral behaviour (Downs, 1957) assume that the voter compares the gains in utility in the present term with those that she would have obtained if the opposition party would have been in government. The difference between these two figures determines to a larger extent the vote choice. Given the quite demanding informational requirements of these models, Downs proposes a tool to evaluate alternative policies: the ideology. Ideology is an information shortcut that allows the voter to self-place and place parties on the political spectrum. Although more recent studies include other variables in the electoral equation (e.g., capacity and ideological consistency for the Spanish case in Sánchez-Cuenca 2008), the ideology happens to be the largest component in prospective analyses of electoral behavior.

There are basically three approaches to the study of the effect of ideology on vote choice: proximity, direction and compensation. If we only focus on those studies that cover the Spanish case, several scholars initially suggested that ideology was largely irrelevant to explain vote choice in regional elections (Llera Ramo 1994; Molas 1992; Padró-Solanet and Colomer 1992). Despite this apparent consensus, more recent studies have cast doubts on the validity of this idea (Fernandez-Albertos 2002; Pallares and Font 1994; Pérez-Nievas and Fraile 2000). In order to study the potential effect of ideology on the vote for nationalist parties in the Balearic Islands, I will first place the parties on the left-right continuum based on citizens' opinions.¹¹ Table 6 displays the results. According to these data, the two nationalist parties of the Balearic Islands are more left-wing than the PP. For this reason, I put forward the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2a: The more right-wing the individual, the less likely to vote for a nationalist party (either PSM-EN or UM) rather than the PP.

Hypothesis 2b: The more right-wing the individual, the less likely to vote for the PSM-EN rather than the PSOE.

Hypothesis 2c: The more right-wing the individual, the more likely to vote for UM rather than the PSOE.

¹¹ Sources: 2610, 2829 and 2956 surveys conducted by the CIS.

(Table 6 about here)

Finally, two of the traditionally most relevant predictors of party choice, social class and party identification, seem to have lost explanatory power in recent times (Curtice and Holmberg 2005; Franklin et al. 1992). Candidates' valence, by contrast, gives the impression of having gained importance in recent years, in spite of the growing cynicism of voters towards politicians (Norris, 1999; Pharr and Putnam, 2000). According to Bosch and Rico (2003), the process of the personalization of politics by which leaders have become increasingly decisive in election outcomes may be identified at four different levels: institutions (Barberá 2010; Carey and Shugart 1995; McAllister 2007), political communication (Butler and Ranney 1992; Mughan 2000; Swanson and Mancini 1996), the electorate (Dalton 1996), and political parties (Scarrow et al. 2000).

Although these assertions lead to the expectation that the quality of candidates fundamentally shapes voters' behaviour, the importance of the process of personalization still needs to be empirically tested. On the one hand, the idea that the evaluation of candidates affects party choice receives weak support in the six democracies (that is, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) examined by Curtice and Holmberg (2005). On the other, Rico (2009) demonstrates the important effect of political leaders in Spanish elections. In fact, going to the regional level and using evidence from Catalonia again, we see that voters in that region who evaluated the Catalan prime minister very positively in 1999 voted for the regional incumbent even when evaluating his economic policies negatively (Riba and Díaz 2002). Likewise, Liñeira (2011) and Riera (2013) demonstrate that key valence variables, such as the evaluation of CiU's and PSC's regional candidates, have strong and significant effects on dual voting in Catalonia. To sum up, and despite some negative findings, I argue that evaluations of regional prime ministers have an impact on the likelihood of casting a vote for a nationalist party in the Balearic Islands:

Hypothesis 3: The more favourable the evaluation of the regional prime minister, the higher the likelihood of voting for the regional incumbent. This implies that:

Hypothesis 3a: The more favourable the evaluation of the regional minister, the higher the likelihood of voting for the PSM-EN between 1999 and 2003, and 2007 and 2011;

Hypothesis 3b: The more favourable the evaluation of the regional minister, the lower the likelihood of voting for the PSM-EN before 1999, between 2003 and 2007, and after 2011;

Hypothesis 3c: The more favourable the evaluation of the regional minister, the higher the likelihood of voting for UM between 1991 and 1995, and 2007 and 2011;

Hypothesis 3d: The more favourable the evaluation of the regional minister, the lower the likelihood of voting for UM between 1995 and 1999.¹²

4. Methods and data

In order to test these hypotheses, I use individual data provided by the CIS. The centre is an independent agency, with its own legal status and funding, that depends on the *Ministerio de la Presidencia* of the Spanish Government and whose purpose is to conduct scientific studies of the Spanish society. More specifically, the data employed include pre and post-electoral surveys (for regional elections), and studies conducted in the middle of the regional terms (the so-called autonomic barometers). Three main advantages of CIS studies justify their use. First, the combination of surveys conducted in different points of time of almost all the regional terms allows me to focus on the appropriate timing to measure the potential effect of our explanatory factors. Second, the availability of measures of national identity and voters' ideological positions, and relevant control variables makes these data ideal for the specific research question motivating this chapter. Third, the coordinated strategies of the CIS team in order to homogenize measurement instruments and survey questionnaires is perfect for a study that aims to introduce a large-N over-time design and to reach the highest degree of external validity possible.

