

A GENDER GAP IN ATTITUDERS REGARDING THE EU?

Irene Sánchez Vítores (irene.sanchez@eui.eu)

Department of Social and Political Sciences

European University Institute

Paper to be presented at the XI Spanish Conference of Political Science.

Donostia – San Sebastián. July 2015.

ABSTRACT

Women have been said to be more vulnerable than men to economic uncertainty (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Figueiredo et al., 2015a) and that this led to be more supportive of welfare state policies. Does this relate to how citizens relate to the EU? Does this gender gap replicate in citizens' trust in the EU in a context which the EU is framed as strongly responsible for the cuts in welfare policies? This paper builds on the existing literature and hypothesizes that women should be less trusting than men, although this effect may be moderated depending on how the crisis has hit their country. Preliminary findings show that contrary to expected, women tend to be more supportive although when they find themselves in situations of economic vulnerability this relation changes.

Key words: vulnerability, gender, trust in the EU

Irene Sánchez Vítores is a researcher at the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the European University Institute. Her research has focused on attitudes towards the EU. Her work has focused on support for the EU and how it has been impacted by the economic crisis in terms of change but also of its consequences on electoral behaviour from a compared perspective.

This paper is a draft – Please do not cite without the permission of the author.

A GENDER GAP IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EU?

1. Introduction

The Great Recession has given an unprecedented salience to how the EU and governments interact. However, the EU already existed when previous crisis struck Europe, why should this one be different? Why should citizens react differently? The institutional design of the EU has deeply changed since then, and the economies of member States have become deeply intermingled. An economic crisis such as the one that unravelled in 2008 seemed to be only surmountable by the coordinated action of member States. Were the governments involved ready for the challenge? Have the plans to revitalize the economy succeeded? Authors are unsure of the outcome (De Grauwe and Ji, 2014; De Grauwe, 2013; Hall, 2013; Streeck, 2014) but Eurogroup meetings never got so much attention from the front covers of media.

This paper does not focus on the formalization of European governance nor the impact of the crisis on the institutional architecture of the EU. The hoarse disagreements, especially after the election in 2015 of the Greek government have highlighted the political component of this crisis. During all these years politics have been the unmentioned elephant in the room. European institutions have encouraged a technocratic framing of the plans to overcome the economic crisis, but the measures were also deeply political. This support for budgetary constraint and austerity has granted the EU many antipathies amongst citizens, especially in the worst hit countries where it has been a useful scapegoat of governments (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014).

Welfare policies have been the largest spending in European budgets during the last decades, and these same policies have suffered the largest adjustments (Auel and Höing, 2015; Kuhn and Stoeckel, 2014; Muñoz, Rico, et al., 2014). The literature has found that women and men relate differently to these policies (Campbell, 2004; Condon and Wichowsky, 2015). Given that the EU has been blamed for these cuts, will men and women relate differently to the EU under the current context of economic crisis?

This paper's aim is to explore whether there is preliminary evidence that supports further research on a gender gap in how citizens relate to the EU, taking into account how they

perceive the interaction between the EU and their welfare state. The literature on this is limited and the evidence used in this paper, the 8th wave of the European Election study is not ideal. In spite of this problems, these data are one of the most recent and they permit a comparative approach across European countries. The existence of a gender gap is mostly based on the idea that the mechanisms behind how men and women relate to politics are different. This paper cannot go that far, however, to explore whether these differences in terms of gender exist, it builds on the literature linking support for welfare state and public opinion. The findings in the paper, although the effects are rather small, seem to contradict the idea that the EU is perceived as a threat to welfare and undermines the trust of citizens that find themselves most vulnerable to social and economic difficulties.

2. Theoretical framework

Nelsen and Guth (2000) co-author one of the few papers that deal with the gender gap in attitudes regarding European integration. They focus on support for European integration using Eurobarometer data of 1994. They find that European integration was perceived differently across countries depending on the how their country faced the trade-off between marketization and social welfare in the frame of compliance with EU regulations. The EU was perceived as an instrument to “elevate market demands over social needs” (Nelsen and Guth, 2000: 275). Subsequently, women that perceived that their economies were not solid enough to produce a satisfactory outcome and felt their social services threatened, as it happened in Denmark, were less likely to support European integration. More broadly, Coffé (2013) looks at gender differences in how citizens relate to multiple levels of governments. Women are less attracted than men to national and international arenas, they prefer local arenas, which could lead to higher levels of mistrust (Delhey, 2007).

These literature does not provide enough support for the paper, so literature with a different focus becomes relevant. For instance, in this section I will briefly describe what has been found in terms of the relation between public opinion and welfare state and what does the existence of a gender gap imply.

Welfare state policies strongly attract the attention of the public opinion because they are awarded some of the largest items of budgets and they are crucial for redistribution (Brady

and Bostic, 2013: 272). Gingrich and Häusermann (2015) point that the literature still does not agree on who benefits the most, although they provocatively propose in their findings that it is not the ones in the worst economic situations but the middle classes. It is important that welfare states are not always guided by the same principles and they are not implemented in the same way¹, mainly due to differences in existing institutions and coalition partners (Doring and Schwander, 2015: 188). These differences also translate into how public opinion relates to welfare policies.

In terms of public opinion, it seems quite intuitive that such a relevant group of policies should attract the public's attention, however, the sense in which it does so is not so clear. For instance, Costa-Font and Cowell (2015: 366) find that social identity, understood as the current and future economic position, is relevant in shaping individuals' redistribution preferences. In a similar fashion, focused on unemployment benefits those who are more likely of consuming such transfers are usually more supportive of extending these schemes and more critical with cuts (Andreß and Heien, 2001; Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Interestingly, Alves (2015) finds that it is not only the personal situation but also the existence of different levels of inequality in a society that can shape the general values and attitudes towards the issue. Put in a nutshell, awareness of the need of social programmes can be due to personal situations of vulnerability and uncertainty but also due to the perception of living in a strongly unequal society.

Esping-Andersen (1999) pointed some time ago that women were more likely than men to find themselves in those precarious situations, with the exception of the Scandinavian countries where social provision schemes had been put in place to compensate for this situation. However, this was not the only starting point for the literature that defends the existence of a gender gap in public opinion. However, before going any further what does a gender gap imply? Different authors have defended the existence of a gender gap in political attitudes and engagement (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Verba et al., 1997). Inglehart and Norris (1999: 442) define the gender gap as a multidimensional political phenomenon that includes any political difference between men and women due to the existence of "*long-term structural and cultural trends, which have transformed women's and men's lives, [and] have gradually produced realignment in gender politics in*

¹ Several classifications have been put forward. Esping-Andersen's (1990) "Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism" and its revision by Andreß and Heien (2001) amongst other probably the best known. It is also interesting to take into consideration the recently published work of Beramendi et al (2015).

postindustrial societies". Three types of explanations have been provided (Morales, 1999): sociodemographic, socialization and methodological².

