

Diversity in Spanish Politics? The Nomination of Immigrant-Origin Candidates and Dynamics of Descriptive Political Representation in Local Elections

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Paper to be presented at the AECPA Conference, Salamanca, July 10-12:

Panel Title: *Party elites' attitudes and strategies towards the social and political inclusion of immigrant minorities*

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Abstract: Despite the sustained increase of immigrant populations all over Europe, an increasing body of scholarship points to the alarming gap in the political representation of citizens of immigrant descent in European societies. What are the factors that allow us gaining a better understanding of the dynamics of these gaps in representation? Is a high concentration of immigrant-origin minorities enough for immigrant-origin minorities to gain political representation? Or are certain groups of parties more prone to nominate candidates than others, or to do so attending specific minority groups? To what extent parties responses are conditioned by their own characteristics such ideology, size or party family? This paper analyses how these factors — political opportunities, residential concentration or ethnicity — interact to help to account for the different levels of representation of immigrant-origin minorities at the local level in the Spanish case. Spain is an ideal case study to test these theoretical propositions regarding migrants' political representation since the recent and rapid increase of the foreign-born population has resulted in a diverse intake of multiple origin groups with different patterns of residential concentration. This paper studies the last 2011 and 2015 local elections in municipalities with the largest concentration of immigrant-origin residents of five different ethnic backgrounds: Romanians, Moroccans, Bulgarians, Latin Americans and Europeans from EU15 countries and examines how the above mentioned factors interact to lead to better or worse outcomes of descriptive political representation of these groups.

Acknowledgments: This paper uses data of the Project '¿Ayuntamientos Plurales? Representación política de los inmigrantes en España' (APREPINM) funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness within the framework of the 2016 call of the National Research Program Oriented to Societal Challenges, within the Technical, Scientific and Innovation Research National Plan 2013-2016 (reference CSO-2016-79540-R). Project co-funded by the European Regional Development Fund.

INTRODUCTION

This paper analyses the factors that facilitate and hinder the access of immigrant-origin minorities (hereafter referred to as IOMs) to elected office. To do so, we focus on the 2011 and 2015 local elections held in Spain. Local parliamentary assemblies generally stand out as the first (and more accessible) arena for IOMs to engage in politics and win elected office, among other reasons also because the ‘strength in numbers’ of the migrant population might be more relevant at the local level. In the Spanish context in particular, local elections also count with the peculiarity of a recent inclusion of certain immigrant-origin groups as part of the electorate. This has been gradually achieved through the enfranchisement of intra-EU migrants due to their EU citizenship status and, more recently, the extension of local voting rights to a number of (mostly) Latin American nationals who were allowed to vote for the first time for the 2011 elections. This greater access of IOMs to electoral rights at the local level might in turn increase their chances of achieving political representation in municipal parliamentary assemblies when compared to the regional or national levels of government.

Language barriers, attitudes of hostility or discrimination by the majoritarian group, and conditions of social exclusion are all factors that can hinder the electoral participation, and in turn, the political representation of ethnic minorities (Bird 2005). Other studies give a greater leverage to political opportunity factors such as the role of parties and party systems (Donovan 2007; Koopmans, 2004; Kittilson and Tate, 2004). This paper tries to analyze the effect of this different set of factors, drawing on the results of an original survey conducted with the local organizations of different Spanish political parties from a sample of 462 municipalities in which immigrants account for a sizeable share of the overall population. In doing so, we depart from previous work in this field by defining IOMs on the basis of the biographical features of the candidate or representative: his/her birthplace, and his/her parents’ birthplace. Thus, our definition includes all immigrant origins and is not restricted to the more ‘visible’ or non-western minorities of previous studies (Bird, 2005; Bloemraad, 2010). This strategy allows us to test whether visible and non-western minorities face greater barriers to gain political representation when compared to intra-EU migrants (see also Pérez-Nievas et al. 2014).

In order to analyze IOM’s levels of representation in the Spanish political arena, we depart from the literature on ‘descriptive’ representation that focuses on the extent to which elected

officeholders reflect group characteristics that are prevalent in the population at large in a manner corresponding to their relative size (Pitkin, 1967; Donovan, 2007). Although the existence of a clear link between the presence of minority groups in elected institutions and the substantive representation of the specific interests has been sometimes contested in the literature, the descriptive political representation of this particular group is still considered as one important step for their political integration in host countries (Mansbridge, 1999). First, many members of ethnic minorities seem to think that their interests can only be appropriately represented by another group member, more prone to advocate policy measures aimed to respond to their specific needs and demands (Ross 1943; Schwartz 1988; Phillips 1993; Williams 1995; Ruedin 2009). Secondly, the political representation of a specific group might carry an important symbolic weight that makes members of the group feel better integrated in the society, by ensuring them equal opportunities of taking part in the decision-making process (Donovan 2007; Bird 2011). Thirdly, it has been argued that the political exclusion of certain ethnic groups increases the potential for future conflicts within democratic societies (Reynolds, 2006). Finally, some of the literature suggests that the mere presence of representatives of traditionally excluded social groups leads to a better representation of their preferences and demands (Vega and Firestone, 1995; Lovenduski and Norris, 2003; Celis and Childs, 2008; Wängnerud, 2009; Bird, 2011; Wüst, 2011).

In order to address these questions we focus on the Spanish case that has been relatively understudied so far for this specific topic. Spain is an ideal case study to test IOM's level of political representation for several reasons. First, the accelerated inflows of foreign-born population since the decade of the 2000s has resulted in a high concentration of IOMs with different socio-economic characteristics and considerable variation in their patterns of settlement at the regional and local level. Second, unlike in many other European countries, the migration inflows to Spain are the combined result of flows of an economic or labour character (mostly from Latin America, Eastern Europe and North Africa), with flows of a residential character (mostly from Western Europe) that settle on small and medium size coastal towns of the country. Third, Spain also counts with an interesting internal variation of the party systems in which a varying degree of party system fragmentation that traditionally existed across the various regions has been further increased in 2015 with the emergence of new parties such as Podemos and Ciudadanos (C's). Thus, the comparison between the 2011 and 2015 local elections is particularly relevant for testing the argument of the extent to which an increased


degree of party competitiveness leads to a higher likelihood of inclusion of immigrant origin candidates in local party lists.

The paper is structured as follows. The first section examines the specificities of migration inflows to Spain by emphasizing the diversity of the most sizeable migrant groups residing in the country; and it further explains the electoral system dynamics at the local level that influenced our research design and the selection of specific municipalities and local party organizations for the analysis. The second section presents the main hypotheses of our paper, drawing on the literature regarding the factors that can affect the level of descriptive political representation for immigrant-origin minorities. In the third section we test these hypotheses through simple bivariate analysis. We conclude the paper with a brief discussion of the implications of our results.