There are two main groups of surveys carried out by the CIS on electoral sociology in the Balearic Islands. Table 7 displays a full list of them with all their relevant variables. On the one hand, similarly to what happens when a general election takes place, the CIS conducts surveys when regional elections are held. There are two types of electoral surveys: pre-electoral, that is, conducted before the election day, and post-electoral, that is, carried out after the election. It is important to note that no survey was conducted when the first regional election was held in 1983. On the other hand, the CIS conducts midterm surveys on the situation of each region since 1992. These surveys are known as Autonomic Barometers since 2005. This second group of surveys is richer than the previous one, and will be mainly used in the econometric analyses.

(Table 7 about here)

The main independent variables (i.e., national identity, left-right ideology and evaluation of the regional Prime Minister) are explained in the appendix. We also have the geographical location variable, whose values range from 1 to 5 if the town in which the

¹² I do not have clear expectations for UM between 1999 and 2007 because it is not in government but externally supports it in Parliament. As I previously argue, UM is disbanded before the 2011 regional election.

respondent lives has fewer than 2,000 inhabitants, between 2,001 and 10,000 inhabitants, between 10,001 and 50,000, between 50,001 and 100,000, and between 100,001 and 400,000, respectively. *Social Class* takes value 1 to 5 if the respondent is a non-qualified worker, a qualified worker, old middle class, new middle class, or high class, respectively. Finally, *religiosity* measures how frequently the respondent goes to church: 1 = seldom; 2 = several times a year; 3 = once a month; 4 = almost every Sunday and religious holidays; and 5 = several times a week.¹³

Despite the availability of data on seven out of eight regional elections, the limited number of observations in each study has forced me to combine the whole set of samples in the last analysis in order to maximize statistical leverage and avoid possible type II errors. I use two dependent variables in my analyses: while the first one distinguishes between voters of the PSM-EN and voters of UM, the second dependent variable combines them in one single category.¹⁴ As for the measures of nationalism, I rely on the so-called “Moreno question” (Moreno 1986) and voters’ constitutional preferences on forms of devolution. Moreover, all respondents are asked to place themselves on the traditional left-right continuum.¹⁵ Finally, I construct an indicator of regional prime minister’s approval on the basis of individual judgments about their level of trustworthiness.

The individual-level controls that I will add in our model specifications are available in all the studies of the CIS and are the following: gender, age, level of education, geographic location, subjective social class, and frequency of church attendance. I decided to opt for a parsimonious strategy with few and very exogenous controls in the single-year specifications because too many covariates in these models could only incur in the estimation of questionable standard errors. In terms of method, I use multinomial logistic regressions.

5. Modelling Balearic voting behaviour

Tables between 8 and 14 test the aforementioned hypotheses in a multivariate setup incorporating the relevant individual-level controls. More specifically, Table from 8 to 13 report the results of a set of multinomial logistic models predicting vote for nationalist parties in each electoral cycle between 1991 and 2015. In Table 8, I only can examine the

¹³ Language is a variable frequently neglected in the surveys devoted to the Balearic case. After a quick review I only found two surveys in which respondents were asked for their language. These are the 2140 and the 2228 studies conducted by the CIS in 1995 and 1996, respectively. For the sake of preserving consistency no analysis including it was conducted.

¹⁴ You can see the Appendix for a detailed description of the main variables used in the empirical tests.

¹⁵ The Moreno national identity question was first developed by Juan Linz in the context of research on Scotland and on Spain’s autonomous communities, primarily the Basques and Catalans.

determinants of vote for the PSM because UM ran in coalition with the PP in that occasion. Three important results emerge from this table. First, the more identified with the region, the more likely the respondent is to vote for the PSM relatively to the PP ($p \leq 0.01$). Second, PSM voters are more leftist (rightist) than PP (PSOE) voters. Third, PSM voters' evaluations of the regional Prime Minister are worse than those of the voters of the other parties.

(Table 8 about here)

Tables from 9 to 13 replicate all the models predicting vote for nationalist parties shown in Table 8, but for the subsequent electoral cycles and distinguishing between PSM and UM. With regard to PSM-EN voters, regional identity is the variable that exhibits the most consistent effect across electoral cycles: PSM_EN voters are usually more identified with the Balearic Islands than with Spain. Ideology is a second variable that is also frequently correlated with vote for the PSM-EN: the more right-wing the respondent is, the less likely to vote for this party. Finally, retrospective evaluations of the regional Prime Minister are the least influential factor to explain vote for the PSM-EN. However, some pattern can be discerned and it seems that positive judgments of the performance of a Socialist incumbent (i.e., during the 1999-2003 and 2007-2011 cycles) increase the likelihood of voting for the PSM-EN instead of PP or UM.

(Tables from 9 to 13 about here)

Explaining the vote for UM is slightly more difficult. Voters of this party present a slightly more right-wing profile than Socialist voters in two out of four electoral cycles. Retrospective evaluations are also explaining vote for this nationalist centre-right party. In the 2003-07 electoral cycle, when the conservative Jaume Matas is in power, improving the evaluation of his performance decreases the likelihood of voting for UM compared to doing so for the PP. Four years later, during the second government of the Socialist Francesc Antich, improving the evaluation of the regional Prime Minister increases the likelihood of voting for UM over the PP.