Whether it is due to their more primary role as carers (Jelen et al., 1994; Pratto et al., 1997) or because they have been educated into being carers and defending values of cooperation and care (Bennett and Bennett, 1989; Eichenberg and Read, 2015; Filler and Jennings, 2015; Rapoport, 1985; Sapiro, 1983; Welch, 1977), women have been found to be more supportive than men of welfare politics than men (Bernauer et al., 2013; Campbell, 2004). Their role as care-providers in the household makes them more prone and sensible to economic vulnerability and poverty (Figueiredo et al., 2015b). In line with what has been found for the general population, they can more easily picture themselves as needing social protection schemes which, in turn, leads them to be more supportive than men of public spending on such policies (Condon and Wichowsky, 2015). Following this line of thought, it would be more likely that they lost trust in those political actors that supported cutting these policies. During the Great Recession, the EU has been one of the scape goats for governments' justification of austerity measures (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). Will this context open the window of opportunity for the existence of a gender gap in how citizens relate to the EU?

Before advancing into the hypothesis, another level of analysis has to be taken into consideration: the methodological. The latest works that research the particular way in which women relate to politics focus on how questions can be relevant in representing or not behaviours and attitudes (Coffé, 2013; Ferrín and Fraile, 2014; Fraile, 2014; Mondak and Anderson, 2004). Two main issues are to be considered: the how and what of the questions. The items used to measure political knowledge or how women participate in politics have been found to focus on those items where men perform better (Hooghe and Stolle, 2004; Mondak and Anderson, 2004). For instance, looking at political knowledge, it has been found that while girls are better at reasoning about politics, boys are more factually-oriented (Ferrín Pereira et al., 2014). Undoubtedly, factual questions have advantages in terms of coding but they also present women as less knowledgeable about politics systematically. In terms of political participation, even if they vote at similar rates (Anduiza Perea, 1999; Morales, 1999), men have been found to prefer competition, while

² For a summary of the arguments that support the different origins of the gender gap Morales (1999) offers a full account.

women rather cooperative and altruistic forms of participation (Hooghe and Stolle, 2004; Verba et al., 1997).

Methodological flaws can also be caused by the way in which the question is formulated. Social psychologists have found that women are more risk-averse than men (Bönte, 2014; Byrnes et al., 1999), which in turn, has an impact on how they face survey questions. Indeed, it has been found that women, for different reasons (amongst which socialization, insecurity or being more afraid of making a mistake are possible explanations), are more likely to choose items such as “Don’t Know” or so-called “refuge categories”. Even if it is unmeant, questionnaires are not designed to counteract this gender bias. Although increasing levels of education seemed to reduce the gender gap, women are still described as less interested and politically engaged than their masculine counterparts (Fraile et al., 2013; Mondak and Anderson, 2004). Most of the works that have been mentioned were experimental, option that was unavailable for this study. Nevertheless, the choice of dependent variable will try to take into account this bias and control for it.

3. Hypotheses

Do men and women relate differently to the EU when they find themselves in contexts of vulnerability? It has been largely studied how the current context of economic crisis has had a negative impact on citizens’ perception of European integration (Bosco and Verney, 2012; Halikiopoulou et al., 2015; Kriesi, 2012; Serricchio et al., 2013), is there a gender gap appearing too? In this section I will formulate and explain the hypotheses that will guide the response to the research question.

The first hypothesis proposes the existence of a gender gap in attitudes towards European integration, as it will be explained further on, the dimension used will be trust in the EU:

H.1. Women are less likely than men to trust the EU.

As it has largely been developed in the previous section, women’s political attitudes should favour policies that sponsor social provision and welfare (Hooghe and Stolle, 2004) because they are more likely to find themselves in vulnerable situations than men (Esping-Andersen, 1999). Following this reasoning, the EU will be understood positively whenever it does not threaten the existing social protection (Nelsen and Guth, 2000). Although some authors have highlighted the enhancement of democracy that was brought

by membership (Díez Medrano, 2003), other authors have also noted that the EU is highly driven by competition and market liberalization (Gabel, 1998). Women could perceive the introduction of market logics in the provision of welfare as conflicting with protective social policies, leading them to display lower levels of trust.

H.2. Women in situations of vulnerability are less likely to trust the EU than men.

Most of the studies on gender gap rely on experiments that allow them to test for the different mechanisms that could explain why men and women relate differently to politics (Ferrín Pereira et al., 2014; Mondak and Anderson, 2004). Given that this option was not available in the survey evidence used, this paper tries to examine whether there are gender-based differences amongst the social groups where it could be salient. In this sense, the economic crisis has affected programmes of social provision due to budget rigour. Those citizens that feel more vulnerable are usually more likely to picture themselves as beneficiaries of social provision and thus, are usually more willing to support welfare spending (Andreß and Heien, 2001; Meltzer and Richard, 1981).

The previous hypothesis highlights the role of institutions in shaping citizens' attitudes. During the Great Recession, countries were neither affected in the same way nor departed from the same scheme of social protection, thus the third set of hypotheses:

H.3. Country-specificities should moderate women's trust in the EU.

H.3.1 Wherever the EU is perceived as a guarantee of welfare, women should be more trusting than men.

H.3.2. Wherever the EU is perceived as a threat to welfare, women should be less trusting than men.

Nelsen and Guth (2000) theorized that the EU did not mean the same for the Spanish than the Danish, in terms of how their welfare would interact with European regulation. The general intuition would be that wherever the country provided a comprehensive welfare provision, such as Denmark, the effect proposed in the previous hypotheses should be reinforced. However, for some countries the EU encouraged the performance of their government. For instance, in countries where the EU is perceived as an opportunity to strengthen institutions (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000) the previous effect should be moderated, leading women to be more supportive than men.