The Spanish case and the research design of our sample of municipalities

As previously mentioned, the topic of the political representation of IOMs in Spain has received relatively little scholarly attention, despite the rapid and substantial intake of migration inflows that this country received during the last decades. The intensity of these inflows has led to a significant increase of the stock of foreign-born residents, from 3% of the total population in the late 1990s to 13% in 2017 (Figure 1). From 2013 to 2016, Spain witnessed a slight decrease of its foreign-born population (in both absolute and relative terms), most probably due to the financial crisis that significantly affected the domestic labour market since 2008. Despite this recent trend, the foreign born population in Spain still exceeds 6 million, this making Spain one of the main countries of destination for both intra-EU and non-EU migrants.

Figure 1. Evolution of migration inflows to Spain (1998-2017). % of foreign-born population out of the total population.




Source: Own elaboration with the data of the Spanish National Institute for Statistics (INE), several years.

A second reason to analyze the Spanish case is that migratory flows towards Spain have been characterized by a high diversity of national origins (Figure 2) and a considerable variation in the patterns of IO minorities' settlement at the regional and local level. The large influx of migration witnessed during the last two decades has been very diverse, resulting in considerably large communities of residents originating from Latin America, Western and Eastern Europe, and North Africa, which are still unevenly concentrated across Spain. Although large metropolitan cities have received a mix of nationalities, smaller cities, towns and villages have seen the settlement of large communities of one or two specific migrant groups.

In the case of mobile EU citizens, it is possible to distinguish migration flows coming from EU15 countries -among which British, German or French nationals- which generally respond to a lifestyle or retirement-driven type of migration (Rodríguez et al., 2010; Janoschka, 2011) - from the most recent arrivals from new EU Member States - particularly Romanians and Bulgarians - that generally subscribe to an economic or labour migration. Regarding non-EU nationalities, Morocco stands out as the main country of origin, followed by important Latin American inflows especially from Ecuador, Colombia, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic.

Since the beginning of the economic crisis, the relative weight of these specific nationalities within the overall immigrant population has started to change. Whereas the relative weight of IOMs originating in Morocco, Colombia, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic or China increased from 2011 to 2015, the percentage Romanian, Ecuadorian or British nationals has decreased during the same period. By countries of origin, in 2015 (i.e. the year of the last elections analysed in this paper), Moroccans were the largest IOM group (12,6 %), followed by Romanians (11%), Ecuadorians (6,9%), Colombians (5,8%), Britons (4,7%), Argentinians (4,1%), French (3,3) and Peruvians (3,1). Yet, the relative weight of these different IOMs also varies considerably by region: whereas in the Madrid region we find a considerable higher concentration of Romanians, Latin Americans or Chinese (and a more limited presence of Moroccans) when compared to the national average, we observe a higher prevalence of North Africans and certain groups of Asians (Pakistan) in Catalonia. Also, given their residential character, migration flows from the EU15 tend to concentrate in small and medium-size coastal towns of Andalusia, Valencia, the Balearic or the Canary Islands, whereas settlements in large cities such as Madrid and Barcelona respond almost exclusively to an economic and labour migration.

Figure 2. Immigrant-origin minorities in Spain, 2011 and 2015.



Source: Own elaboration with the data of the Spanish National Institute for Statistics (INE), several years.

Taking into account the relevance and characteristics of these different migrant flows, the sample of municipalities selected for this study focuses specifically on five migrant groups: Romanians, Bulgarians, Moroccans, Latin Americans, and EU nationalities before the 2004 EU enlargement wave (i.e. 14 nationalities). These five groups were selected not only because they are among the most sizeable migrant groups in Spain (Figure 2), but also because they count with sufficient variability in their group characteristics that could, in turn, affect their likelihood of obtaining political representation at the local level. As previously mentioned, these groups are quite diverse in terms of migration trajectories: whereas EU15 nationals respond mostly to a residential or *lifestyle migration* (Rodríguez et al., 2010; Janoschka, 2011; Huete et al., 2013; Janoschka & Durán, 2013), the other four groups generally respond to an economic migration of individuals who first arrived to Spain attracted by the job market of the fast-growing economy during the 2000's. Furthermore, in terms of linguistic resources, Latin Americans represent the only group sharing Spanish as their mother tongue with the autochthonous population, this potentially placing them in a better position to acquire political representation than the other IOMs.

Second and most importantly, these groups also differ significantly with regard to their right to vote and stand as candidates in Spanish local elections. As EU citizens, Romanians, Bulgarians and EU15 nationalities enjoy the right to active and passive suffrage in local elections in Spain since 1999. The situation is different for third-country nationals, whose possibility to stand as candidates for local elections in Spain is restricted only to those who have acquired the Spanish nationality. Nevertheless, when it comes to the active suffrage of non-EU migrants, in the late 2000's, the Spanish Government subscribed a number of bilateral agreements that formally granted the right to vote in local elections to a number of Latin-American nationalities (Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, among others) and which were first implemented in the 2011 local elections. However, potential recipients of these agreements have faced important institutional barriers to exert their right to vote, with very few of them actually registering in the electoral roll (Bermúdez & Escrivá 2016).

As for the naturalization process (which automatically allows migrants to stand as candidates in all Spanish elections), it is important to note that the standard procedure for ordinary naturalization establishes a qualifying period of 10 years of prior legal residence before immigrants can claim the Spanish nationality. Nevertheless, migrants originating from countries that have a previous colonial

relation with Spain benefit from a fast track access to the Spanish nationality after only two years of prior residence in the country. These clearly places the Latin American group in a privileged position to access to the Spanish citizenship when compared to the other four groups. In fact, between 2001 and 2009, nearly 80% of the half a million applicants who became Spanish citizens were of Latin-American origin (Pérez-Nievas et al. 2014: 17). Another million citizens of immigrant origin have naturalised between 2009 and 2015 (Vintila y Morales, 2018: 9) so if the previous ratio was maintained, this clearly gives Latin-Americans a privileged access to political rights via

Given this institutional configuration, Moroccans are the most disadvantaged group in terms of access to political rights at the local level in Spain: they do not enjoy the EU citizenship status, there is no bilateral agreement guaranteeing their enfranchisement in Spanish elections, nor they benefit from a fast track access to Spanish citizenship as their Latin American counterparts.

Taken into consideration these different criteria, we have selected our sample of Spanish municipalities following the condition of a minimum concentration of one (or more) of these five groups. Our sample thus includes all municipalities with 1,000+ inhabitants in which any of these IOMs represented at least 10% of the population (defined as foreign-born) in any of the two time-points (2011, 2015) of the local elections that we focus on. The underlying logic was that crossing the threshold of 10% of the population given significant demographic visibility to IOMs, thus increasing their likelihood of political mobilization.

