

# Very first draft with pilot test results – please do not cite –comments welcome

## **Threat of Repression: Mobilization or Withdrawal**

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### **Abstract**

What is the effect of civil rights retrenchment on contentious politics and attitudes towards dissent?

Responses to contentious politics in the context of the economic crises in Spain have included changes to the laws that regulate public demonstrations of dissent. These changes have been broadly contested for their potential effects on civil rights retrenchment and withdrawal of citizens from political action. Extant scholarly literature on the effects of government repression or state-induced sanctions on popular protest has established that responses from the demonstrators are context dependent. This means that individuals have increased their activity, have backed away from contestation or have combined both types of responses strategically. An important part of this research has focused on has dealt with event or issue-specific responses to particular causes or groups and has mostly focused on police responses. This research aims to contribute to this literature by placing the debate in the current context of state repression in Europe as a consequence of the economic crisis since 2008 and by focusing on the individual level mechanisms that explain responses. Our experimental approach expands previous findings by considering repressive policy to non-violent protest in democratic contexts, and by providing new evidence on the role of individual attitudes and emotions, as well as on the relevance of public support of protest.

**Keywords:** Protest, repression, crisis, political engagement, attitudes

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## Intro

### Anti-austerity demonstration and changes to the LSC

Spain has witnessed an unprecedented rise in contentious action as a response to the economic crisis since 2008. New organisations and exceptional social movements have sprouted in defence of social rights in the European country with the highest levels of protest activity. These vast mobilisations have brought low levels of public disorder both in terms of police sanctions or detainees<sup>2</sup> which is quite remarkable considering the despair and anger driving the demonstrators in response to the economic crisis. However in the first months of 2013, the incumbent *Partido Popular* (PP) argued for the need to strengthen public safety by eliminating violence and pushed changes to the Public Safety Act and the Penal Code (*Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana* – hereon LSC). The project, commonly known as the *Ley Mordaza* (Gag Law), has been widely criticized for its potential impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and assembly impact. The changes have already been approved by the parliamentary majority of the PP and came into force on July 1<sup>st</sup> 2015.

Scholarly research on the effects of repression on political contestation has found conflicting evidence when considering multiple contexts and types of repression. State repression can increase, decrease, or have no effect; and these effects vary when considering different timeframes and contexts (e.g., Francisco 1996, 2004; Gupta, Singh, and Sprague 1993; Gurr and Moore 1997; Hibbs 1973; Lichbach and Gurr 1981; Muller 1985; Rasler 1996; Davenport 2007). Most of the standing research has dealt with protest event analysis, thus considering group action and a broad operationalisation of government repression that includes police coercion against demonstrators, arrests, banning assemblies, press censorship and martial law. This study is based on the current political situation in Spain, where the reform to the LSC is closely linked to the incumbent's reaction to the crisis and is therefore a much polarised issue. The experimental design leverages the current political situation in Spain, where changes to the LSC have determined four types of repertoires as very serious offenses punishable by substantial fines. Repression is taken as the lawful attempt to deter participation in contentious action. However, broad mobilisation against anti-austerity policy has involved violent clashes and cases of police brutality against protesters. These cases have received unprecedented media attention and have therefore been closely related to citizens' reactions to the LSC.

We use an experimental design in order to manipulate public reactions questioning the legitimacy of the LSC for its potential impact on the freedom of expression and rights of

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<sup>2</sup> Data from the yearly reports on protest events and civil disobedience from the Home Office in Spain reveal an important peak of contentious activity since 2009 coinciding with austerity measures, and a minor rise on police interventions, arrests and street violence since then.

assembly. We also use factual data on the first cases in which the law has been enforced and the fines it conveys to protesters in order to prime threat and cost, respectively. We aim to shed some light on the mechanisms underlying individual responses, in order to extend previous findings in three ways: (1) provide causal evidence for non-violent forms of protest in democratic contexts following on survey-based studies (Opp & Roehl, 1990) (2) determine the role of attitudes toward protest and emotional reactions to repression in explaining reactions to repression; and (3) examines the contextual effect of public perceptions about the legitimacy of legal state repression.

The experiment provides evidence of how far the perceptions of illegitimacy of repression influence the willingness to demonstrate and the attitudes towards repertoires of protest. It also taps on the emotional reactions to the threat of repression in order to test how fear and anger affect the intention to take actions against the LSC and to get directly involved in the online campaign by signing petitions and spreading the call through social networks.