Many of the works of welfare have used as starting point Esping-Andersen's (1990) classification based on the capacity of welfare schemes to de-commodify the provision of services. However, this paper uses Beramendi et al's (2015: 44–45) classification, which includes expectations over how countries have dealt with the economic crisis given the institutional configuration from which they had to face the crisis and the feasibility set to tackle it. Equality and competitiveness countries are expected to perceive the EU as a threat given that they may find the EU legal framework limiting in different ways. For status countries, on the other hand, the EU is a good instrument to guarantee their role in an increasingly competitive environment. Capture countries would have been immediately categorized as countries where the EU is a guarantee, however, the role that the EU has had during the Great Recession opens the door for both possibilities: either it is still perceived as a protection or it pays the toll for the encouragement of austerity and it is perceived as a threat for already meagre systems of social provision.

Table 1. Classification of countries considered in the analyses.

Type	Countries	Expected perception of the EU regarding welfare
Equality	Sweden, Denmark, Finland	Threat
Status	Belgium, France, Germany, Austria	Opportunity
Competitiveness	Ireland, United Kingdom, The Netherlands	Threat
Capture	Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece	Opportunity / Threat

Source: Adapted from Beramendi et al (2015: 44–45).

4. Operationalization

Women and men face surveys and political knowledge differently (Ferrín and Fraile, 2014; Mondak et al., 2004), thus, the selection of the dependent variable has tried to be sensible to this extent. For this reason, the dimension that has been looked into has been trust in the EU. Trust was defined by Mishler and Rose (2001: 55–56) as “*the expectation that institutions will perform or provide the basis for such performance to occur in the near future*”. The EU has nurtured the development of this kind of feeling amongst the citizens of member States to guarantee its legitimacy (Fuchs et al., 2009; Weßels, 2007). But the fact that it strongly relies on performance and outcomes requires trust not to be taken for granted (Delhey, 2007: 256). Particularly under the current context, trust captures more accurately discontent than a more general question, such as evaluating EU membership in terms of being good or bad. Research on attitudes regarding the EU has

largely focused on different operationalizations of support (Braun and Tausendpfund, 2014; Gabel, 1998, 2000; Hooghe and Marks, 2005, 2009; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970; Maier et al., 2012; Schimmelfennig, 2014).

Since the 1970s, different questions have tried to capture the various components of support for the EU, the problem is that most of these questions include a refuge category³ aside from the “Don’t Know” option that would pose further challenges to the research because of the problems of attributing a meaning to it (de Vries and Steenbergen, 2013; de Vries, 2013; Ingelgom, 2014). The survey used does not provide sufficient information to test for what could be standing behind this category and understand differences amongst respondents, which further encourages the use of trust. Even if the question does not have a refuge response, it does contain the category “*don’t know*” but, as it can be seen in further detail in table B of the annex, less than 5 percent of the sample chose this option. It is true that women almost double the rate of men but the amounts are so small that have not been considered at this stage. To ease the analyses, trust has been simplified into a dichotomous variable, those who trusted and those who did not.

Gender is a variable that is usually introduced in statistical models as a control, less frequently as an explanatory variable. However, the current context, in which the EU is not delivering as it had been doing, should have put under stress citizens’ trust on the EU, providing a good opportunity to explore this variable’s explanatory potential. It is expected that women’s trust should be under higher pressure because the policies that they are supposed to cherish are the ones undergoing the biggest adjustments. This design is not fit enough to make general statements about the existence or not of a gender gap in trust for the EU. Yet if the phenomenon is to exist, this context seems ideal to capture those differences with statistical techniques.

Hypothesis 2 refers to the role of vulnerability on citizens’ trust in the EU. Vulnerability is constructed in this paper by the interaction of two dimensions: family situation and economic difficulties. Given the exploratory nature of this paper, citizens that find themselves in the most vulnerable situations should be more likely to have lower likelihood of trusting the EU than citizens that are better off.

³ Preliminary descriptive analyses performed on the 2014 wave of the EES show that this category is the second most populated with almost 30% of the respondents, after “a good thing” (54%). Table A in the annex includes the full description of the variable.

The family situation of respondents is originally a large variable that accounts for different compositions that families can take nowadays. To be more easily interpreted it has been simplified in order to identify three types of family units (the description of the chosen operationalization can be found in tables C of the annex): single adults, families that are composed by a couple and children and families with only one adult and children. It is assumed that compared to the first, the latter are less tied by obligations, which makes them less susceptible to finding themselves in situations of stress and poverty when there are no social safety nets. However, not all of those who have children are the same. Even if I will not get into the precise identification of broken homes, those that only have one provider seem more likely to fall into situations of need than those that count on two adults.

The mere presence of two adults, nevertheless, is not enough to assume that a family is at risk of exclusion or not. Some sort of economic indicator needed to be taken into consideration but finding the right one was a challenge. On the one hand, household income has a low level of response. On the other, subjective social class has low variance. Both of them were substantively inadequate to find those families that were in need. The 2014 wave of the EES offered a third option that seemed better suited for this work: it was methodologically sensible and it inquired on how households make ends meet. The survey asked respondents whether they had experienced trouble paying their bills in the last year or not (the description of the respondents' distribution can be found in table D of the annex). Even if the content could be sensitive, respondents seemed willing to answer (less than 2 percent refused to answer). In addition, the dimension asks in a gender-sensitive way whether the household is experiencing economic problems or not. The variable introduced in the model has been simplified into those that experienced troubles or not.

The last independent variable considered has been the country in which the respondents were interviewed. This paper does not take into consideration every member State, just Western European countries. Ideally, every member State should have been considered but Central and Eastern European countries introduced unnecessary complexity to the models. For this reason, in the first model the errors have been clustered by countries, to account for country-level confounding effects (Möhring, 2012). However, the crisis has not hit in the same way every country. For this reason, in a second step, the data have been segmented according to Beramendi et al.'s (2015) classification. Geographical

grouping (north-south, for example) was not enough to account for policy path-dependence and the feasibility set of options were to be considered also because they have been said to define womens' expectations (Hudson, 2006; Nelsen and Guth, 2000).