Following this criteria our sample includes a total of 474 municipalities of which 47% have been included because they have a significant concentration (more than 10%) of population born in a EU15 country, 28% because they have a significant concentration of Romanians, 18% because they have a significant concentration of Latin Americans, 10% because they have a significant concentration of Moroccans, and only 2% because they present a significant concentration of Bulgarians. Out of the 474 there are 26 municipalities that present significant concentrations of more than one IO minority. In relation to their size, the largest group of the municipalities of our sample (30%) have a population size between 2000 and 5000 inhabitants, whereas only 31% of the sample have over 10.000 inhabitants, and just 8% of them have over 50.000 inhabitants (this last group includes Madrid and Barcelona). The different IOMs are distributed differently by the population size of the municipalities: Bulgarians and Romanians tend to concentrate in small municipalities, Latin-Americans tend to settle in larger towns and cities, while EU-15 citizens and Moroccans present a more even distribution.

As Table A1 in the Appendix shows the municipalities are quite spread out across the different Spanish Regions to the extent that only two (the Basque Country and Asturias) of the 17 Autonomous Communities do not have any municipality included in the sample. Andalusia (81), Valencia (80), Catalonia (58), the Canary Islands (40), Aragón (41), the Balearic Islands (37) and Madrid (35) are the regions with the largest number of municipalities included.

A second research design choice we made was in connection to the selection of electoral lists that we would consider for our study. In Spain, it is common that small local parties or lists of independent candidates will run for local office in competition with the more established nation-wide or region-wide parties. Given that our only possible source of data to identify IO candidates and elected officials were the local spokespeople for the electoral lists, we needed to include relatively stable political parties that could be located and asked questions about the two elections. Thus, for our sample only the electoral lists of political parties that had seats either in the national or the regional parliaments at the time of either the 2011 or the 2015 were included. Hence, our sample includes the following parties in one or several municipalities: PP, PSOE, Ciudadanos, Podemos, IU and UPyD as nation-wide parties. In the 2015 municipal elections, Left-wing coalitions between local sections of national parties (in most cases with the participation of Podemos, often also with IU and some regional parties) and local social movements and platforms were presented in a large number of municipalities. These have been coded as Left-wing coalitions in our data base. Together with these a number of regional parties in Catalonia (CiU, ERC, CUP) the Canary islands (CC) as well as other less relevant regionalist parties are also included in the sample .

Roughly half of those local organizations involve either the PSOE or the PP, the two traditional parties of the Spanish Party System. By contrast the third traditional party, IU, presented lists in about one third of those municipalities, (although in the 2015 election IU also participated as part of the above mentioned local left-wing coalitions). Of the new parties Podemos presented candidates only in the 2015 election, in most cases as part of broader left-wing coalitions mentioned above; whereas Ciudadanos presented lists in about 120 of the municipalities, in most cases only in the 2015 election, although a few of these involve both years since the party was already rooted in Catalonia in 2011. UPyD was a centrist-right party that obtained a few seats in the national parliament in both the 2008 and 2011 general elections, although it was subsequently wiped out when Ciudadanos jumped up to the national stage. All the rest of the parties included in the regional wide parties.

With regard to the Spanish local electoral system, the councilors that form the municipal assembly are directly elected every four years with the same calendar for all the municipalities, and it is the assembly that elects the mayor from among the councilors. Each municipality forms a single electoral constituency and the elections are based on closed and blocked (usually party) lists. This means that voters vote for a list, rather than a person. Each list must contain a number of candidates equal to the number of council seats at stake, which in 2015 oscillated between 9 and 57 according to population size. Within our sample we have a considerable number of municipalities (119 out of 474) where only 9 councilors are elected, but at the opposite end, in Madrid, the local assembly is made up of 57 members. Council seats are apportioned proportionally to the number of votes according to the D'Hondt formula, with a minimum vote threshold of 5 per cent for the apportionment of seats. The council members are then drawn from each list using the exact ordering in which the candidates were listed. Hence, there is no scope for the expression of preferences, and parties determine the position of candidates on the list and, as a consequence, their chances of being elected to office.

Once the samples (IO minorities, municipalities and parties) were defined, we designed an individualized questionnaire that included the names of all candidates included in the electoral lists for the local elections of 2011 and 2015 per party and municipality, 1853 questionnaires in total. We created our own dataset of local party contacts and sent the questionnaires to identify IO candidates, their country and region of origin. We provided explicitly in the questionnaire, a definition of IO candidates as those: (a) born abroad of non-Spanish parents (i.e. first generation immigrants), or (b) born in Spain of at least one non-Spanish parent (i.e. offspring of immigrants). The questionnaires were sent by e-mail to local party contacts- accompanied by a letter of presentation of the project and sometimes a letter of support of the national or regional party headquarters-. In the case of lists with representation at the local level for municipalities under 20.000 inhabitants we also sent the questionnaires by ordinary mail. In most cases responses were also returned by e-mail or ordinary mail, but sometimes they were completed through a follow-up telephone call and interview.

We began our field work in December 2017 and finished it by March 2019. In Table A1 in the Appendix we show our response rate by municipality, local parties' lists and region. We received a total of 518 completed questionnaires which represents a 28% response rate of all the lists included in our sample (and well above that average in some regions such as Castilla-Leon, Andalusia, Aragón or Madrid). We had at least one completed questionnaire in 307 (or 65%) of all the municipalities included in our sample.

Theoretical framework and hypotheses

A growing body of literature has examined the social and political barriers and drivers of the recruitment of IOMs to elected office in established democracies. In doing so, previous studies have put forward a comprehensive repertoire of factors that can explain the gap between migrants and non-migrants' presence in elected institutions, the dissimilarities observed in levels of descriptive representation of different migrant groups, or parties' varying levels of inclusiveness in fielding immigrant-origin candidates (see, for instance, Bird 2005; Donovan 2007; Ruedin 2009; Bloemraad 2010; Claro da Fonseca 2011; Soininen 2011; Sobolewska 2013; Bloemraad & Scholwalder 2013; Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013). Consequently, it has been argued that migrants' chances of obtaining access to the political arena are very closely linked to their different socio-economic resources, the openness of the parties in the host country, or even institutional barriers faced by IOMs.