#### **<Preview of results>**

#### **<Paper structure>**

The first part of the paper introduces the major theoretical currents on political repression to contentious politics and our take on the matter. A second section presents our research design and hypotheses. A third section describes basic results, a discussion of the experimental design and finally a discussion of our substantive results in relation with the theoretical expectations. In section four we conclude.

## The context of the LSC

Anti-austerity protest in Spain evolved rapidly into multidimensional conflicts, with unusual repertoires of action, organized by multiple types of actors and with increasing threats to government. All these characteristics have been identified by scholars as precursors of repression (Davenport 1996, Gartner and Regan 1996, Poe et al. 2000, Davenport 2000). Most of the concentrations and demonstrations that have taken place since the outbreak of the economic crisis were peaceful events, although in some cases, clashes between the demonstrators and the police took place as isolated phenomena. According to government records, violent incidents in protest events have not risen proportionally to the number of events (Ministerio del Interior 2015). However, when police intervention has taken place, multiple reports of abuse of authority and excessive use of police force have been filed (ref) and social contestation to police brutality has also led to massive demonstrations<sup>3</sup>. Anti-austerity protest has been harshly repressed by anti-riot police when compared to preceding standards but most of the cases have not been sanctioned by the criminal courts (ref). In response, the incumbent PP sustained that increasing government-sanctioned repression towards protest was necessary in order to prevent violence and consequently proposed the criminalization of new forms of protest with legislative changes intended to facilitate the sanction of these behaviours.

The LSC has been widely criticized both on the substantive contents of the bill as well as on the procedures for its approval. Following its approval in late spring 2015, the LSC has aroused the concern and rejection of a broad part of the Spanish society as well as the Constitutional Court, which admitted for revision an appeal of unconstitutionality. With regard to the limitations that may be imposed on the right to demonstrate, the Constitutional Court has stated that no restrictions can be absolute, nor may they obstruct the fundamental right beyond reasonable measure, as the importance of the fundamental right restricts the scope of the limiting regulations that may be placed upon it.<sup>4</sup> The Court has also repeatedly maintained that freedom of expression and information covers not only inoffensive or immaterial criticism but also that which could annoy or offend, especially when related to someone in public office” (Amnesty International 2014).

International organisations like the United Nations and the Human Rights Commissioner of the Council of Europe have also criticized the law harshly and multiple actors have questioned the procedures of an incumbent that has been accused of taking advantage of its majority in handling the parliamentary procedures (ref).

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<sup>3</sup> Response to the cleanup of the Indignados encampments, student occupations of universities and Occupy Congress events all over the country from 2009 to 2012 especially.

<sup>4</sup> STC 110/2006, of 3 April 2006, FJ 3 referring to STC 20/1990, 15 February, FJ 5 and STC 53/1986, 5 May, FJ3

## <Literature review>

### **Repression and its behavioural and attitudinal consequences**

Research on the behavioural effects of repression has a long tradition and has investigated multiple forms of repression and its outcomes. Social movement studies as well as the research on violent conflict have built multiple theoretical models and have carried on vast empirical research (for a complete review see Earl 2011). Multiple results regarding the effects of repression point to the importance of the contextual determinants of reactions to repression. This is the way to explain deterrence or withdrawal of political action in some cases and backlash or radicalising effects in other cases where the repressed augment their mobilisation in response to repression. Standing research deals with important methodological challenges for studying repression, considering the endogenous nature of the challenge-repression-response dynamics and the need to take into account the timeframe of reactions. This has led to approaches that deal with consequences of repression and those that look for the explicative factors of repression. The former have been widely guided by a reversed U-curve model where increasing political violence or dissent leads to repression, which consequently diminishes government-challenging behaviours (Gurr 1969; Muller 1985; Weede 1987). The latter have focused on how increased dissent turns into repression; they refer to this as the threat-response theory (Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003) and propose a law of coercive responsiveness (Davenport 2007).

Most of the research on repression and dissent is based on protest event data and time series analysis. This approach emphasises the political opportunity structure explanations and consequently provides a rich understanding of contextual level factors. Individual level data has been used as well for case studies on particular issues (Opp & Roehl 1990) and causality has been addressed through instrumental variable models (Ritter and Conrad 2015) and survey experiments to committed activists (Lawrence 2013). However, most of the research has largely ignored political attitudes. We suggest that attitudinal consequences of repression are also central for understanding the effects of repression. Attitudes have not only been consistently identified as precursors for behaviour, but they are a critical goal when struggling for political change. We therefore expect that attitudes towards protesters change within similar logics than those of the behavioural reactions, and, most importantly, that they act as mediating factors between repression and behavioural responses.