The control variables included are: age, education and ideology. To begin with, the theoretical framework highlighted the importance of education and changes in curricula that, in this type of analyses, can be measured by generational replacement (Inglehart and Norris, 1999: 457), that is by taking into account the **age** of respondents. Given that this is not the focus of the paper but that women socialized in the 50s can be expected to be substantively different than those educated in the 2000s, this variable has just been introduced as a control. Besides, **education** shapes the roles that men and women are expected to assume (Bennett and Bennett, 1989; Bolzendahl and Coffé, 2013; Coffé, 2013; Immerzeel et al., 2013). Additionally, higher levels of education have been found to foster higher levels of cosmopolitan values because citizens have more skills to understand and benefit from an increasingly internationalized context (Fligstein, 2009). Thus, developing amongst individuals with higher levels of education, higher levels of support for European integration. Last but not least, Hudson (2006) found that the lack of knowledge also related to higher levels of mistrust amongst citizens. The last variable considered is the **ideological self-placement** of respondents, grouped into four categories: left (0-4), centre (5), right (6-10) and those who refuse to place themselves. Although the relation is not exempt of debate, some authors have defended the relationship between ideological self-placement and the development of more or less positive positions regarding European integration (Eijk and Franklin, 2004; Gabel and Anderson, 2004; Hooghe, 2005). In any case, ideology does relate to the preferred policy options of individuals, which makes the inclusion of this variable paramount to avoid confounding effects (Calvo et al., 2014; Freire and Belchior, 2011; Hellwig, 2007; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2008; Vegetti et al., 2013). The inclusion of this variable and the fact that citizens in Central and Eastern Europe relate differently to the scale was another reason to avoid considering these countries in the analyses.

5. Discussion

Several logistic regression models have been calculated using the variables described in the previous section to test the hypotheses. The first set of models considered can be found

in table E of the annex. These models show step by step the effects leading to the triple interactive term.


The first model is the simplest model which includes all the countries without even taking into account a potential clustering of errors. The following columns show the results of clustering the errors, to control for country-specific features, and including an additive term to control for potential interaction effects between the different sources of vulnerability. Being a woman remains statistically significant along all the models, the same as experiencing difficulties in paying the bills. Contrary to what the first hypothesis expected, although the size of the effect is rather small, women tend to trust more the EU than men. Difficulties with paying the bills have a larger effect and they reduce the likelihood of the respondent of trusting the EU. The family situation of respondents seems to have a limited effect on the respondent's trust in the simple model.

Looking at the additive models, the combination of women and hard family situations do not yield differences. However, when bills cannot be paid women do react differently than men, trusting less the EU. Surprisingly, when the interactive term includes the family situation with hardship paying the bills, those in hardship are more likely to trust the EU. The model with the triple interaction confirms these results. But what do they point to substantively?

Contrary to what this paper expected to find, the key element is not gender but vulnerability. It is true that the number of respondents in the most vulnerable groups is rather small, which impedes some differences to reach statistical significance. Still, the descriptive analyses showed in tables A to D, already announced the small size of the effects that would appear. Women tend to be more trusting than men in the EU, thus, it could seem that it is not so threatening or that there are bigger threats and they assume it as a necessary evil⁴. The difference seems to appear when gender combines with economic vulnerability, because here women and men do react differently and it is here where women are less trusting than men.

⁴ On the relation between public opinion and the development of global markets see Hellwig (2007).

Fig.1. Average marginal differential effect of being a woman over being a man of the logistic regression model with a 90 percent confidence interval. Western European countries. 2014



Source: European Election Study 2014.

Oppositely, when families with descendants are economically vulnerable, they tend to be more trusting than those that do not have dependents. Figure 1 shows the gender based differences for the triple interaction effect (combining gender, family situation and difficulties paying the bills). It is shown here that women that do not face difficulties making ends meet, whether they are alone or have a partner and children, are more trusting than men in the same situation. In situations of vulnerability they seem to have lower chances of being trusting, although they are still more trusting than men. Since these results are not statistically significant, no actual claim can be made based on these coefficients.


To test the third hypothesis, clustering the errors by country was not enough. Instead, as it was explained in the expectations of the hypotheses, the countries were classified into four groups according to Beramendi et al's (2015) typology. The full report of these regressions can be found in table F of the annex and figure 2 shows the average difference due to being a woman in the marginal effect of the full additive model, the one that includes the triple interaction effect. This triple interaction's aim is to identify those that are more vulnerable and should be more willing to defend social provision schemes. However, the relation between the EU and national institutions is not homogeneous and

some countries have perceived it as a threat to their existing institutions while others have framed it as an opportunity to improve (Christin, 2005; Ehin, 2001; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000). This relation should reproduce at the micro-level between those that are more likely to benefit from social provision.

Figure 2 shows the average difference of being a woman in the marginal effect calculated for the regression models, still with a triple interactive effect, to test for H.3 (differentiated effects across countries due to how the EU was perceived in relation to national institutions). Instead of clustering the errors by country, four models have been calculated segmenting the sample according to the typology of countries. As in the previous models, results are somehow unexpected. The size of the differences between men and women is rather small and the trends resulting from the grouping of countries are less different than expected. Although there is some variation in the size of the effect, the sign it takes is the same across countries whenever it is able to reach statistical significance. In this sense, it is relevant to comment that women with partner and children that are unable to face their bills, against what was expected, are more trusting in the EU than men. If differences reached statistical significance in the other categories, the size of the effect would be bigger, which would somehow contradict the hypothesis that the EU is perceived as a threat in countries with well-functioning welfare states.

In terms of the relevance of social vulnerability for trust in the EU two comments are to be made. The first one is that results can be interpreted for the sample surveyed because differences do not reach statistical significance in most cases. The amount of respondents in this situation for every group is rather small given all the conditions that are to be met. Not only, precisely these respondents may be underrepresented because they are harder to get to (Blair et al., 2013; Couper, 2000). The second is that, the group that was expected to be in the weakest situation was that of women with children, without a partner and that has difficulties affording the household bills. In equality and competitiveness countries women are less supportive. However, in status countries the effect size is almost the same for women that can pay the bills and those that cannot, both of them being more trusting. In capture countries, the effect is negative, which would point to these women finding the EU menacing for their meagre welfare. Surprisingly they have higher chances of being supportive than women with the same family situation but that cannot afford bills.

Fig.2. Average marginal differential effect of being a woman over being a man of the logistic regression model with a 90 percent confidence interval. 2014



Source: European Election Study 2014 using Beramendi et al's (2015) classification of countries.

6. Concluding remarks

This paper has attempted a preliminary exploration of the link between public opinion and trust in the EU in a context where the EU has adopted a more relevant role demanding budgetary rigour that has strongly affected welfare provision (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014; Muñoz, Anduiza, et al., 2014). Do women react differently to men to this context in terms of their trust in the EU? The existence of such differences would then support further research into whether these differences are due a differentiated way of relating to politics or methodological issues.