First, drawing on different strands of the mainstream literature on political engagement, much of the scholarship has argued on the effects of the background characteristics on immigrants' propensity to gain elected office. Socio-economic resources have been, for a long time, deemed essential for political participation and political incorporation (Nie et al. 1969a; Nie et al. 1969b; Verba & Nie, 1972). More recently, they have been found to profoundly shape the opportunities for participation of ethnic and racial minorities (Verba et al. 1995; Fieldhouse & Sobolewska 2013; Bloemraad & Schonwalder 2013). Resources are not just limited to financial means, but also education or civic skills, under the rationale that better educated IOMs have easier access political information, this increasing, in turn, their electoral engagement, both in terms of voting as well as in terms of chances to be nominated as candidates in party lists (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993; Blais 2000). Additionally, migrants' language proficiency or length of stay in the host country have been also highlighted as structural reasons that can facilitate or hinder their electoral mobilization and implicitly, their descriptive political representation (Bloemraad & Schonwalder 2013). As argued in previous studies, newcomers find it more difficult to engage in host country electoral politics when facing linguistic barriers (De Sipio 1996; Ramacrishnan & Espenshade 2001; Jones-Correa 2001; Gonzalez-Ferrer 2011). On the contrary, a longer period of prior residence (which often correlated with a better language proficiency) fosters migrants' familiarity with the host country's political and electoral system, thus facilitating their incorporation in the new political environment (Chui *et al.* 1991; Bass and Casper 2001; White *et al.* 2008; Morales and Giugni 2011). Moreover, migrants' residential concentration –

especially when coinciding with electoral district boundaries – sets the conditions for IOMs to have leverage and act as a “voting block”. This, in turn, is expected to trigger a response from political parties, as they will have a strong incentive to reach out to a constituency of activated and coordinated voters (Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008; Schönwälder, 2013; Saalfeld y Bischof, 2013; Berg & Bjorklund, 2011).

Following these arguments, and beginning with the patterns of residential settlement, we expect to find that IO minorities living in areas where there is a large concentration of foreign-born residents in general (**H1a**) or where their own group is particularly numerous (**H1b**), will be more successful in achieving party nominations and elected office. Following the arguments about access to resources we expect that IO minorities from EU15 countries that have, generally speaking, a greater access to socioeconomic resources and respond mostly to a residential or a *lifestyle* migration are more likely to be nominated as candidates when compared to the other four groups that belong to a labor or economic migration (**H2**). On the other hand, Latin-American groups who are Spanish native speakers and are culturally closer to the autochthonous population might have a comparative advantage in being fielded as candidates on Spanish party lists (**H3**).

Also, certain individual characteristics of IO potential candidates might also be relevant in improving (or hindering) their chances of being nominated, or eventually elected as local councillors. In this respect there is a growing literature that looks at how demands for gender and ethnic minorities’ representation can interact to result in better or worse outcomes in levels of inclusion for men and women belonging to ethnic minority groups (See, for instance, Mügge 2013; Celis et al. 2014; Celis and Erzeel 2013). Some of these studies reveal additive patterns of inclusion and exclusion that make ethnic minority women experience “multiple barriers” in politics due to their belonging to more than one disadvantaged group (Hull et al. 1982; Strolovitch 2007). Especially ethnic minority women might experience difficulties with gaining access to political power because ‘the less one resembles a white man, the harder it is to gain power’ (Murray 2013). Following this “multiple barriers” hypothesis we might expect the proportion of IO male candidates to be higher than the proportion of IO female candidates on electoral lists (**H4a**), while these male candidates will also stand a higher chance to be finally elected as councillors than their female counterparts (**H4b**).

A second strand of the literature, however, contradicts this “multiple” barrier hypothesis, arguing for more complex, interactive patterns of inclusion and exclusion (Celis et al. 2014; Celis and

Erzeel 2013). To these other studies, parties, when confronted with multiple claims for group representation, usually do not engage with these claims to the same extent or in similar ways. Following new-institutionalist theories these works suggest that institutions tend to resist change and lean towards preserving the initial power equilibrium (Franceschet 2010; Celis and Erzeel 2013). Parties will favour the selection of candidates whose presence is least damaging for the majority male power, and, in that respect, ethnic minority women can be seen in many ways as ‘complementary to’—rather than ‘competing with’—the majority male candidates (Celis and Erzeel 2013: 490). Because they are non-male and yet do not belong to the women majority group (and are also often young), they can be seen as presenting a good match with the ‘experienced white male’ candidate (Meier et al. 2006). Selecting ethnic minority women candidates thus allows parties to ‘kill two birds with one stone’ (Mügge 2013). Finally, negative stereotypes about ethnic minorities—mostly related to crime—predominantly concern men, a factor that might also work for parties considering ethnic minority women as a safer option (Celis and Erzeel 2013: 491). Following this second strand of the literature we might expect the proportion of IO female candidates to be higher than the proportion of IO male candidates on electoral lists (**H5a**), while also these female candidates will also be better positioned in electoral lists and will stand a better chance of being finally elected as councillors than their male counterparts (**H5b**)

A second strand of the literature goes beyond IOM’s collective or individual resources and argues instead that immigrants’ descriptive representation might depend on the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) of the host country (Bloemraad y Schönwälder 2013). Electoral rules are a first set of variables with a potential impact in the level of representation of immigrant minorities (Bergh and Bjorklund 2003; Moser 2008; Ruedin 2009; Dancygier 2011). In our case study, the electoral system remains constant as the different municipalities analysed share the common electoral feature of a proportional system based on closed party lists. We only find variance in the district magnitudes of the municipalities included in the sample (an aspect that will be systematically analysed in the future draft of this paper).

The citizenship regime or the specific integration policies adopted by host countries also condition the chances of political representation for minority groups (Ireland, 2000; Koopmans et al., 2005; Donovan, 2007). Here we consider two mechanisms that might constrain the chances that different IOMs have to obtain political representation in Spain: the naturalization regime and the recognition of local electoral rights based on prior residence in the country (Moya y Viñas 2010; Pérez-

Nievas et al 2014; Vintila 2015; Vintila et al forthcoming). As already explained, while the standard procedure for ordinary naturalization in Spain requires 10 years of prior legal residence, this qualifying period is reduced to only two years for nationals of countries that have past colonial ties with Spain. Hence, this fast track access to the Spanish citizenship for certain nationalities mainly benefits the Latin American group, when compared to the other four groups. On the other hand, the recognition of electoral rights deriving from the EU citizenship status places Romanians, Bulgarians, and EU15 nationalities in a more privileged position when compared to the non-EU groups, by granting them the right to stand as candidates in local elections. Nonetheless, recent evidence based upon electoral registration rates shows that intra-EU migrants generally have quite low levels of political participation in Spanish local elections, particularly when it comes to EU nationals from more recent EU enlargement waves (Romania and Bulgaria in our case: see Vintila 2015). Also, before the 2011 local elections, the Spanish Government signed a number of bilateral agreements formally granting the active suffrage at the local level to a number of Latin-American nationalities quite well represented in demographic terms in Spain (Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, among others). Although very few of them actually registering in the electoral roll to vote for Spanish local elections (Bermúdez & Escriva 2016), they still lack the right to stand as candidates at the municipal level as bilateral agreements cover exclusively the right to active suffrage.

While for future versions we will try to estimate which of these two mechanisms adds to a greater number of voters for each of our IO groups for the time being, we set alternative hypotheses regarding the (dis)advantages for political representation created by the Spanish legal framework: 1) the privileged access to Spanish citizenship gives an advantage to the Latin American group to obtain political representation in relation to the other four groups (**H6a**); the EU citizenship status places Romanians, Bulgarians and EU15 citizens in a better position to obtain political representation compared to the other two groups (**H6b**). The combination of these two mechanisms also makes us to expect that the legal framework places the Moroccan group in clear disadvantage in relation to the other four groups in order to obtain political representation at the local level (**H6c**).