### **Illegitimacy and threat, mobilization or withdrawal?**

Following on Opp and Roehl (1990) in the aim of identifying the conditions under which repression leads to withdrawal or mobilisation, we propose two conditions to explore the effects

of repression on mobilisation: first, we put to test their assertion that repression is likely to fuel resistance when it is regarded as illegitimate, and second, we test how perceived threats and costs associated to repression affect individual perceptions and reactions.

We test a conception of legitimacy which is not based on the “legalistic” nature of State action as opposed to violent actions, but on the illegitimacy associated with low popular support to the LSC and the allegations of potential human rights violations in the law.

In this sense, we expect that differences in the framing on the legitimacy of the legislative changes in the LSC will affect responses to repression. We thus expect legitimacy framing to have a demobilising effect and conversely, illegitimacy framing to provoke action and support towards contentious politics.

Regarding the threats and costs associated to repression, we follow on the rationalist paradigm which envisages a deterring effect on behaviour when individuals face higher costs. However, we are particularly interested in studying the conditions and individual traits that may moderate this effect, as well as the mechanisms underlying the effects of threat on political action.

#### <Mechanisms>

The effects of higher costs associated to the threat of imprisonment, fines or other forms of legal action vary between individuals both as a function of their individual traits and their social context. Ritter & Conrad (2015) ascertain that dissidents that mobilize despite the threat of repression should be systematically different in terms of their determination for taking action than groups that withdraw when faced with repressive action. They point to values for undertaking contentious action and to their resistance to the costs incurred from repression. Opp and Roehl (1990) sustain within a similar logic to the differences between highly involved activists and regular protesters and to the effects of “protest-encouraging networks”. We propose that risk aversion, and specifically in the context of risk deriving from protest actions, will be central in understanding individuals perceptions of threat. Therefore, **we expect that knowledge of potential threat and costs associated with state-induced repression will lead to higher perceptions of risk and consequently to lower levels of participation.**

Within a similar logic, we are interested in studying previous involvement in protest as, not surprisingly, it is the strongest predictor of engagement in protest activities. Past behaviour may be signalling involvement with organisational networks and/or identification with causes. In this sense, past involvement in protest is central for determining both individual level and contextual conditions. At the individual level, group support associated with organisational involvement or identity, can be thought of as a buffer of the costs of repression and therefore as a moderator of the effect of repression on withdrawal. This supports the hypothesis that repression will be

perceived as more costly or threatening by individuals not previously involved in protest. Consequently, **we expect repression to have a stronger demobilizing effect on individuals with no previous experience in protest than for experienced protesters.**

At an aggregated level, previous involvement in protest is important as repression may have an effect through contextual attitudes towards protesters. Repression can stigmatize protesters by labelling them as social deviants and this could lead to social isolation (DeNardo 1985:191, cited in Opp & Roehl, 1990). This is the strategy that spokesmen of the incumbent *Partido Popular* have followed systematically in the last years by associating protesters to toutsled street performers (*perroflautas*) or to terrorist bands (ETA) in their appearances on the media<sup>5</sup>. Repressive policy has a similar purpose of stressing the undesirability of dissenters. This highlights the importance of attitudes towards protesters and their repertoires as negative attitudes may bring two possible outcomes via social sanctions to those who transgress the social norm –and are consequently repressed: (1) negative attitudes may led protesters into a “deviant career” which incentivises further mobilisation, or (2) negative attitudes may exert social pressure by stigmatising dissent and thus portraying it as undesirable. In the first case, a reaffirmation of group identity for protesters as deviants would encourage their continued action, and in the second case, social pressure would lead them to withdrawal. **We expect that the effect of repression on participation is mediated by attitudes towards protesters and that the effect depends on the individual’s previous involvement in protest.**

On the other hand, repressive acts may also be regarded as immoral (White 1989) and individuals may feel a moral obligation to support protesters or their causes and even to regard socially sanctioned repertoires as justified. This would lead to positive attitudes towards protest and these expressions of sympathy and support for demonstrators who may become victims of repression may reinforce their behaviour or may rise the intention to participate as well. Therefore, **we expect positive attitudes towards protest to be a mechanism by which repression turns into political participation.**

Emotions are a final mechanism we consider relevant in our study of individual reactions to repression. Scholarly literature on political psychology has made great progress in studying how emotional reactions affect collective action. Repression can lead to social indignation and reactions produced by perceptions of illegitimacy. In this case, repression should lead to anger which has been documented as a ‘fight’ emotion, which leads to participation (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2007, Gurr & Moore 1997). On the other hand, repression is intended to threat potential dissenters and produce fear towards sanctions; as fear is a ‘flight’ emotion it works as