In the results it looks like women link differently vulnerability and trust in the EU. Contrary to what was expected in the first hypothesis, women are more trusting than men in the EU. However, they become less trusting when they find themselves unable to make ends meet. It is important to underline that the size of the effects found is rather small, wherever it was able to reach statistical significance. Evidence in the sample only supports that some women when they have no partner nor children or partner and children, so less likely to find themselves in situations of vulnerability, are more likely to trust the EU than men in the equivalent situation. However, for those that are in hardship, probably due to the small size of the subsample that is included in this group, results are inconclusive although they point to lower chances of trusting. Across countries results are also problematic because they do not reach statistical significance, although in this sample there appear to be little differences between types. However, women with partner and children and no difficulties in making ends meet seemed more trusting than men, in line with Gingrich and Häusermann's (2015) findings.

This paper is a timid first attempt to link the literature on gender gap with that of public opinion and support for welfare states. Survey data such as the European Election Study that has been used here are far from ideal to understand the mechanisms behind differentiated reactions amongst men and women to their context. However, it provides a good starting point to explore relations found and to point out the countries where further studies could be relevant. Furthermore, in this case, the results, contrary to what Nelsen and Guth (2000) find, support that women tend to be generally more trusting. Further research definitely needs to be done but there could be interesting lessons to be learned. In a context where unemployment seems to be taking a toll on support for the EU,

engaging with welfare-state-related issues could provide more rewarding for European institutions than focusing on other issues that are more divisive. Having said this, the research I am presenting is far from finished and many new questions open: is the EU less threatening to women than to men? Does the winner-losers scheme (Bartolini, 2005; Kriesi, 2012; Kriesi et al., 2013) really explain how citizens relate to the EU or is the scene slightly more complex? What could be the mechanism behind a gender gap? Which other variables could be relevant in the explanation?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alves S (2015) Welfare State Changes and Outcomes - The Cases of Portugal and Denmark from a Comparative Perspective. *Social Policy & Administration*, 49(1), 1–23.
- Andreß HJ and Heien T (2001) Four worlds of welfare state attitudes? A comparison of Germany, Norway, and the United States. *European Sociological Review*, 17(4), 337–356.
- Anduiza Perea E (1999) *¿Individuos o sistemas? Las razones de la abstención electoral en Europa Occidental*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- Auel K and Höing O (2015) National Parliaments and the Eurozone Crisis: Taking Ownership in Difficult Times? *West European Politics*, 38(2), 375–395.
- Bartolini S (2005) *Restructuring Europe. Centre formation, system building, and political structuring between the nation state and the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bennett LLM and Bennett SE (1989) Enduring Gender Differences in Political Interest. The Impact of Socialization and Political Dispositions. *American Politics Quarterly*, 17(1), 105–122.
- Beramendi P, Häusermann S, Kitschelt H, et al. (2015) *The Politics of Advanced Capitalism*. Beramendi P, Häusermann S, Kitschelt H, et al. (eds).
- Bernauer J, Giger N and Rosset J (2013) Mind the gap: Do proportional electoral systems foster a more equal representation of women and men, poor and rich? *International Political Science Review*.
- Blair J, Czaja RF and Blair EA (2013) *Designing Surveys: A Guide to Decisions and Procedures*.
- Bolzendahl C and Coffé H (2013) Are ‘Good’ Citizens ‘Good’ Participants? Testing Citizenship Norms and Political Participation across 25 Nations. *Political Studies*, 61, 63–83.
- Bönte W (2014) *Gender differences in competitive preferences: New cross-country empirical evidence*. Schumpeter Discussion Papers.
- Bosco A and Verney S (2012) Electoral Epidemic: The Political Cost of Economic Crisis in Southern Europe, 2010–11. *South European Society and Politics*, 17(2), 129–154.
- Brady D and Bostic A (2013) Paradoxes Lost and Found: The Dimensions of Social Welfare Transfers, Relative Poverty, and Redistribution Preferences.
- Braun D and Tausendpfund M (2014) The Impact of the Euro Crisis on Citizens’ Support for the European Union. *Journal of European Integration*, 36(3), 231–245.

- Byrnes JP, Miller DC and Schafer WD (1999) Gender differences in Risk Taking: A Meta-Analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, 125(3), 367–383.
- Calvo E, Chang K and Hellwig T (2014) Beyond assimilation and contrast: Information effects, ideological magnification, and the vote. *Electoral Studies*, Elsevier Ltd, 36, 94–106.
- Campbell R (2004) Gender, Ideology and Issue Preference: Is There such a Thing as a Political Women’s Interest in Britain? *British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, 6, 20–44.
- Christin T (2005) Economic and Political Basis of Attitudes towards the EU in Central and East European Countries in the 1990s. *European Union Politics*, 6, 29–57.
- Coffé H (2013) Women Stay Local, Men Go National and Global? Gender Differences in Political Interest. *Sex Roles*, 69, 323–338.
- Condon M and Wichowsky A (2015) Same blueprint, different bricks: reexamining the sources of the gender gap in political ideology. *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 3(1), 4–20.
- Costa-Font J and Cowell F (2015) Social identity and redistributive preferences: A survey. *Journal of Economic Surveys*, 29(2), 357–374.
- Couper MP (2000) Web Surveys : A Review of Issues and Approaches. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 64(4), 464–494.
- De Grauwe P (2013) The Political Economy of the Euro. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 16(1), 153–170.
- De Grauwe P and Ji Y (2014) The Future of the Eurozone. *The Manchester School*, 82, 15–34.
- De Vries C and Steenbergen M (2013) Variable Opinions: The Predictability of Support for Unification in European Mass Publics. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 12(1), 121–141.
- De Vries CE (2013) Ambivalent Europeans? Public Support for European Integration in East and West. *Government and Opposition*, 48(03), 434–461.
- Delhey J (2007) Do enlargements make the European union less cohesive? An analysis of trust between EU nationalities. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(2), 253–279.
- Delli Carpini M and Keeter S (1996) *What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Díez Medrano J (2003) *Framing Europe attitudes to European integration in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. Princeton studies in cultural sociology*, Oxford: Princeton University Press.