Finally, Table 14 tests all the hypotheses when using all the available data. According to the expectations, all the coefficients of national identity but one are positive and significant. In other words, identification with the region rather than with Spain increases the likelihood of voting for nationalist parties. Second, ideology also performs as expected in four out of 5 cases. In general terms, PSM voters are more leftist than right-wing parties' supporters. By contrast, UM voters place themselves, ideologically speaking, between the PP and left-wing parties (i.e., PSOE and PSM-EN). Finally, PSM voters are statistically indistinguishable from the ideological point of view from PSOE voters. Our last hypothesis is

also validated in the pooled analysis since the likelihood of voting for a nationalist party increases when the regional prime minister is Socialist (the coefficient of the constitutive term “regional prime minister” is almost invariably positive and significant) but decreases when the PP is in government (the coefficient of the interaction term is consistently negative and significant in all the occasions but one).

(Table 14 about here)

In terms of controls, some interesting patterns emerge. First of all, tables show that gender is not a variable that explains particularly well the vote for nationalist parties in the Balearic Islands, even though it seems that voters of these parties (particularly, UM voters) tend to be men. Secondly, these individual-level analyses confirm our expectations about the geographic location of UM voters: They are less likely to live in Palma, the capital. Third, somehow unexpectedly, social class has a positive impact on the likelihood of voting for the PSM-EN. Finally, the role of religiosity seems to fit expectations and PSM-EN voters are less religious than voters of right-wing parties (i.e., UM and PP)

The magnitude of the effect of an explanatory factor in a model with a categorical dependent variable cannot be evaluated through the size of the coefficient shown in the regression table. Thus, it is necessary to illustrate graphically the changes in the predicted probability of voting for a nationalist party when the explanatory factor goes from its minimum to its maximum values. To this end, Figures from 3 to 5 plot the effect of the three main independent variables (i.e., national identity, left-right ideology and evaluation of the regional prime minister) on the vote for nationalist parties in the pooled models of Table 14. The first graph shows that the predicted probability of casting a vote for the PSM-EN dramatically increases as the respondents’ level of identification with the Balearic Islands does so. This effect is considerably smaller in the case of UM. Second, the impact of respondents’ ideology on the predicted probability of voting for a nationalist party is smaller than for previous variables and presents an inverted-U shape. In other words, the more left-wing a citizen is, the higher her probability of voting for a nationalist party up to a point where this likelihood begins to decrease with further movements to the left. Also as expected, UM voters are slightly more right-wing than PSM-EN voters. Finally, looking at Figure 5, I conclude that the evaluations of the regional prime ministers when the PP is not in government have a bigger impact on the probability of voting a nationalist party than the level of approval of Conservative presidents. Moreover, the effect is practically zero in the case of UM.

(Figures from 3 to 5 about here)

6. Conclusions

In contrast to what has happened in Catalonia or the Basque Country, the construction of the *Estado de las Autonomías* has not given rise to the emergence of important nationalist parties in the Balearic Islands. Although at least one of them has managed to obtain parliamentary representation at the regional level throughout the entire current democratic period, and both have participated in subnational governments, the party system of the archipelago largely reproduces the number of parties and the patterns of interaction registered at the national arena. While the relative weakness of the nationalist parties in the Balearic Islands can be considered a reflection of the lack of relevance of the regional cleavage in this community, the presence of a left-wing (PSM-EN) and a centre-right (UM) nationalist party can be seen as a manifestation of the ideological “cleavage” and the need for them to compete with the state-wide political forces. From a dynamic point of view, it is worth noting that the PSM-EN has attempted in recent times albeit with small success to form coalitions with other left-wing parties (including United Left). By contrast, UM, which was the predominant party within the nationalist camp during the first pair of regional elections, was disbanded after several episodes of political corruption in 2011.

The results of the 2015 regional elections were somewhat different from previous ones. First, the PP obtained its worst result ever with 28.5% of the total vote and 20 seats, not being able as a result to stay in government. The marked centralist profile of the former regional Prime Minister, José Ramón Bauzá, seems to have been at least partially responsible for this serious drawback. Up to eight different parties were guaranteed parliamentary representation after the last regional election, turning the current Parliament into the most fragmented since the beginning of the democratic period. In the new regional Chamber, the nationalist left-wing parties (i.e., *Més per Mallorca* and *Més per Menorca*) have nine seats whereas the nationalist centre-right party (i.e., *Proposta per les Illes*) is back to the autonomic institutions after four years with three seats. The new regional cabinet is a coalition government lead by the Socialist Francina Armengol and with presence of the nationalist left-wing parties.

Overall, my analyses provide significant support for my hypotheses. Identification with the Balearic Islands, left-wing ideology and positive and negative evaluations of the regional prime minister when he belongs to the PSIB-PSOE and the PP, respectively, tend to be associated with higher probabilities of voting for nationalist parties. Hence, party competition in the Balearic Islands is two-dimensional, although the electoral support

gathered by nationalist parties is not only explained by the impact of the nationalist dimension. Moreover, the results of my research may also help us to address some of the wider questions posed in the workshop outline. Increasing decentralisation does not seem to have had any impact on the electoral support of nationalist parties in the Balearic Islands. Moreover, the absence of a strong and widespread regional identity (like in the Basque Country or Catalonia) explains why nationalist parties have been unable to channel the discontent with the performance of state-wide parties and significantly increase as a result their vote shares.