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an attenuator or inhibitor of action (Gray 1987). Following this logic, we expect that individual emotional reactions have an immediate effect on attitudes and intention to participate following the fight /flight logic: **individuals for whom the LSC makes them feel fear will tend to inaction and less support for protest and individuals who react with anger will tend to take action and support protest.**

### <Hypotheses>

Our expectations can be concisely stated as:

Legitimacy frames

- Perceived illegitimacy of repression -> positive attitudes toward transgressive repertoires (confrontation of threatening policy) / withdrawal
- Perceived legitimacy of repression -> fear/ negative attitudes towards transgressive repertoires (persuasion/alignment with threatening policy) / mobilization (particularly if not risk averse or engaged)

Threat and cost

Threat/Cost -> fear/withdrawal/disengagement

Threat/Cost -> anger/support/engagement

### Design

This study is based on an experimental 3x3 between-subjects design. It is a lab experiment with individual treatment.

### <Treatment design>

Participants were randomly assigned to one of nine conditions plus a control group: Threat (prime on repression) + Cost (prime on fines) + No prime x Legitimacy of repression (with 3 treatment groups) and one control group<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> Treatment wording is presented in Appendix 1



**Figure 1 – Treatment design**

		<b>Legitimacy</b>			
		<b>Legitimate repression -</b> Law justified in order to prevent violence	<b>Illegitimate repression –</b> Human rights violations	<b>Socially illegitimate repression –</b> No social support	<b>Control – No</b> legitimacy frame
<b>Threat</b>	Prime on repression - arrest of demonstrators enforcing the dispositions of the LSC				
<b>Cost</b>	Prime on fines - example of the fines established in the LSC: 601€ to 30.000€ for demonstrating in front of public buildings or for refusing to disband a concentration or demonstration.				
<b>Control</b>	No prime				

<DV>

### **Political engagement under repression**


In order to tap individual reactions to repression, we used both attitudinal and behavioural measures. Attitudinal measures include intention to protest and support for repertoires and protesters. Behavioural measures include online participation such as signing petitions and posting them on Facebook or Twitter.

#### **Intention to protest and participation**

Subjects were asked whether they would take action in any of six repertoires to act on standing campaigns that either supported or rejected the LSC, according to their position on the issue.

We presented the behaviour questions (invitation to sign petitions and social media diffusion) with a reference to standing campaigns. This was expected to provide external validity, but to introduce as well an upward bias on our results towards mobilization instead of withdrawal. The choice of multiple organizations promoting petitions or the reference to “Several citizen platforms of various ideologies” aimed at reducing the importance of the mobilization source when generating expectations for acting against repression. Intention to mobilize was high for all the repertoires except for camping in public squares.

**Figure 2 – Intention to protest (items and aggregated index)**



(Responses for each item were 1. Completely sure I will not, 2. Probably not, 3. Probably yes, 4. Completely sure I will)

### Attitudes towards protest

Following on Cristancho *et al.* 2015, we are interested in studying attitudes towards protesters, grievances and repertoires. Reactions to repression may be directed to each of this attitude objects independently, as people who support certain grievances or actors may disagree from the strategic choices of repertoires. Conversely, people who consider particular repertoires to be legitimate vehicles for social expression of dissent, may think of them as highly context-dependent and therefore unsuitable for particular situations.

Additionally, attitudes towards political objects have been shown to be strong predictors of political action (ref). Dealing with attitudes towards actors, issues and repertoires in the cleanest possible way is therefore crucial to establish important outcomes such as support for repertoires questioned by repressive policy, as well as mediating variables explaining actual behavioural responses.

### Petition and social signal

Subjects were also invited to take actual action on online campaigns. They were provided with links to three campaigns against the proposed changes to the LSC, and were instructed to choose between reading through the campaigns and surfing the internet freely during 10 minutes. After that time, they could sign the petitions and/or post them on Facebook or Twitter.

We consider petition signing and posting petitions as indicators of mobilization in reaction to repression. Posting messages in social media can be interpreted both as an act of contents diffusion in order to inform and invite others, but also as expressive political participation with the purpose of taking action on a cause by signaling support (ref).

16% of the respondents signed one petition (and spent a mean time of 4 and a half minutes reading through the campaigns), 13% two, and 10% signed the three petitions.

## **Findings**

We present only the results of a pilot carried out on 43 experimental subjects. These results provide preliminary evidence which indicate mostly the performance of the experimental design and the direction of treatment effects. We do not expect these to be conclusive evidence considering this is a very small sample.