- Doring H and Schwander H (2015) Revisiting the left cabinet share: How to measure the partisan profile of governments in welfare state research. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 25(2), 175–193.
- Ehin P (2001) Determinants of public support for EU membership: Data from the Baltic countries. *European Journal of Political Research*.
- Eichenberg RC and Read BM (2015) Gender Difference in Attitudes towards Global Issues. In: Steans J and Tape D (eds), *Handbook of Gender in World Politics*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
- Eijk C Van Der and Franklin MMN (2004) Potential for contestation on European matters at national elections in Europe. In: Marks G and Steenbergen M (eds), *European integration and political conflict*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 32–50.
- Esping-Andersen G (1990) *The three worlds of welfare capitalism*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Esping-Andersen G (1999) *Social Foundations of Post-Industrial Economies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ferrín M and Fraile M (2014) La medición del conocimiento político en España: problemas y consecuencias para el caso de las diferencias de género / Measuring Political Knowledge in Spain: Problems and Consequences for the Gender Gap in Knowledge. *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, 53–72.
- Ferrín Pereira M, Fraile M and Rubal M (2014) Young and Gapped? Political Knowledge of Girls and Boys in Europe. *Political Research Quarterly*, 68(1), 1–14.
- Figueiredo H, Rocha V, Biscaia R, et al. (2015a) Gender pay gaps and the restructuring of graduate labour markets in Southern Europe. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 39, 565–598.
- Figueiredo H, Rocha V, Biscaia R, et al. (2015b) Gender pay gaps and the restructuring of graduate labour markets in Southern Europe. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 39(2), 565–598.
- Filler N and Jennings MK (2015) Familial Origins of Gender Role Attitudes. *Politics & Gender*, 11(01), 27–54.
- Fligstein N (2009) Who are the Europeans and How does this matter for politics? In: Checkel JT and Katzenstein PJ (eds), *European Identity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 132–166.
- Fraile M (2014) Do women know less about politics than men? the gender gap in political knowledge in Europe. *Social Politics*, 21(0), 261–289.
- Fraile M, García-Albacete G and Ferrin M (2013) An experimental look at the gender gap in political knowledge: Visual versus verbal political knowledge. In: *Análisis*

metodológicos de la medición de comportamientos, valores y actitudes sociopolíticas, Sevilla: XI Congreso de la Asociación Española de Ciencia Política. ‘Política en tiempos de crisis’.

Freire A and Belchior AM (2011) What left and right means to Portuguese citizens. *Comparative European Politics*, 9(2), 145–167.

Fuchs D, Magni-Berton R and Roger A (2009) European Cleavage, Euroscepticism and Support of the EU: A Conceptual Discussion. In: Fuchs D, Magni-Berton R, and Roger A (eds), *Euroscepticism. Images of Europe among mass publics and political elites*, Farmington Hills (MI): Barbara Budrich Publishers, pp. 9–34.

Gabel M (2000) European integration, voters and national politics. *West European Politics*, 23(4), 52–72.

Gabel MJ and Anderson CJ (2004) The structure of citizen attitudes and the European political space. In: Marks G and Steenbergen MR (eds), *European Integration and Political Conflict*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gabel MJM (1998) Economic Integration and Mass Politics: Market Liberalization and Public Attitudes in the European Union. *American Journal of Political Science*, 42(3), 936–953.

Gingrich J and Hausermann S (2015) The decline of the working-class vote, the reconfiguration of the welfare support coalition and consequences for the welfare state. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 25(1), 50–75.

Halikiopoulou D, Nanou K and Vasilopoulou S (2015) *Economic crisis and the rise of welfare nationalism across the EU*. Political Behaviour Colloquium, Florence.

Hall P (2013) The political origins of our economic discontents: contemporary adjustment problems in historical perspective. In: Kahler M and Lake DA (eds), *Politics in the new hard times. The Great Recession in comparative perspective*, Ithaca: Cornell U Press, pp. 129–149.

Hellwig T (2007) Economic openness, policy uncertainty, and the dynamics of government support. *Electoral Studies*, 26(4), 772–786.

Hobolt SB and Tilley J (2014) *Blaming Europe? Responsibility Without Accountability in the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hooghe L (2005) Calculation, Community and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration. *European Union Politics*, 6, 419–443.

Hooghe L and Marks G (2005) Calculation, community and cues - Public opinion on European integration. *European Union Politics*, 6(4), 419–443.

Hooghe L and Marks G (2009) A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(01), 1.

- Hooghe M and Stolle D (2004) Good Girls Go to the Polling Booth, Bad Boys Go Everywhere. *Women and Politics*, 26(4), 1–23.
- Hudson J (2006) Institutional Trust and Subjective Well-Being across the EU. *Kyklos*, 59(1), 43–62.
- Immerzeel T, Coffé H and van der Lippe T (2013) Explaining the gender gap in radical right voting: A cross-national investigation in 12 Western European countries. *Comparative European Politics*, 13, 263–286.
- Ingelgom V Van (2014) *Integrating Indifference A Comparative, Qualitative and Quantitative Approach to the Legitimacy of European Integration*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Inglehart R and Norris P (1999) The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: Women and Men's Voting Behavior in Global Perspective. 21(4), 441–463.
- Jelen TG, Thomas S and Wilcox C (1994) The Gender Gap in Comparative Perspective. *European Journal of Political Research*, 25(April 1992), 171–186.
- Kriesi H (2012) The political consequences of the financial and economic crisis in Europe: Electoral punishment and popular protest. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 18(4), 518–522.
- Kriesi H, Bochsler D, Matthes J, et al. (2013) *Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kuhn T and Stoeckel F (2014) When European integration becomes costly: the euro crisis and public support for European economic governance. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21(4), 624–641.
- Lindberg LN and Scheingold SA (1970) *Europe's would-be polity. Patterns of change in the European Community*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Maier M, Adam S and Maier J (2012) The impact of identity and economic cues on citizens' EU support: An experimental study on the effects of party communication in the run-up to the 2009 European Parliament elections. *European Union Politics*, 13(4), 580–603.
- Meltzer A and Richard S (1981) A Rational Theory of Government. *Journal of Political Economy*, 89(5), 914–927.
- Mishler W and Rose R (2001) What are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 34(1), 30–62.
- Möhring K (2012) The fixed effects approach as alternative to multilevel models for cross-national analyses. In: *10th ESPAnet Conference*, Edinburgh.