The small step forward that I attempted to make in this chapter has also opened up many avenues for improvement and future research. First, my focus on individual-level data inevitably needed to put aside the assessment of the importance of aggregate-level variables. The role played by the urban-rural cleavage should undoubtedly be a matter of further analysis and debate in future research. Second, my models showed a strong capacity to explain the vote for nationalist parties in regional elections in the Balearic Islands. However, my models did not address the performance of these parties in other types of elections. Future studies should devote more attention to this question, and understand whether the predictors that explain voting behaviour in regional elections can also do so at the national and mainly the local level. Finally, my analyses showed the existence of important transfers of votes across electoral arenas. Future work will have to investigate whether the same factors examined here can explain these patterns as well.

Appendix: Coding of the dependent and the most important independent variables

Vote Nationalist Parties. This is an assessment of voting behaviour in regional elections. It is a categorical variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent votes for the PSIB-PSOE, 2 if he or she votes for the PP, 3 if he/she votes for the PSM-EN, and 4 if he/she votes for UM.

National Identity. This represents the national self-identification of the respondent. It takes values that range from 1 to 5 according to whether people consider themselves ‘only Spanish’, ‘more Spanish than Balearic’, ‘as Balearic as Spanish’, ‘more Balearic than Spanish’, or ‘only Balearic’, respectively.

Ideology. This represents the ideological self-placement of the respondent. It takes values that range from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).

Evaluation of Regional Prime Minister. This represents the respondents' level of trustworthiness of the regional prime minister. It takes values that range from 1 to 4 according to whether the people consider that the regional prime minister is a "very trustworthy", "quite trustworthy", "a little trustworthy" or "not trustworthy at all".

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Tables and Figures

Table 1. Electoral Results in Regional Elections in the Balearic Islands (1983-2011)

Parties	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Alianza Popular/Partido Popular	35.21 (21)	37.22 (25)	47.82 (31)	45.39 (31)	44.84 (28)	45.45 (29)	47.43 (29)	46.37 (35)
Unió Mallorquina (UM)	15.42 (6)	9.13 (4)		5.39 (2)	7.45 (3)	7.58 (3)	6.88 (3)	
Centro Democrático y Social		10.3 (5)	2.96 (0)					
P. Socialista Obrero Español	35.11 (21)	32.6 (21)	30.41 (21)	24.3 (16)	22.43 (13)	24.95 (15)	24.25 (16)	24.86 (19)
Pacte Progressista d'Eivissa					4.51 (6)	3.7 (5)	3.93 (6)	
Els Verds (EV)			2.14 (0)	3.15 (1)				
Bloc per Mallorca							8.54 (4)	
P. Socialista de Mallorca - Entesa Nac.	5.54 (2)	4.96 (2)	6.7 (3)	11.13 (5)	11.03 (4)	7.39 (3)		8.61 (3)
P. Socialista de Menorca	1.22 (2)	1.32 (2)	1.39 (2)	1.08 (1)	0.9 (1)	0.7 (1)	0.67 (1)	0.89 (1)
PCIB / Esquerra Unida	2.5 (0)	2.24 (0)	2.3 (0)	6.7 (3)	5.53 (3)	4.88 (2)	0.42 (0)	
Others	5 (2)	2.23 (0)	6.28 (2)	2.86 (0)	3.3 (1)	5.35 (1)	7.88 (0)	19.27 (0)

Notes: These are percentages of the valid vote and the number of obtained seats is in parentheses. In 1983, the two seats for other parties correspond to the PDL (*Partido Demócrata Liberal*, Democratic Liberal Party) and CIM (*Candidatura Independent de Menorca*, Independent Candidature of Minorca) with 1.25% and 1.04% of the total vote, respectively. In 1987 and 1991, EU ran in coalition with the *Partit Socialista de Menorca*. In 1991, UM ran in coalition with the PP. In 1991, the two seats for other parties correspond to the UIM (*Unió Independent de Mallorca*, Independent Union of Majorca) and the FIEF (*Federació d'Independents d'Eivissa i Formentera*, Federation of Independents of Ibiza and Formentera). In 1995, 2003 and 2007, the PP obtains the seat from Formentera running as AIPF (*Agrupació Independent Popular de Formentera*, Popular Independent Group of Formentera) with 0.32%, 0.39% and 0.44%, of the total vote, respectively. In 1995, 1999 and 2003, the *Partit Socialista de Menorca* ran in coalition with the PSM-EN. In 1999, the seat for other parties correspond to the COP (*Coalició d'Organitzacions Progressistes de Formentera*, Coalition of Progressive Organizations of Formentera), that is formed by the PSOE, EU and EV (*Els Verds*, Green Party). In 1999 and 2003, the *Pacte Progressista d'Eivissa* is a coalition of the PSOE, EV, EU, *Entesa Nacionalista i Ecologista* (ENE, Nationalist and Ecologist Agreement) and *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC, Republican Left of Catalonia). In 1999, the first two obtain three and one seats within it, respectively (the other two are for independents). In 2003, the PSOE and EU obtain three and one seat within it, respectively (the other one is for an independent). In 1999 and 2003, EV runs in coalition with EU obtaining zero and one seat, respectively. In 2007, we have the following pre-electoral coalitions on the left side of the political spectrum: in Majorca, *Bloc per Mallorca* (PSM-EN [2] + EU [1] + EV [1]); in Minorca, *Partit Socialista de Menorca* (1)-EV (0); and in Ibiza, PSOE (4)-*Eivissa pel Canvi* (EU-EV [1] + ERC [1] + ENE [0]). In 2011, the PSM-EN runs in coalition with *Iniciativa Verds* and *Entesa per Mallorca* and obtains two seats (the third one obtained by this coalition corresponds to *Iniciativa Verds*).