### **Experiment performance**

#### **<Randomization>**

No significant differences were found between treatment groups in terms of age, education or ideology. Differences in gender were significant between prime treatments and this should be considered in the composition of the sample, and controlled for in the analyses. This problems are expected to disappear with a larger sample.


#### **<Manipulation checks>**

Manipulation checks were used both for the legitimacy treatments, as well as the primes. 75% of the subjects were fully aware of whether they read a text that defended the LSC, rejected it on one of two accounts (it involves violations of human rights or it lacks popular support), or just mentioned the law without issuing any position on it. The threat and cost primes work in the same direction. After being primed for threat and cost, 43% believed the most important effect of the LSC was people being arrested for demonstrating without violence and only 17% believed the most important effect were fines discouraging certain protest actions, respectively. These results may be signalling both the difficulty of treating individuals effectively in a highly salient issue where respondents have already been pre-treated (Slothuus 2012) and the similar nature of the primes –threat of imprisonment and fines.

### Descriptives – main effects


The results by prime type provides evidence that the impact of threat and cost on support for repertoires and actors is quite similar and in the expected direction. However, both primes augment the intention to protest which runs opposite to the rationalist expectation of withdrawal under higher costs or threat conditions. The effect on issue-specific behaviour regarding the LSC (petitioning and social signal) is different for both primes. Individuals in the threat condition prefer not to support the anti-LSC campaign, while those in the cost prime (information on fines) sign more petitions and share them more on social media than those with no cost treatment. A third element of perceived risk may be mediating the effects as subjects perceiving the threat of being arrested may have a stronger disincentive than those perceiving the probability of being fined.

**Figure 3 – Main effects for prime treatments**



Because our data is limited to a pilot test, these results are only suggestive and only useful to test the direction of differences. Working with a larger sample will provide an indication of the significance of the differences and the possibility to obtain data on the combined effect of cost and threat in order to better explore issues of independence between the two effects.

**Figure 4 – Main effects for legitimacy framing treatments**



### Multivariate analysis

Our main indicators of mobilization have been actual petitioning, social signal or expressive behaviour, along with intention to demonstrate. As presented in table 1, the strongest predictor of engagement is previous engagement. However, mobilisation could also be understood as a change in previous behavioural patterns; these implies considering reported activism or engagement in contentious politics in order to tell apart mobilisation from previously passive individuals or potential demobilisation from politically active subjects.

**Table 1 – The effects of illegitimacy framing on intention to protest, support for repertoires and support for actors**

	Intention to protest		Support for repertoires		Support for anti-LSC demonstrators		Support for austerity demonstrators	
Illegitimacy treatment	-0.470	(0.475)	0.021	(0.393)	-0.161	(0.558)	-0.606	(0.666)
Risk aversion	-0.056	(0.078)	-0.029	(0.064)	-0.039	(0.091)	0.010	(0.109)
Treatment*Risk aversion	0.058	(0.091)	-0.004	(0.075)	0.126	(0.107)	0.124	(0.128)
Support for LSC	-0.088	(0.047)	-0.131**	(0.039)	-0.084	(0.055)	-0.022	(0.066)
Involvement against LSC	0.337	(0.299)	0.025	(0.248)	0.177	(0.371)	0.072	(0.419)
Internal efficacy	-0.107	(0.167)	-0.016	(0.138)	-0.141	(0.198)	-0.044	(0.234)
Interest in politics	0.063	(0.209)	0.145	(0.173)	-0.439	(0.249)	-0.412	(0.292)

Past political participation	1.995***	(0.445)	0.658	(0.368)	0.807	(0.537)	0.810	(0.624)
_cons	2.064**	(0.723)	3.160***	(0.598)	3.787***	(0.865)	3.817***	(1.013)
N	39		39		38		39	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.623		0.420		0.489		0.299	

Standard errors in parentheses \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 2 presents the results for threat priming on both legitimacy groups. If the causal relationship between repression and mobilisation is driven by anger, as the fight/flight theory posits (Gray 1987), then we would expect those with the highest levels of anger to have the highest intentions to protest and conversely, that those reporting fear to have lower intentions to protest. The relatively high and positive value of the anger coefficient indicates that anger is positively related to intention to protest. However, fear has also a positive effect on intention to protest.