- Mondak JJ and Anderson MR (2004) The knowledge gap: A reexamination of gender-based differences in political knowledge. *Journal of Politics*, 66(2), 492–512.
- Mondak JJ, Anderson MR, The S, et al. (2004) The Knowledge Gap : A Reexamination of Gender-Based Differences in Political Knowledge The Knowledge Gap : A Reexamination of Gender-Based Differences in Political Knowledge. *The Journal of Politics*, 66(2), 492–512.
- Morales L (1999) Political Participation: Exploring the Gender Gap in Spain. *South European Society and Politics*, 4(2), 223–247.
- Muñoz J, Rico G and Anduiza E (2014) Empowering Cuts? Austerity Policies and Political Involvement in Spain. 1–20.
- Muñoz J, Anduiza E and Rico G (2014) Empowering cuts? Austerity policies and political involvement in Spain. In: Kumlin S and Stadelmann-Steffen I (eds), *Feedback? How Welfare States shape the democratic public*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
- Nelsen BF and Guth JL (2000) Exploring the Gender Gap: Women, Men and Public Attitudes toward European Integration. *European Union Politics*.
- Pratto F, Stallworth LM and Sidanius J (1997) The gender gap: differences in political attitudes and social dominance orientation. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 36(1), 49–68.
- Rapoport RB (1985) Like Mother, Like Daughter: Intergenerational Transmission of DK Response Rates. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 49(2), 198.
- Sanchez-Cuenca I (2000) The Political Basis of Support for European Integration. *European Union Politics*, 1(2), 147–171.
- Sánchez-Cuenca I (2008) How can governments be accountable if voters vote ideologically? In: Maravall JM and Sánchez-Cuenca I (eds), *Controlling governments: voters, institutions and accountability*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 45–81.
- Sapiro V (1983) *The political integration of women: roles, socialization, and politics*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Schimmelfennig F (2014) European Integration in the Euro Crisis: The Limits of Postfunctionalism. *Journal of European Integration*, 36(December), 321–337.
- Serricchio F, Tsakatika M and Quaglia L (2013) Euroscepticism and the Global Financial Crisis. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(1), 51–64.
- Streeck W (2014) How will capitalism end? *New Left Review*, 87(May/June), 35–64.

- Vegetti F, Poletti M and Segatti P (2013) When responsibility is blurred: Italian national elections in times of economic crisis, technocratic government, and ever-growing populism. *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, 43(March 2010), 329–352.
- Verba S, Burns N and Schlozman KL (1997) Knowing and Caring about Politics: Gender and Political Engagement. *The Journal of Politics*, 59(04), 1051.
- Welch S (1977) Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Political Participation Differences. *American Journal of Political Science*, 21(4), 711–730.
- Weßels B (2007) Discontent and European Identity: Three Types of Euroscepticism. *Acta Politica*, 42, 287–306.

ANNEX

Table A. Evaluation of EU membership by gender of respondent. Original variable. All countries in the survey. Percentages. 2014.

	Male	Female	Total
Do not know	2	3,6	2,9
A good thing	56,7	51,4	53,8
A bad thing	14,7	13,2	13,8
Neither a good thing nor a bad thing	26,6	31,8	29,5
Total	100	100	100
(n)	13522	16512	30064
Pearson chi2(3) = 187.4911 Pr = 0.000			
likelihood-ratio chi2(3) = 190.1418 Pr = 0.000			
Cramér's V = 0.0790			
gamma = 0.0630 ASE = 0.010			
Kendall's tau-b = 0.0345 ASE = 0.005			
<i>Source:</i> European Election Study (wave 8, 2014).			

Table B. Trust in European institutions by gender of respondent. Original variable. All countries in the survey. Percentages. 2014.

	Male	Female	Total
Do not know	2,9	5,6	4,4
Yes, definitely	9,9	8,7	9,2
Yes, to some extent	41,9	42,2	42
No, not really	28,5	29,2	28,9
No, not at all	16,9	14,3	15,5
Total	100	100	100
(n)	13522	16512	30064
Pearson chi2(4) = 169.2130 Pr = 0.000			
likelihood-ratio chi2(4) = 173.8903 Pr = 0.000			
Cramér's V = 0.0750			
gamma = -0.0499 ASE = 0.009			
Kendall's tau-b = -0.0295 ASE = 0.005			
<i>Source:</i> European Election Study (wave 8, 2014).			

Table C. Family situation by gender of respondent. Original variable. All countries in the survey. Percentages. 2014.

	Male	Female	Total
No children	66,1	57	61,1
Partner and children	31,3	33,8	32,7
Children without partner	2,6	9,2	6,2
Total	100	100	100
(n)	13358	16360	29718
Pearson chi2(2) = 640.6568 Pr = 0.000			
likelihood-ratio chi2(2) = 693.3570 Pr = 0.000			
Cramér's V = 0.1468			
gamma = 0.2169 ASE = 0.011			
Kendall's tau-b = 0.1094 ASE = 0.006			
<i>Source:</i> European Election Study (wave 8, 2014).			

Table D. Difficulties to pay the bills by gender of respondent. Original variable. All countries in the survey. Percentages. 2014.

	Male	Female	Total
Refusal	1,9	1,7	1,8
Most of the time	10,6	13,2	12
From time to time	25	27,8	26,5
Almost never/ never	62,5	57,4	59,7
Total	100	100	100
(n)	13552	16512	30064
Pearson chi2(3) = 97.8424 Pr = 0.000		gamma = -0.0956 ASE = 0.010	
likelihood-ratio chi2(3) = 98.2213 Pr = 0.000		Kendall's tau-b = -0.0502 ASE = 0.005	
Cramér's V = 0.0570			

Source: European Election Study (wave 8, 2014).

Table E. Logistic regression models for trust in the EU. Western European countries, 2014