Source: <http://www.historiaelectoral.com>.

Table 2. Evolution of PSM-EN Vote Shares and Number of Seats in Regional Elections in the Balearic Islands by District (1983–2011)

	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Majorca	6.6 (2)	5.9 (2)	8.2 (3)	13.4 (5)	13.4 (4)	9.0 (3)	11.1 (4)	10.7 (4)
Minorca	13.5 (2)	14.7 (2)	14.0 (2)	11.8 (1)	9.8 (1)	8.1 (1)	8.9 (1)	9.8 (1)
Ibiza			4.7	1.8	(Pacte)	(Pacte)	(ExC)	1.3
Total	6.7 (4)	6.2 (4)	8.3 (5)	12.1 (6)	11.7 (5)	7.9 (4)	9.8 (5)	9.5 (5)

Notes: These are percentages of the valid vote and the number of obtained seats is in parentheses. In Majorca, the PSM-EN runs as *Bloc per Mallorca* in 2007 and in coalition with *Iniciativa Verds* and *Entesa per Mallorca* in 2011. The total number of seats obtained in those occasions by these coalitions is shown in parentheses. In Minorca, the percentages correspond to the vote shares of the *Partit Socialista de Menorca*, although this party ran on its own in 1983 and in coalition with *Esquerra Unida* in 1987 and 1991. In Ibiza, the 1991, 1995 and 2011 percentages correspond to the vote shares of the *Entesa Nacionalista i Ecologista*; the PSM-EN supports the coalitions formed with other left-wing parties in this district between 1999 and 2007.

Source: <http://www.historiaelectoral.com>.

Table 3. Evolution of UM Vote Shares and Number of Seats in Regional Elections in the Balearic Islands by District (1983–2011)

	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Majorca	18.4 (6)	10.9 (4)	(PP)	6.6 (2)	9.1 (3)	9.2 (3)	8.3 (3)	3.5
Total	16.6 (7)	9.1 (4)	(PP)	5.3 (2)	7.3 (3)	7.4 (3)	6.7 (3)	2.8

Notes: These are percentages of the valid vote and the number of obtained seats is in parenthesis. In 1983, UM runs in coalition with the Liberal Democrat Party that obtains 14.6% in Ibiza and one seat, and 11.5 but no seat in Formentera. In 1991, UM runs in coalition with the PP. In 2011, the percentages correspond to the vote shares of *Convergència per les Illes*.

Source: <http://www.historiaelectoral.com>.

Table 4. PSM-EN Voters' Transfers between Regional and General Elections, Balearic Islands (1986–2011)

	A87- G86 (%)	A91- G89 (%)	A95- G93 (%)	A99- G96 (%)	A03- G00 (%)	A07- G04 (%)	A11- G08 (%)	Mean (%)
AP/PP	2.86	0	0	22.22	9.68	2.94	6.67	6.33
PSOE	60	44	0	37.04	64.52	47.06	26.67	39.89
PSM	x	28	75	x	x	32.35	50	46.33
IU	0	8	16.67	7.41	0	5.88	3.33	5.89
UM	0	x	0	x	x	0	0	0
Others	20	4	0	29.63	19.35	5.88	3.33	11.74
Abstention	17.14	16	8.33	3.7	6.45	5.88	10	9.64
N	35	25	12	27	31	34	30	28

Notes: Cells report column percentages and indicate the share of PSM-EN voters in regional elections that also voted for it in the previous national elections or switched to other parties. There are no data for the 1983–82 electoral cycle. The PSM-EN runs as *Bloc per Mallorca* in 2007 and in coalition with *Iniciativa Verds* and *Entesa per Mallorca* in 2011.

Sources: 1630, 1945, 2162, 2353, 2514, 2689 and 2874 surveys conducted by the CIS.

Table 5. UM Voters' Transfers between Regional and General Elections, Balearic Islands (1986–2011)

	A87- G86 (%)	A95- G93 (%)	A99- G96 (%)	A03- G00 (%)	A07- G04 (%)	A11- G08 (%)	Mean (%)
AP/PP	25.71	16.67	50	60.87	25.93	0	29.86
PSOE	31.43	0	35.71	8.7	37.04	20	22.14
PSM	x	0	x	x	3.7	20	7.9
IU	2.86	0	0	0	0	0	0.47
UM	22.86	50	x	x	18.52	40	32.84
Others	8.57	0	14.29	13.04	0	0	5.98
Abstention	8.57	33.33	0	17.39	14.81	20	15.68
N	35	6	14	23	27	5	18

Notes: Cells report column percentages and indicate the share of PSM-EN voters in regional elections that also voted for it in the previous national elections or switched to other parties. Figures for the 1983–82 and the 1991–89 electoral cycles are missing due to lack of availability of data, and the PP-UM coalition, respectively. In 2011, the percentages correspond to the vote shares of *Convergència per les Illes*.

Sources: 1630, 1945, 2162, 2353, 2514, 2689 and 2874 surveys conducted by the CIS.