Together with legal and institutional factors, party system design and dynamics can also significantly shape migrants' access to the political arena. Parties play a critical role as gatekeepers to the electoral process. The way in which parties react to growing diversity with organized efforts to recruit members and candidates from minority groups will determine the access of the later to representative office (Messina, 1989; Geddes, 1998; Saggat, 2000; Kittilson and Tate, 2004). Previous

studies (see, for instance, Claro da Fonseca (2011)) have emphasized several constraints and incentives that condition parties to field IO candidates: the potential mobilization of IO voters and the counter-mobilization of anti-immigrant parties, the competitiveness of the electoral contest, parties' stances on immigration-related issues; party organizations' openness to migrants; their electoral strategies regarding migrant groups; and their nomination processes. For this version, we focus only on two of these factors, for which we consider two different hypotheses. First, we assess the role of party ideology in IO political representation, under the rationale that left-wing parties are more prone to 'take the risk' of nominating IO candidates (Donovan, 2007; Bloemraad y Schönwälder, 2013; Schönwälder, 2013; Berg y Bjorklund, 2011), thus being more inclusive than right-wing parties (**H 7**). Nonetheless, previous research on the political representation of immigrants in the Spanish case have not confirmed this expectation and even find that the conservative PP might be more inclusive of candidates of migrant origin when compared to their left-wing counterparts (Pérez-Nievas et al. 2014; Vintila & Morales, 2018).

Secondly, we also expect the competitiveness of the electoral contest to have a positive effect on inclusion and therefore we hypothesize that higher levels of party fragmentation will incentivize parties to include more IO candidates on their electoral lists (especially when coupled with a significant electoral potential from migrant groups) to attract this new niche of voters – the immigrant-origin electorate (**H8**). In fact, in a highly competitive electoral environment, reaching out the “migrant vote” might be a key element that can guarantee parliamentary seats (Konstantinidou, Ramiro, Vintila 2016); so a higher degree of electoral competition is expected to favour parties' propensity to return immigrant-origin candidates (Bird 2005; Berg and Bjorklund 2011; Pérez-Nievas et al. 2014).

With regard to the Political Opportunity Structure offered by the Party and Party System there is an additional to be considered. In the case of Spain, as in other European countries, the Great Recession not only brought about increased volatility and party fragmentation but also growing popular demands for more direct forms of democracy. A key aspect of this democratizing trend has been the adoption of more inclusive modes of candidate selection, either through the implementation of primaries, or through the better incorporation of party members in the selection processes of electoral candidates. In the case of Spain, the new parties, Podemos and Ciudadanos, have been more innovative in this respect by resorting to primaries not only to select candidates as heads of executive office (mayors in this case) but also other members of party lists (Jaime-Castillo et al 2018). Thus,


methods of candidate selection can also be seen as an additional factor that restricts or opens new opportunities for IO candidates

Preliminary findings

Figure 3 aims to capture the “mirror” effect in the levels of descriptive political representation of migrants by comparing their share within the population of the municipalities under analysis (horizontal axis) with the percentage of immigrant-origin candidates fielded in the party lists presented in these municipalities (vertical axis). The data clearly confirms the pattern of under-representation of migrants already highlighted in previous studies on the Spanish case, either at the local level (Perez-Nievas et al. 2014) or at the national and regional level (Vintila & Morales 2018, Vintila et al. forthcoming). In the large majority of municipalities included in our study, the share of immigrant-origin candidates nominated by local party organisations is well below the corresponding share of foreigners within the population. Overall, in more than 40% of the municipalities analysed, no immigrant-origin candidate has been identified in the lists presented by local party organizations; and a substantial representational gap still exists even in municipalities in which foreign-born individuals account for almost 50% or more of all residents. Thus, although local politics is generally expected to constitute a more accessible pathway of access to the home country’s political arena, our findings indicate that migrants are still far from achieving political representation even in municipalities hosting very sizeable migrant communities. In fact, an (almost) “perfect” level of representation is reached in very few cases; and only three municipalities return a slight overrepresentation of immigrant-origin candidates in party lists when compared to their demographic concentration within the population.

Moreover, this pattern of under-representation is confirmed for the two consecutive election waves analysed, thus disproving, at least for the Spanish case, the hypothesis according to which a large concentration of foreign-born residents in specific municipalities is sufficient for ensuring higher levels of minority representation (H1a). Nonetheless, we do find a slight increase in the presence of IO candidates when crossing the 20% threshold (3.85% average for both waves) and even more so when crossing the 30% threshold (7.28% average for both waves). Also we find a slight increase for the 2015 local elections (4.35% of all candidates) when compared to 2011 (3.56%: see Table X in the Annex), this being mostly due to the increase in the nomination of migrants from Latin America and EU15 between the two electoral years.

Figure 3. Levels of descriptive political representation of immigrant-origin minorities in Spain compared to their demographic share, 2011 and 2015.



Source: Own elaboration based on the APREPINM dataset. The data on % of foreign-born population is from the Spanish Institute for Statistics (INE).

Nonetheless, the probability of inclusion varies considerably if we look at different categories of municipalities with different predominant IO Minorities (Table 1). Leaving aside the Bulgarian group for which we have very few completed questionnaires, the probability of inclusion is higher in municipalities that were included in the sample for their concentration of citizens from the EU 15 (an average of 5.7% of all candidates in both waves) or in municipalities included for the concentration of Latin-Americans (4% average in both waves), much higher than the level of inclusion in those municipalities selected for the concentration of Romanians or Moroccans (1.9% average in both cases).

Table 1. IOMs candidates as percentage of eligible candidates by predominant IOM minority in the municipality

Predominant IOM minority in the municipality	2011		2015		Total	
	% IOMs Candidates (N)	Total Candidates (N)	% IOMs Candidates (N)	Total Candidates (N)	% IOMs Candidates (N)	Total Candidates (N)
Bulgarian	0.00 (0)	121	2.22 (2)	90	0.95 (2)	211
EU15	5.15 (137)	2658	6.17 (199)	3224	5.71 (336)	5882
Latin American	3.81 (98)	2573	4.26 (90)	2111	4.01 (188)	4684
Moroccan	1.57 (12)	763	2.23 (16)	719	1.89 (28)	1482
Romanian	2.01 (38)	1893	1.87 (30)	1607	1.94 (68)	3500
Total	3.56 (285)	8008	4.35 (337)	7751	3.95 (622)	15759

Source: own elaboration based on data provided local party organizations in completed questionnaires

However, our expectation according to which the presence of candidates from a particular minority group in party lists is higher when that specific community is well represented in demographic terms (H.1.b) is only partly confirmed. As shown in Table 2, this argument mostly stands for EU15 migrants and, to a lesser extent, for the Romanian and Latin-American groups. In municipalities selected for the concentration of EU15 migrants, 73% of IO candidates originate, indeed from EU 15 countries. The same applies for Romanians, as in municipalities in which the Romanian community is particularly sizeable, almost 65% of IO candidates are Romanian. However, the situation is more nuanced for other groups. For instance, in municipalities with a high concentration of Latin Americans, 60% of all immigrant-origin candidates fielded in party lists originate from this region, although almost one in four candidates nominated in these municipalities has an European background. This “mismatch” between the nomination of a particular group and its demographic presence at the local level is even more visible in those municipalities included in our sample due to their high concentration of Moroccan-origin residents. Surprisingly, in these particular cases, the large majority (more than 80%) of immigrants included in party lists actually have another origin than Moroccan, this further confirming that the Moroccan group is particularly disadvantaged in terms of securing political representation in Spanish local politics.