**Table 2 – The effects of threat on intention to protest, support for repertoires and support for actors**

	Intention to protest		Support for repertoires		Support for anti-LSC demonstrators		Support for austerity demonstrators	
Threat prime	0.730	(1.300)	2.224*	(1.031)	1.809	(1.862)	3.140	(2.077)
Fear	0.088	(0.328)	0.397	(0.260)	0.709	(0.458)	0.508	(0.524)
Threat prime*fear	-0.281	(0.363)	-0.397	(0.288)	-0.323	(0.502)	-0.256	(0.581)
Anger	0.580	(0.372)	0.145	(0.295)	-0.180	(0.545)	0.003	(0.594)
Threat prime*anger	-0.294	(0.416)	-0.171	(0.330)	0.061	(0.590)	-0.341	(0.664)
Risk aversion	-0.125	(0.097)	0.106	(0.077)	0.231	(0.133)	0.276	(0.155)
Prime*Risk aversion	0.269	(0.129)	-0.143	(0.103)	-0.279	(0.178)	-0.263	(0.207)
Support for LSC	0.081	(0.074)	-0.082	(0.059)	-0.086	(0.107)	0.002	(0.119)
Involvement against LSC	0.565	(0.316)	-0.021	(0.250)	0.195	(0.511)	0.068	(0.504)
Internal efficacy	0.151	(0.223)	0.358	(0.177)	0.094	(0.328)	0.241	(0.357)
Interest in politics	0.383	(0.283)	0.108	(0.224)	-0.904*	(0.397)	-0.670	(0.452)
Past participation	0.226*	(0.083)	0.066	(0.065)	0.028	(0.118)	0.087	(0.132)
_cons	-0.585	(1.282)	0.793	(1.017)	2.329	(1.916)	1.283	(2.048)
N	28		28		27		28	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.807		0.731		0.653		0.432	

Standard errors in parentheses \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

## **Discussion**

We provide the first individual-level causal evidence of the impact of political repression on political engagement and support for contentious politics.

Dealing with repression regarding actual government response to contentious politics in the context of the economic crisis in Spain provides external validity to our experimental design.

### **<caveats>**

The models include interactions that test for moderating effects. Multiple step models will provide evidence for mediation tests. Furthermore, a big challenge in the proposed research is establishing and correctly modelling the independence of alternative causal mechanisms, considering that the proposed theoretical explanations are closely related to each other.

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## Appendix 1 – Question wording

### Treatment

Ahora te pedimos que leas con atención el siguiente texto. Más adelante en el cuestionario encontrarás preguntas al respecto del texto

### Legitimate repression

#### ***La Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana como instrumento de prevención de la violencia***

*Como respuesta a una creciente intensidad en las protestas ciudadanas, varios países europeos han planteado cambios a sus leyes de seguridad ciudadana. En España se ha presentado el Proyecto de Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana. El proyecto se ha defendido argumentando que busca garantizar que los derechos y libertades de los ciudadanos puedan ser ejercidos con seguridad y sin violencia.*

*Los impulsores del proyecto muestran su preocupación por conseguir un adecuado funcionamiento de las instituciones democráticas. Subrayan la necesidad de proteger especialmente a los más vulnerables y salvaguardar los derechos fundamentales y especialmente el de manifestación. Con el cambio propuesto se espera garantizar que las manifestaciones se den en un ambiente de mayor libertad, los manifestantes estén más protegidos de la violencia y del vandalismo, y la intervención policial sea siempre gradual y proporcionada.*

### Threat prime

*Actualmente, ya se han detenido los primeros manifestantes basándose en el artículo 505 del nuevo Código Penal. El Código, modificado por la Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana, contempla penas de seis meses a un año de prisión para quienes "perturben de forma grave el orden [...]".*

### Cost prime

*La ley considera que manifestarse frente a la sede del Congreso, del Senado o de parlamentos autonómicos o negarse a disolver una concentración o manifestación son acciones graves, y establece multas de 601€ a 30.000€ para este tipo de acciones.*

### Illegitimate repression

#### ***La Ley de Seguridad ciudadana viola los derechos fundamentales***

*Como respuesta a una creciente intensidad en las protestas ciudadanas, varios países europeos han planteado cambios a sus leyes de seguridad ciudadana. En España se ha presentado el Proyecto de Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana. El proyecto ha sido criticado argumentando que supone una limitación de las libertades individuales de reunión y participación reconocidas en la constitución, así como de los derechos de carácter civil y político reconocidos en la declaración universal de los derechos humanos.*

*Los detractores del proyecto han mostrado, en múltiples instituciones nacionales e internacionales, su preocupación por los castigos y restricciones a la protesta social que la ley pretende imponer. Con el cambio propuesto se limitará el ejercicio de la libertad de expresión y reunión pacífica en la medida en que se otorgan amplios poderes de prevención y sanción a las fuerzas y cuerpos de seguridad del estado sin incluir mecanismos independientes de control policial.*