Table 6. Ideological Profiles of the Parties, Balearic Islands (2003-2011)

	2003- 2007	2007- 2011	2011- 2015
PSIB-PSOE	3.82	3.6	3.97
PP	7.52	7.76	8.12
PSM-EN	3.09	3.35	2.78
UM	5.82	6.01	x

Notes: The figures represent the mean ideology of the parties according to the sampled population. The electoral cycles previous to 2003 have been excluded because of lack of available data. There is no information for *Convergència per les Illes*.

Sources: 2610, 2829 and 2956 surveys conducted by the CIS.

Table 7. List of Surveys conducted by the CIS on the Voting Behaviour of the Balearic Electorate (1987-2012)

Surveys	Electoral surveys											
Variables	1630	1686	1945	2162	2328	2353	2486	2514	2689	2709	2874	2902
Language												
Identity												x
Ideology	x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Geographic location					x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Social class	x	x				x		x				x
Religion	x	x				x				x		x
Short-term	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Date	April 1987	June 1987	March 1991	April 1995	May 1999	June 1999	March 2003	May 2003	April 2007	June 2007	March 2011	May 2011
Surveys	Midterm surveys											
Variables	2028	2140	2228	2275	2286	2314	2455	2610	2829	2956		
Language			x	x								
Identity		x		x		x		x	x	x	x	
Ideology		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Geographic location		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Social class		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Religion		x		x		x		x	x	x	x	
Short-term		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Date	November 1992	March 1995	November 1996	February 1998	May 1998	January 1999	September 2002	December 2005	January-March 2010	September-October 2012		

Table 8. Determinants of Vote for Nationalist Parties in Regional Elections, Balearic Islands (1991–1995)

Independent Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	PSM/PP	PSM/PSOE	PSM/PP	PSM/PSOE	PSM/PP	PSM/PSOE
<i>Controls:</i>						
Male	2.11 (2.8)	0.10 (2.57)	-2.13 (2.65)	-0.03 (1.89)	-1.33 (1.75)	0.72 (1.86)
Age	-0.12 (0.12)	-0.23* (0.12)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.13* (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.24** (0.1)
Education	8.52 (852.59)	13.3 (852.59)	9.23 (2408.73)	22.2 (2409.65)	13.31 (1397.02)	12.28 (1397.02)
Geographic location	0.12 (1.01)	0.44 (0.96)	-0.51 (1.009)	2.82** (1.2)	-0.05 (0.55)	0.19 (0.57)
Social class	1.79 (3.74)	7.39* (3.79)	10.01** (4.08)	11.52*** (3.55)	5.55 (3.49)	11.21*** (3.44)
Religiosity	-2.51 (1.84)	3.04* (1.64)	-0.61 (1.21)	0.66 (0.97)	-1.34 (1.14)	3.61** (1.47)
<i>Main explanatory factors:</i>						
National identity	5.01*** (1.7)	2.16 (1.56)				
Ideology			-2.38** (1.07)	3.62*** (1.34)		
Regional Prime Minister					-3.8*** (1.09)	-2.71** (1.07)
Constant	-36.65 (2557.95)	-76.61 (2557.93)	-45.03 (7226.21)	-121.8 (7228.98)	-37.79 (4191.08)	-68.69 (4191.08)
Chi ²	478.58***		502.58***		450.89***	
Pseudo-R ²	0.76		0.92		0.71	
N	358		324		357	

Notes: The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent votes for the PSIB-PSOE, 2 if he or she votes for the PP-UM, and 3 if he/she votes for the PSM. Unstandardized logistic coefficients with standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.

Sources: 2028 CIS.

Table 9. Determinants of Vote for Nationalist Parties in Regional Elections, Balearic Islands (1995–1999)

Independent Variables	PSM			UM	
	PSM/PP	PSM/PSOE	PSM/UM	UM/PP	UM/PSOE
<i>Controls:</i>					
Male	0.39 (1.0003)	-0.19 (0.99)	-18.23 (1601.48)	18.62 (1601.48)	18.03 (1601.48)
Age	0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.19 (0.16)	0.2 (0.16)	0.24 (0.16)
Education	0.21 (0.46)	0.46 (0.48)	0.4002 (0.84)	-0.18 (0.8)	0.06 (0.84)
Geographic location	0.05 (0.36)	-0.09 (0.39)	1.907 (1.29)	-1.85 (1.29)	-2.007 (1.305)
Social class	1.59** (0.69)	1.96** (0.71)	-0.49 (1.505)	2.08 (1.42)	2.45* (1.43)
Religiosity	-1.2** (0.55)	-1.24** (0.55)	0.805 (1.96)	-2.005 (1.94)	-2.05 (1.95)
<i>Main explanatory factors:</i>					
National identity	1.68*** (0.58)	2.06*** (0.59)	1.77 (1.35)	-0.08 (1.27)	0.29 (1.28)
Ideology	-0.85*** (0.24)	0.27 (0.25)	-0.17 (0.52)	-0.68 (0.503)	0.44 (0.52)
Regional Prime Minister	-0.79 (0.61)	0.32 (0.64)	-0.38 (1.15)	-0.41 (1.07)	0.71 (1.12)
Constant	-7.27 (5.17)	-18.87*** (5.39)	18.65 (1601.52)	-25.93 (1601.52)	-37.53 (1601.52)
Chi ²	176.58***				
Pseudo-R ²	0.58				
N	156				

Notes: The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent votes for the PSIB-PSOE, 2 if he or she votes for the PP, 3 if he/she votes for the PSM, and 4 if he/she votes for UM. Unstandardized logistic coefficients with standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.