Table 2. Levels of descriptive political representation of immigrant-origin minorities by predominant IO minority in the municipalities. 2011 and 2015 Spanish Local Elections

Municipalities with sizeable communities of...	Candidates with an immigrant background					
	Bulgarian	EU15	Latin American	Moroccan	Romanian	Other origins
...Bulgarian origin	50	0	50	0	0	0
...EU15 origin	0	72.6	16.4	3.3	1.8	5.9
...Latin American origin	1.6	21.8	59.6	4.8	3.7	8.5
...Moroccan	0	21.4	35.7	17.9	14.3	10.7
...Romanian	1.5	13.2	17.6	0	64.7	3
All municipalities	0.8	48.2	30.5	4	9.8	6.7
<i>Total N candidates by origin</i>	5	300	190	25	61	41

Source: Own elaboration based on the APREPINM dataset.

Given that we have a larger number of observations from municipalities with a high concentration of EU 15 and Latin-American minorities than the other 3 groups we must be cautious not to jump to conclusions when comparing the chances of different groups to be nominated. Nonetheless our results do suggest some of our initial expectations regarding the variation in the levels of descriptive representation achieved by different migrant groups. To begin with, we expected to find that, due to a combination of group-level characteristics and institutional factors, some specific migrant communities will have, a priori, better chances to achieve political representation than others. In particular, EU15 migrants were expected to be more successful than other groups in terms of entering Spanish local politics given that they count with a more privileged socio-economic profile (H2), while also benefitting from the EU citizenship status that grants them an easy access to local electoral rights in Spain (H6.b). In turn, the inclusion of Latin Americans candidates in Spanish party lists was expected to be facilitated by the fact that, unlike other migrant groups, Latin Americans are Spanish native speakers, they benefit from a fast-track access to the Spanish citizenship, and they are culturally closer to the autochthonous population (H3 and H6.a). Finally, despite having a less privileged access to economic resources when compared to EU15 nationals, Romanians and Bulgarians were still expected to return relatively higher levels of representation due to the electoral advantages of their EU citizenship status, especially when compared to Moroccans that were initially

expected to face greater barriers for entering Spanish local politics (H6C.) The combined results from Table 1 and 2 suggest that the specific origin of migrant candidates is still an important factor to be considered when assessing their likelihood of being nominated by the local branches of Spanish parties. Almost half of all immigrant-origin candidates identified in our sample are EU15 migrants, whereas 30% of them originate from Latin America. By contrast, very few Romanian, Bulgarian or Moroccan origin candidates entered the local electoral competition in 2011 and 2015. Consequently, these preliminary findings seem to support the initial argument that migrant group characteristics and different institutional configurations might significantly shape the chances of different migrant groups to secure political representation in Spain.

By nationalities, British, German, French are the most frequent nationalities of candidates from EU 15 countries whereas Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela or Ecuador are the most frequent among Latin-American countries. Table 3 also shows a significant decrease in the inclusion of candidates of Rumanian origin and a slight increase of those of Moroccan origin from the 2011 to the 2015 election.

Table 3. Main nationalities included as IO candidates. 2011 and 2015 local elections


Nationality	2011	2015	Total	%
United Kingdom	66	71	137	22,0
Romania	39	22	61	9,8
Argentina	15	28	43	6,9
Germany	17	22	39	6,3
France	12	23	35	5,6
Colombia	12	20	32	5,1
Italy	12	14	26	4,2
Morocco	9	16	25	4,0
Venezuela	12	13	25	4,0
Ecuador	7	15	22	3,5
Portugal	8	10	18	2,9
Peru	10	7	17	2,7
Belgium	8	7	15	2,4
Netherlands	7	3	10	1,6
Uruguay	3	6	9	1,5
Cuba	5	3	8	1,3
Dominican Republic	6	1	7	1,1
Sweden	4	2	6	1,0
Brazil	2	4	6	1,0
Bulgaria	2	3	5	0,8

Ireland	1	4	5	0,8
Jordan	3	1	4	0,6
Others	16	20	36	5,8
NS	9	22	31	5,0
Total	285	337	622	

Source: Own elaboration based on the APREPINM dataset.

As for the gender distribution, Figure 4 shows the balance between the share of female candidates in party lists and the percentage of women within the overall population, by specific origins. As previously mentioned, we had contradictory hypotheses in this regard. On the one hand, we expect that female candidates belonging to IO minorities might face multiple barriers, thus reaching even lower representation levels than male candidates belonging to IO minorities (H4). On the other hand the nomination of female minority candidates might represent a very strategic political move, as it allows parties to tick two “diversity boxes” at the same time, thus showing inclusiveness towards the migrant electorate and female voters in general with a single candidate nomination, leading to higher levels of inclusion of ethnic minority women in relation to men (H5). Yet, our data shows mixed results in this regard (Figure 4). On the one hand, we observe a significant under-representation of women for the Moroccan group (also for Bulgarians although our N is very low in this case to reach any conclusion). Women generally represent little more than 40% of the overall number of individuals residing in Spain and born in Morocco, although only 20% of all Moroccan-origin candidates nominated for the 2011 and 2015 Spanish elections are women. Hence, for the Moroccan group, our data not only indicates that this community is, in general, the most disadvantaged one in party nomination processes, but also that female Moroccan migrants have even fewer chances than their male counterparts to be actively included in Spanish local politics (thus confirming the H4a for the Moroccan group). Interestingly enough, the same pattern is confirmed for the autochthonous group, thus potentially pointing towards a more systematic problem of the underrepresentation of women face in general at least at the municipal level. However, the situation is different for migrants originating from EU15 and, to a lesser extent, for Romanians and Latin Americans, where we find slightly higher percentages of female minority candidates fielded in party lists when compared to the share of women within the total population of the municipalities under analysis. This seems to confirm H5a even if we are unsure of the actual mechanism leading to the slight overrepresentation of women candidates in these three groups.