## Socially illegitimate repression

### *La opinión pública en contra de la Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana*

*Como respuesta a una creciente intensidad en las protestas ciudadanas, varios países europeos han planteado cambios a sus leyes de seguridad ciudadana. En España se ha presentado el Proyecto de Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana. Este proyecto ha sido recibido con un fuerte rechazo popular. Según las encuestas, tan solo el 7% de la población se muestra favorable al proyecto.*

*Quienes se han manifestado en contra del proyecto muestran su preocupación porque creen que una norma tan relevante como ésta debería ser consensuada entre todos los partidos políticos, o como mínimo, ser aprobada sin el rechazo abrumador de la opinión pública. Aprobar en solitario un cambio tan importante como esta reforma con el rodillo de una mayoría absoluta y contra la opinión pública mayoritaria pone en cuestión el adecuado funcionamiento de nuestras instituciones democráticas.*

## Control

### *Cambios a la Ley de Seguridad ciudadana*

*Como respuesta a una creciente intensidad en las protestas ciudadanas, varios países europeos han planteado cambios a sus leyes de seguridad ciudadana. En España se ha presentado el Proyecto de Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana.*

## Post treatment questionnaire (dv, mediators, manipulation checks)

Variable	Question wording	
Attitudes towards repertoires	Some people think that certain actions of political protest should be permitted in all cases while others should never be allowed. How strongly do you approve or disapprove the following actions? Where would you place yourself on a scale from “0“ to “10“, where 0 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. March through town or stage mass protest demonstrations</li> <li>2. Take part in strikes</li> <li>3. Occupy public squares indefinitely</li> <li>4. Take illegal action such as blocking roads or damaging public property</li> <li>5. Concentrate in front of the houses of public officials</li> <li>6. Political chants during sporting events</li> <li>7. Block evictions</li> </ol>
Petition signing to campaign against retrenchment policy -  <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Time invested in reading through petitions</li> <li>2. Number of petitions signed</li> <li>3. Number of social media posts</li> <li>4. Number of social media signal (share, like, RT, ...)</li> </ol>	<p>We found several campaigns against the proposed changes to the LSC. Now you have 10 minutes to read through the campaigns and their perspectives and proposals, or you can surf the internet freely.</p> <p>After 10 minutes you can choose one or more of the following options:</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Sign one or several petitions against the changes to the LSC.</li> <li>2. Like, share or Retweet request(s) on Facebook or Twitter</li> <li>3. Choose you do not want to participate in any campaign and terminate your participation in the study.</li> </ol>
Intention to protest	<p>Several citizen platforms of various ideologies are organizing acts in several cities to show their rejection toward the LSC. If you happen to receive a call that matches your position on the issue, would you join any of the following actions?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. March through town or stage mass protest demonstrations</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Completely sure I will not</li> <li>2. Probably not</li> <li>3. Probably yes</li> <li>4. Completely sure I will</li> </ol>

	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. Take part in strikes</li> <li>3. Occupy public squares indefinitely</li> <li>4. Take illegal action such as blocking roads or damaging public property</li> <li>5. Concentrate in front of the houses of public officials</li> <li>6. Chant during a sporting event</li> </ol>	
Personalization	Regardless of whether you signed any petitions or shared them on social media, we ask you to participate in the campaign by writing new arguments, slogans or relevant contents to overthrow the LSC. You'll have five minutes for this task.	Open response
Manipulation check – legitimacy	Please select the most suitable option according to the text that you just read regarding the public security law:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The text has defended the Public Safety Act arguing that it is a way of preventing violence.</li> <li>○ The text has criticized the Public Safety Act arguing that it involves violations of human rights.</li> <li>○ The text has rejected the Public Safety Act arguing that it lacks popular support.</li> <li>○ The text just mentioned the Public Safety Act without issuing any position on it.</li> </ul>
Manipulation check – threat or cost prime	With regard to changes in the LSC, please select the effect you consider most important	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Thanks to changes in the LSC people have been arrested for demonstrating without violence</li> <li>○ Thanks to changes in the LSC the established fines will discourage certain protest actions</li> </ul>
Emotions	The current situation of citizen rights in my country and the changes proposed by the Public security law makes me feel.... Please report your feelings on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means Not at all and 10 means Very much.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>security</li> <li>anger</li> <li>impotence</li> <li>fear</li> <li>sadness</li> <li>sorrow</li> <li>security</li> <li>tranquility</li> </ul>
Perceived risk of protest repertoires	Some people think that some actions of political protest involve certain personal risks (such as being fined, being involved in altercations with police, injured or arrest), while others feel that there is no personal risk. For the following list of actions, to what extent do you consider that carry no personal risk (0 on the scale) or involve great personal risk (10 on the scale)?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. March through town or stage mass protest demonstrations</li> <li>2. Take part in strikes</li> <li>3. Occupy public squares indefinitely</li> <li>4. Take illegal action such as blocking roads or damaging public property</li> <li>5. Concentrate in front of the houses of public officials</li> <li>6. Claim or sing during a sporting event</li> <li>7. Block evictions</li> </ol>
Attitudes toward demonstrators	To what extent do you sympathize with	Not at all