Sources: 2286 CIS.

Table 10. Determinants of Vote for Nationalist Parties in Regional Elections, Balearic Islands (1999–2003)

Independent Variables	PSM			UM	
	PSM/PP	PSM/PSOE	PSM/UM	UM/PP	UM/PSOE
<i>Controls:</i>					
Male	-0.31 (0.69)	0.62 (0.58)	-0.78 (0.74)	0.46 (0.65)	1.4** (0.66)
Age	-0.5** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.06** (0.03)	0.005 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Education	-0.41 (0.4)	-0.33 (0.37)	-0.77* (0.42)	0.35 (0.32)	0.43 (0.35)
Geographic location	0.03 (0.27)	-0.12 (0.23)	0.56* (0.31)	-0.52** (0.24)	-0.69*** (0.26)
Social class	0.23 (0.28)	0.24 (0.24)	0.3 (0.3)	-0.06 (0.26)	-0.06 (0.26)
Religiosity	-0.41 (0.34)	-0.04 (0.3)	-0.29 (0.36)	-0.12 (0.29)	0.24 (0.3)
<i>Main explanatory factors:</i>					
National identity	1.74*** (0.47)	1.8*** (0.41)	1.3*** (0.49)	0.43 (0.41)	0.49 (0.4)
Ideology	-1.71*** (0.31)	-0.3 (0.22)	-0.7** (0.29)	-1.01*** (0.29)	0.39 (0.26)
Regional Prime Minister	1.28** (0.56)	0.06 (0.54)	0.71 (0.61)	0.56 (0.32)	-0.65 (0.49)
Constant	2.71 (3.66)	-3.98 (3.18)	0.47 (3.83)	2.24 (3.16)	-4.45 (3.09)
Chi ²	201.97***				
Pseudo-R ²	0.41				
N	189				

Notes: The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent votes for the PSIB-PSOE, 2 if he or she votes for the PP, 3 if he/she votes for the PSM-EN, and 4 if he/she votes for UM. Unstandardized logistic coefficients with standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.

Sources: 2455 CIS.

Table 11. Determinants of Vote for Nationalist Parties in Regional Elections, Balearic Islands (2003–2007)

Independent Variables	PSM			UM	
	PSM/PP	PSM/PSOE	PSM/UM	UM/PP	UM/PSOE
<i>Controls:</i>					
Male	0.73 (0.94)	1.46* (0.88)	-0.59 (1.21)	1.33 (0.89)	2.06** (0.92)
Age	0.09** (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.13*** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)
Education	1.26*** (0.41)	0.78** (0.37)	1.62*** (0.53)	-0.35 (0.4)	-0.83** (0.41)
Geographic location	-0.19 (0.34)	-0.05 (0.31)	0.35 (0.46)	-0.55 (0.38)	-0.4 (0.38)
Social class	-0.25 (0.3)	0.16 (0.27)	-0.49 (0.4)	0.23 (0.31)	0.66** (0.32)
Religiosity	-0.41 (0.37)	-0.003 (0.33)	-0.16 (0.5)	-0.24 (0.39)	0.16 (0.41)
<i>Main explanatory factors:</i>					
National identity	1.62*** (0.56)	1.29** (0.53)	0.51 (0.7)	1.1** (0.49)	0.77 (0.5)
Ideology	-1.16*** (0.29)	-0.04 (0.24)	-1.01*** (0.37)	-0.14 (0.28)	0.97*** (0.3)
Regional Prime Minister	-2.29*** (0.6)	-0.55 (0.53)	-0.72 (0.73)	-1.56*** (0.55)	0.16 (0.56)
Constant	-3.99 (4.05)	-12.11*** (3.9)	-6.39 (4.96)	2.39 (3.52)	-5.72 (3.52)
Chi ²	196.78***				
Pseudo-R ²	0.45				
N	211				

Notes: The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent votes for the PSIB-PSOE, 2 if he or she votes for the PP, 3 if he/she votes for the PSM-EN, and 4 if he/she votes for UM. Unstandardized logistic coefficients with standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.

Sources: 2610 CIS.

Table 12. Determinants of Vote for Nationalist Parties in Regional Elections, Balearic Islands (2007–2011)

Independent Variables	PSM			UM	
	PSM/PP	PSM/PSOE	PSM/UM	UM/PP	UM/PSOE
<i>Controls:</i>					
Male	0.11 (0.78)	0.21 (0.67)	1.08 (1.02)	-0.96 (0.85)	-0.87 (0.84)
Age	-0.002 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Education	-0.08 (0.44)	0.07 (0.36)	-0.47 (0.53)	0.39 (0.39)	0.55 (0.41)
Geographic location	-0.25 (0.33)	-0.57** (0.29)	0.03 (0.41)	-0.28 (0.34)	-0.61* (0.34)
Social class	1.03* (0.54)	1.55*** (0.5)	2.02*** (0.6)	-0.99** (0.39)	-0.47 (0.37)
Religiosity	-0.85** (0.39)	-0.43 (0.35)	-1.18** (0.48)	0.33 (0.37)	0.75** (0.37)
<i>Main explanatory factors:</i>					
National identity	1.63*** (0.57)	1.87*** (0.51)	1.47** (0.66)	0.15 (0.48)	0.4 (0.47)
Ideology	-0.8*** (0.26)	0.29 (0.19)	-0.34 (0.28)	0.45* (0.23)	0.64*** (0.22)
Regional Prime Minister	2.27*** (0.58)	0.81 (0.49)	1.2* (0.68)	1.06** (0.54)	-0.39 (0.53)
Constant	-9.93** (4.59)	-16.28*** (4.06)	-12.38** (5.23)	2.45 (3.66)	-3.89 (3.52)
Chi ²	248.65***				
Pseudo-R ²	0.52				
N	210				