Figure 4. Share of women as candidates and within the population, by origin (2011 and 2015)





Source: Own elaboration based on the APREPINM dataset. The share of women within the overall population is an average between 2011 and 2015, based on the data of the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE).

In addition to differences by national origins, our findings also highlight an interesting variation in parties' responsiveness towards the inclusion of immigrant-origin candidates in their respective electoral lists (Figure 5). Firstly, our data tends to confirm the hypothesis according to which left-wing parties are more prone to field immigrant-origin candidates for local elections when compared to their right-wing counterparts (H7), although this seems to be the case especially for the 2015 elections. In 2011, both left and right wing parties seemed equally responsive towards the inclusion of immigrant-origin candidates. The share of minority candidates increased for both groups by 2015, although in a more significant manner amongst left-wing parties, mainly due to the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates on the lists of left-wing coalitions in 2015. In fact, left-wing coalitions returned the highest ratio of candidates with an immigrant background in their 2015 lists, followed by the Canary Coalition (CC). As for PP and PSOE, their local organizations returned rather similar shares of immigrant-origin candidates, despite the trend recently highlighted in other studies of a higher propensity of PP to field immigrant-origin representatives in other parliamentary arenas (see Vintila & Morales 2018 and Vintila et al forthcoming for a longitudinal analysis of the representation of migrants in national and regional parliaments).

Also, given the strong bias towards the inclusion of IO candidates by the left-wing coalitions that were formed at the municipal level for the 2015 elections, the differences between parties that are shown in Figure 5 might be better explained, rather than party ideology, by the more open and inclusive methods of candidates selection (primaries in most cases) that were used by these left-coalitions in the elaboration of their lists, in contrast with the more exclusive selection methods used, particularly by traditional parties.


Figure 5. IOMs candidates as percentage of all candidates nominated in party lists, by year (2011-2015) and party



Source: Own elaboration based on the APREPINM dataset. In the first graph, left-wing parties include PSOE, left-wing coalitions, IU and ERC; whereas right-wing parties include the rest of the parties analysed, except for "other nationalist and regionalist parties". For both graphs: Cs in 2011 has been dropped (34 candidates, 4 of foreign origin). For the second graph, the same applies for UpyD in 2015.

Yet, further refinement is required for assessing parties' inclusiveness towards minority groups. For instance, previous studies have also pointed out that, in anticipating the potential electoral gains from minority voters, parties might be inclined to show a certain predisposition to field candidates of specific nationalities only. In this regard, our findings indicate that more than a half of all immigrant-origin candidates fielded on the lists of the two mainstream nation-wide parties of the left and right side of the political spectrum (PP and PSOE) originate from EU15 (Figure 6). In turn, left-wing coalitions, Cs and UPyD returned higher shares of Latin American candidates when compared to the rest of the parties. As mentioned, very few Romanians, Moroccans and Bulgarians were included in the electoral lists for the 2011 and 2015 local elections across all parties analysed. However, the share of Romanians tends to be slightly higher on the lists of PP compared to other mainstream national parties; whereas ERC returned the higher share of candidates with a Moroccan background (although still lower when compared to the share of EU15 migrants in their party lists).


Figure 6. IOM candidates by specific origin and political parties (2011 & 2015)



Source: Own elaboration based on the APREPINM dataset.

As discussed in the previous section, the degree of party system fragmentation (especially when coupled with a significant electoral potential from migrant groups) can significantly influence parties' decision to attract this new niche of voters – the immigrant-origin electorate- by fielding minority candidates on their electoral lists (H8). In fact, in a highly competitive electoral environment, reaching out the “migrant vote” might be a key element that can guarantee parliamentary seats (Konstantinidou, Ramiro, Vintila 2016); and a higher degree of electoral competition is expected to favour parties' propensity to return immigrant-origin candidates (Bird 2005; Berg and Bjorklund 2011). Yet, our results for the 2011 and 2015 Spanish local elections (Figure 7) do not support this argument that migrants have better chances to be nominated in party lists in municipalities counting with the presence of a higher number of relevant parties.

Figure 7. Share of immigrant-origin candidates in municipalities by the Number of Effective Parliamentary Parties (NEPP) in 2011 and 2015




Source: Own elaboration based on the APREPINM dataset.

Finally, it is reasonable to expect that having immigrant-origin candidates in party lists does not necessarily guarantee the presence of minority representatives in elected institutions. Especially in a closed-list party system such as the Spanish one, parties might follow a rather instrumental rationale in their candidate nomination process. In hope for electoral awards from minority voters, they might still play the inclusiveness card by fielding immigrant-origin candidates, while placing them in rather unwinnable positions of the electoral lists and keeping the positions more likely to be translated into seats for autochthonous candidates. This strategy can be particularly “beneficial” for parties’ final aim of reaching out to the immigrant-origin segment of the electorate while still keeping control over the potential costs of losing support from majority voters who are not particularly favourable towards immigrants in general.

One rough indicator of the extent to which migrant candidates are placed in rather secure positions of the electoral lists is the analysis of how many of them actually got elected as local councillors (Figure 8). As previously mentioned, few immigrant-origin individuals have been

nominated as candidates for the 2011 and 2015 local elections in municipalities in which they constitute an important fraction of the population; yet even fewer of them managed to get elected in the local councils of those municipalities. The higher electoral success rate in terms of entering the local council is observed amongst EU15 migrants, who were also the most successful in terms of being nominated in party lists. Yet, there is still an important gap between the share of EU15 migrants obtaining seats in the local council and the corresponding success rate amongst autochthonous candidates. This gap is even more prominent for other minority groups, such as Latin Americans, but especially so, in the case of Moroccans, Romanians and Bulgarians. In light of the data, the later three groups face serious difficulties in entering party lists in the first place (first stage of the nomination process); and when they do, they are generally placed in rather unwinnable positions (second stage of inclusion in electoral lists), with the result that very few of them manage to get elected. Consequently, the pattern of under-representation of these specific groups in local councils is even more striking than in party lists, this indicating, in turn, that Spanish local councils are still far from reflecting the diversity by national origins observed within the overall population.

Figure 8. Share of immigrant-origin elected representatives, by origin (2011 & 2015)




Source: Own elaboration based on the APREPINM dataset.

Furthermore, when evaluating the success rate of all immigrant-origin candidates by party affiliation, we also observe that the lists of left-wing coalitions included a higher share of migrants who were elected after the 2011 and 2015 Spanish local elections (14.8%), while also being the lists

that were more inclusive towards nominating candidates with an immigrant background (Figure 4 above). In turn, the three mainstream nation-wide parties (PP, PSOE and IU) returned a very limited success rate amongst immigrant-origin candidates as only 2% of them (in the lists of PSOE) or even less (in the lists of PP or IU) managed to become local councils after the elections analysed.