	the protesters ... 1. Against the <i>Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana</i> ? 2. Against austerity policies and cuts?	A little bit Quite a bit Very much
Perceived political influence	Thinking in citizen actions against the Public Safety Act, to what extent do you agree that: ... 1. requests are addressed to those responsible for reversing the law 2. the text of the petitions is suitable for the purpose of reversing the law 3. new demonstrations against the law to increase public interest in the topic 4. new demonstrations against the law will pressure the government to reverse the law	Totally disagree Tend to disagree Neither agree nor disagree Tend to agree Totally agree Don't Know

### Pre treatment questionnaire (controls, conditioning factors)

Variable	Question wording	
Past political participation	Think about the past 12 months. Have you in this time done the following? - Signed a petition / public letter - Boycotted certain products or deliberately bought product for political/ethical/environment reasons - Contacted or visited a politician or government/local government official - Donated money or helped to raise money for a political organization/party or action group - Attend a demonstration or march - Joined a strike	
Participation in specific protest	Have you taken part in any of the demonstrations, encampments, marches or protests ... Against austerity policies or cuts? ... Against the proposed citizen security law (Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana)? ... In favour of gender equality or pro-abortion? ... Against abortion? ... Against reform to education policy? ... In favour of the proposed citizen security law (Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana)?	1. Surely No 2. No 3. DK
Intended vote choice	If there were a general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?	1. PP 2. PSC/PSOE 3. IU/ICV 4. UPyD 5. Podemos 6. C's 7. CiU 8. ERC 9. CUP 10. I would not vote 11. DK
Internal Political efficacy	Where would you place your views on this scale where 0 means you Disagree completely	I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important

	and 10 means you Agree completely with each of the following statements? If your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.	political issues facing our country I think that I am as well-informed about politics and government as most people
External political efficacy	Where would you place your views on this scale where 0 means you Disagree completely and 10 means you Agree completely with each of the following statements? If your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.	Public officials don't care much what people like me think People like me don't have any say about what government does
Collective political efficacy	Where would you place your views on this scale where 0 means you Disagree completely and 10 means you Agree completely with each of the following statements? If your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.	Organized groups of citizens can have a lot of impact on public policies in this country  We, as people, are able to work together in order to achieve political goals
Satisfaction with democracy	In general, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the functioning of democracy in your country	0 . Very Dissatisfied 10. Very satisfied
Political interest	How interested would you say you are in politics?	1. Very interested 2. Quite interested 3. Not very interested 4. Not at all interested
Ideology	People sometimes talk about the Left and the Right in politics. Where would you place yourself on the following scale where 0 means Left and 10 means Right?	1. Left – 10. Right 11. Don't know
Risk aversion	In general, people often have to take risks when making financial, career or other life decisions. Overall, how would you place yourself on the following scale?	0 . I feel extremely comfortable taking risks 5. I feel neither comfortable nor uncomfortable taking risks 10. I feel extremely uncomfortable taking risks
Political discussion	When you get together with your friends, relatives, or fellow workers, how often do you discuss politics?	1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Sometimes 4. Fairly often 5. Very often
Gender	Are you...	0. Female 1. Male
Age	Please state your date of birth:	[DD/MM/YYYY]
Education	What is the highest level of education that you have completed?	0. No studies / illiterate 1. Not completed primary education (under 5 years of primary school) 2. Primary education or first stage of basic education (EGB) 3. Lower level secondary education or second stage of basic education 4. Lower Vocational training (FP1) 5. Upper secondary education 6. Higher vocational training (FP2) 7. Post-secondary, non tertiary education 8. Advanced technical degree 8. First stage of tertiary education (not leading directly to an advanced research qualification) 9. Three years of tertiary education 10. Bachelor in Arts or Sciences

		11. Architect or higher engineer 12. PhD
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