Notes: The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent votes for the PSIB-PSOE, 2 if he or she votes for the PP, 3 if he/she votes for the PSM-EN, and 4 if he/she votes for UM. Unstandardized logistic coefficients with standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.

Sources: 2829 CIS.

Table 13. Determinants of Vote for Nationalist Parties in Regional Elections, Balearic Islands (2011–2015)

Independent Variables	PSM	
	PSM/PP	PSM/PSOE
<i>Controls:</i>		
Male	-2.06 (1.7)	0.73 (0.63)
Age	0.08 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.02)
Education	-1.05 (0.72)	0.12 (0.3)
Geographic location	-1.58* (0.82)	0.17 (0.18)
Social class	1.38 (1.03)	0.08 (0.26)
Religiosity	-3.67** (1.52)	-0.34 (0.42)
<i>Main explanatory factors:</i>		
National identity	-0.67 (1.09)	1.63*** (0.43)
Ideology	-24.16 (1468.06)	0.12 (0.23)
Regional Prime Minister	0.72 (1.04)	-0.008 (0.66)
Constant	125.73 (7340.45)	-7.67 (3.14)
Chi ²	244.4***	
Pseudo-R ²	0.71	
N	167	

Notes: The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent votes for the PSIB-PSOE, 2 if he or she votes for the PP-UM, and 3 if he/she votes for the PSM-EN. Unstandardized logistic coefficients with standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.

Sources: 2956 CIS.


Table 14. Determinants of Vote for Nationalist Parties in Regional Elections, Balearic Islands (1991–2015)

Independent Variables	PSM			UM	
	PSM/PP	PSM/PSOE	PSM/UM	UM/PP	UM/PSOE
<i>Controls:</i>					
Male	0.28 (0.31)	0.6** (0.27)	-0.37 (0.42)	0.65* (0.37)	0.97** (0.38)
Age	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)
Education	0.08 (0.15)	0.05 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.2)	0.11 (0.17)	0.08 (0.18)
Geographic location	0.002 (0.11)	-0.002 (0.09)	0.56*** (0.17)	-0.55*** (0.15)	-0.56*** (0.15)
Social class	0.29** (0.13)	0.49*** (0.11)	0.3* (0.17)	-0.009 (0.14)	0.18 (0.15)
Religiosity	-0.5*** (0.15)	-0.18 (0.13)	-0.4** (0.19)	-0.1 (0.16)	0.21 (0.16)
<i>Main explanatory factors:</i>					
National identity	1.4*** (0.2)	1.58*** (0.18)	1.04*** (0.26)	0.36 (0.22)	0.54** (0.22)
Ideology	-1.02*** (0.11)	0.12 (0.08)	-0.59*** (0.14)	-0.42*** (0.12)	0.72*** (0.12)
Regional Prime Minister	1.63*** (0.34)	0.53* (0.3)	0.75* (0.39)	0.88*** (0.31)	-0.22 (0.32)
PP Government	5.59*** (1.12)	1.64 (1.02)	3.67** (1.48)	1.92 (1.21)	-2.03 (1.26)
Regional Prime Minister* PP Government	-2.77*** (0.45)	-0.74* (0.41)	-1.32** (0.59)	-1.44*** (0.49)	0.58 (0.51)
Constant	-4.73*** (1.68)	-9.98*** (1.52)	-4.1* (2.18)	-0.62 (1.76)	-5.87*** (1.82)
Chi ²	921.3***				
Pseudo-R ²	0.43				
N	933				

Notes: The first dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent votes for the PSIB-PSOE, 2 if he or she votes for the PP, 3 if he/she votes for the PSM-EN, and 4 if he/she votes for UM. Unstandardized logistic coefficients with standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.


Sources: 2028, 2286, 2455, 2610, 2829 and 2956 surveys conducted by the CIS.

Figure 1. Evolution of PSM-EN Vote Shares in General, Regional, European and Local Elections in the Balearic Islands (1979–2011)




Source: <http://www.argos.gva.es>.

Figure 2. Evolution of UM Vote Shares in General, Regional and Local Elections in the Balearic Islands (1983–2009)




Source: <http://www.argos.gva.es>.

Figure 3. Identification with the Balearic Islands and Voting Behaviour in Regional Elections (1991-2015)




Notes: Predicted probabilities are calculated according to the models in Table 14.

Figure 4. Ideology and Voting Behaviour in Regional Elections (1991-2015)



Notes: Predicted probabilities are calculated according to the models in Table 14.

Figure 5. Approval of Regional Prime Minister and Voting Behaviour in Regional Elections (1991-2015)



Notes: Predicted probabilities are calculated according to the models in Table 14.