Finally, Figure 9 shows that despite the slight overrepresentation of women among IO candidates in three of our groups (EU15, Latin-Americans, and Romanians) this is not repeated when it comes to the candidates finally elected as councillors. With the exception of the Latin American group, female candidates from all other groups (including the autochthonous one) have significantly lower chances of being elected when compared to their male counterparts. Interestingly enough, this applies even for the EU15 group. Only 17% of EU15 female candidates actually obtain a seat in local councils, despite the fact that: a) EU15 candidates in general are nominated to a larger extent than other minority groups; b) their success rate is usually above the one observed for other migrant communities; and c) the share of female minority candidates from EU15 fielded in party lists is even higher than the share of EU15 women among the general population. In sum, even though we found mixed results in relation to the inclusion ethnic minority women as candidates, when it comes to achieving representation in local councils the evidence shown in Figure 9 gives greater support to the multiple barriers faced by women from ethnic minorities hypothesis (H4a), except perhaps for the Latin-American group.

Figure 9. Elected representatives by gender and autochthonous/immigrant origin (2011 & 2015)



Source: Own elaboration based on the APREPINM dataset.

Discussion

Our results clearly confirm the pattern of under-representation of migrants already highlighted in previous studies on the Spanish case. In the large majority of municipalities included in our study, the share of IO candidates nominated by local party organisations is well below the corresponding their share of foreigners within the population. In more than 40% of the municipalities analysed, no IO candidate has been identified in the lists presented by local party organizations; and a substantial representational gap still exists even in municipalities in which foreign-born individuals account for almost 50% or more of all residents. Thus, although local politics is generally expected to constitute a more accessible pathway of access to the home country's political arena, our findings indicate that migrants are still far from achieving political representation even in municipalities hosting very sizeable migrant communities.

Nonetheless we do find a slight increase in the presences of IO candidates in the more recent 2015 local election (4.4% of all candidates examined) in relation to the 2011 election (3.6%). Also, levels of concentration of migrant minorities at the local level seem to increase the probability of inclusion of IO candidates. As expected we also find differences in the levels of inclusion between different migrant groups. In this respect IO minorities from EU15 countries, and to a lesser extent also the Latin American group, stand much higher chances of being selected as candidates than the Rumanian, Bulgarian and the Moroccan minorities. Also, the slight increase in the overall rate of inclusion for the 2015 responds mostly to an increase of candidates from the first two groups and also, but to a lesser extent, the Moroccan minority. These confirms our expectations that differences in access to socio-economic resources or cultural resources, as well as the different institutional configurations might significantly shape the chances of different migrant groups to secure political representation in Spain.

If migrant minorities face great gaps of underrepresentation with regard to inclusion in party lists, even fewer of them managed to get elected in the local councils of those municipalities. Again, the higher electoral success in terms of entering local councils is observed among the EU15 and the Latin-American groups whereas the other three groups are practically excluded from elected office. Nonetheless, our evidence points that all candidates from our five migrant minorities show a lower

rate of success of entering local office than the autochthonous since they are all placed in less winnable positions than natives. Consequently, the pattern of under-representation of these specific groups in local councils is even more striking than in party lists, this indicating, in turn, that Spanish local councils are still far from reflecting the diversity by national origins observed within the overall population.

Our results of IO candidate inclusion by gender shows that only in the case of the Moroccan minority, female candidates stand a lower chance of inclusion than their male counterparts. Levels of inclusion of female candidates are in fact higher for the EU15, the Latin American and the Romanian group than in the autochthonous candidate group. However when it comes to being elected as local councillors, male candidates show higher rates of success than female candidates in all groups (including the autochthonous one) except in the case of Latin-Americans for which females show slightly higher success rates.

With regard to the impact of political factors our results show that parties of the left are more inclusive than parties of the right. However this difference was not apparent in 2011 and it is produced by the high rates of inclusion of the left-wing coalitions that were formed at the municipal level for the 2015 elections. The two traditional parties, the PP and the PSOE, show very similar rates of inclusion (when it comes candidate inclusion in the list) and national wide parties are more inclusive than regional parties except for the Canarian Coalition (CC) in the Canary Islands that shows high rates of inclusion.

Surprisingly we find no clear evidence that higher party system fragmentation leads to higher levels of inclusion.

Finally, different parties show bias towards the inclusion of different groups. While about half of the minority candidates identified within the PP and the PSOE lists are from EU 15 countries, the PP otherwise shows a stronger bias to include candidates of Rumanian origin whereas the PSOE is more inclusive with candidates of Latin-American origin. Candidates of Latin-American origin are more frequently found in national left- wing candidacies and in Ciudadanos (but less in the PP). Candidates of Moroccan origin are more frequently found also in left-wing parties and some regionalist parties (such as the CC or the ERC in Catalonia), but not in the PP or Ciudadanos lists.

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[1] We must take into account that the total population in Spain has also decreased slightly since 2013: from 47,1million in 2013 to 46,6 million in 2017

ANNEXE

Table A1. Response rate by electoral lists and response rate by municipalities contacted.

Autonomous Communities	Response rate by electoral list (%)	Response rate by electoral list (N)	Response rate by municipalities (%)*	Response rate by municipalities (N)
Andalusia	35,5%	279	71,6%	81
Aragon	33,8%	77	56,1%	41
Asturias	25,0%	4	100,0%	1
Balearic Islands	20,4%	162	54,1%	37
Cantabria	66,7%	3	100,0%	1
Castilla La Mancha	26,9%	145	46,9%	32
Castilla y León	37,0%	54	78,9%	19
Catalonia	26,5%	272	77,6%	58
Ceuta	14,3%	7	100,0%	1
Community of Madrid	32,3%	155	74,3%	35
Valencian Community	25,9%	294	56,3%	80
Extremadura	21,4%	14	66,7%	3
Galicia	11,4%	44	23,1%	13
Canary Islands	26,8%	205	80,0%	40
La Rioja	35,7%	14	66,7%	6
Melilla	0,0%	8	0%	1
Navarre	33,3%	30	66,7%	9
Basque Country	25,0%	20	50,0%	4
Region of Murcia	30,0%	60	75,0%	12
Total	28,0%	1853	64,8%	474

*Percentage of municipalities with at least one list responded.

Source: own elaboration based on data provided local party organizations in completed questionnaires

Table A2. IOMs candidates as percentage of eligible candidates by foreign birth concentration.

Foreign birth concentration	2011		2015		Total	
	%	Total Cand.	%	Total Cand.	%	Total Cand
Until 10%	2.08	96	2.99	134	2.61	230
10- 20%	2.41	3024	1.74	2925	2.08	5949
20-30%	3.32	3252	4.49	2742	3.85	5994
More 30%	6.23	1636	8.15	1950	7.28	3586
Total	3.56	8008	4.35	7751	3.95	15759

Source: own elaboration based on data provided local party organizations in completed questionnaires