VARIABLES	Basic model	Basic model, clustered errors	Family vulnerability	Economic vulnerability	Family's economic vulnerability	Both vulnerabilities	Triple interactive term
Being a woman	0.106*** (0.0253)	0.122*** (0.0399)	0.0872** (0.0398)	0.163*** (0.0451)	0.120*** (0.0401)	0.126*** (0.0459)	0.123** (0.0496)
Family composition (ref. cat.: without partner nor children)							
Having partner and children	0.112*** (0.0287)	0.123* (0.0644)	0.0632 (0.0913)	0.124* (0.0646)	0.0341 (0.0706)	0.0561 (0.0906)	-0.0479 (0.0948)
Having children and no partner	-0.0288 (0.0533)	-0.0617 (0.0969)	-0.0387 (0.127)	-0.0531 (0.0972)	-0.198 (0.132)	-0.0496 (0.125)	-0.246 (0.155)
Difficulties paying bills	-0.430*** (0.0263)	-0.570*** (0.0879)	-0.570*** (0.0876)	-0.503*** (0.0969)	-0.674*** (0.0755)	-0.495*** (0.0984)	-0.614*** (0.105)
Interaction woman*family situation							
Woman*Having partner and children			0.116 (0.0847)			0.135 (0.0838)	0.165** (0.0826)
Woman*Having children and no partner			-0.0151 (0.117)			0.0147 (0.113)	0.0693 (0.167)
Interaction woman*difficulties paying bills				-0.123* (0.0670)		-0.139** (0.0659)	-0.116 (0.0932)
Interaction family*difficulties paying bills							
Having children and partner*Difficulties paying bills					0.237*** (0.0770)		0.303** (0.123)
Having children and no partner*Difficulties with bills					0.297* (0.164)		0.502** (0.243)
Triple interactive term							
Woman*Having children and partner*Difficulties with bills							-0.120 (0.161)
Woman*Having children and no partner*Difficulties with bills							-0.216 (0.242)
Age	0.00454*** (0.000854)	0.00354 (0.00216)	0.00365* (0.00214)	0.00359* (0.00216)	0.00314 (0.00215)	0.00373* (0.00215)	0.00330 (0.00212)
Categorized ideology (ref.cat.: Don't know)							
Left	0.348*** (0.0382)	0.490*** (0.157)	0.491*** (0.156)	0.490*** (0.157)	0.489*** (0.157)	0.491*** (0.157)	0.490*** (0.157)
5	0.274*** (0.0390)	0.447*** (0.137)	0.448*** (0.136)	0.447*** (0.137)	0.446*** (0.136)	0.448*** (0.136)	0.447*** (0.136)
Right	0.618*** (0.0382)	0.610*** (0.137)	0.611*** (0.136)	0.612*** (0.137)	0.608*** (0.137)	0.613*** (0.136)	0.611*** (0.137)

(continued)

Table E (continued)

Years of education (ref. cat.: No studies)

15 or less	0.136 (0.129)	0.0661 (0.343)	0.0634 (0.344)	0.0631 (0.341)	0.0523 (0.339)	0.0595 (0.341)	0.0448 (0.338)
16-19	0.395*** (0.128)	0.326 (0.359)	0.324 (0.360)	0.323 (0.357)	0.309 (0.355)	0.319 (0.357)	0.301 (0.355)
20 or more	0.811*** (0.128)	0.857** (0.352)	0.855** (0.353)	0.854** (0.349)	0.844** (0.348)	0.851** (0.351)	0.837** (0.348)
Still studying	0.999*** (0.143)	1.065*** (0.328)	1.065*** (0.328)	1.064*** (0.326)	1.053*** (0.323)	1.064*** (0.326)	1.050*** (0.322)
Constant	-0.880*** (0.142)	-1.020** (0.454)	-1.008** (0.457)	-1.042** (0.456)	-0.953** (0.445)	-1.030** (0.459)	-0.957** (0.448)
Observations	27,519	15,412	15,412	15,412	15,412	15,412	15,412
Pseudo-r2	0,034	0,047	0,047	0,047	0,048	0,047	0,048

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: EES 2014.

Table F. Regression model for trust with triple interaction model and clustered errors by country. By country typology. 2014

VARIABLES	M2. Equality	M3. Status	M4. Competitiveness	M5. Capture
Age	5.21e-05 (0.00277)	0.00454** (0.00211)	-0.000991 (0.00265)	0.00779*** (0.00250)
Ideology (ref. cat.: DK)				
Left (1-4)	0.347* (0.180)	0.649*** (0.107)	0.393*** (0.123)	0.574*** (0.105)
Centre (5)	0.340* (0.190)	0.568*** (0.110)	0.0568 (0.119)	0.699*** (0.111)
Right (6-10)	0.790*** (0.180)	0.496*** (0.109)	0.132 (0.122)	0.969*** (0.113)
Years of education (ref. cat.: No education)				
15- years	-0.531* (0.271)	-0.0154 (0.609)	-0.198 (0.881)	1.131*** (0.311)
16-19 years	-0.232 (0.252)	0.0755 (0.606)	0.320 (0.877)	1.348*** (0.317)
20+ years	0.0771 (0.242)	0.524 (0.607)	1.014 (0.878)	1.896*** (0.318)
Still studying	0.401 (0.320)	0.933 (0.625)	1.294 (0.900)	1.833*** (0.361)
Being a woman (ref. cat.: man)				
	0.0983 (0.0928)	0.102 (0.0865)	0.201* (0.108)	0.0200 (0.139)
Family situation (ref. cat.: without partner nor children)				
With partner and children	0.165 (0.138)	-0.353*** (0.119)	-0.00202 (0.146)	0.0459 (0.165)
With children without partner	-0.108 (0.332)	-0.853** (0.364)	-0.0293 (0.496)	0.153 (0.517)
Interaction [woman*family] (ref.cat.: female#without partner or children)				
Female # Partner and children	0.0241 (0.190)	0.330** (0.166)	0.137 (0.201)	0.166 (0.233)
Female # Children without partner	0.368 (0.430)	0.242 (0.423)	0.199 (0.563)	-0.783 (0.626)
Difficulties in paying the bills				
	-0.570** (0.230)	-0.656*** (0.126)	-0.427*** (0.155)	-0.468*** (0.128)
Interaction [woman*difficulties with bills]				
	-0.0115 (0.322)	-0.100 (0.177)	-0.141 (0.216)	-0.0988 (0.183)
Interaction [family*bills] (ref. cat.: without partner or children # difficulties with bills)				
With partner and children # Difficulties with bills	-0.322 (0.428)	0.520** (0.227)	0.417 (0.256)	0.167 (0.210)
With children without partner # Difficulties with bills	1.058 (0.958)	0.706 (0.609)	0.421 (0.664)	0.0770 (0.629)
Triple interaction (ref. cat.: woman # without family or kids # difficulties with bills)				
Woman # with partner and children # difficulties with bills	1.355** (0.602)	-0.295 (0.308)	-0.0288 (0.346)	-0.229 (0.293)
Woman # with children without partner # difficulties with bills	-1.525 (1.117)	0.0567 (0.682)	-0.472 (0.755)	0.497 (0.749)
Constant	-0.0720 (0.341)	-0.731 (0.623)	-0.601 (0.895)	-2.623*** (0.372)
Observations	3,117	4,521	3,230	4,037
Pseudo r2	0.029	0.038	0.055	0.05

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: EES 2014.

