How do domestic and foreign policy priorities shape states’ migration policymaking? This paper advances a novel analysis of migration diplomacy by integrating it with two-level game theory from political science. It challenges approaches that treat migration diplomacy primarily as a function of bilateral or external bargaining, arguing instead that states’ strategies toward migration and refugees are fundamentally conditioned by domestic political agendas, constraints, and priorities. The study develops this argument through an inductive examination of three recent border crises between European Union (EU) and non-EU states: the 2020 Greece–Turkey crisis, the 2021 Spain–Morocco crisis, and the 2022 Poland–Belarus crisis. These cases illustrate how governments leverage migration flows internationally while simultaneously responding to domestic political pressures, such as electoral incentives, public opinion, and regime legitimacy. Building on these empirical insights, the paper offers a theoretical re-interpretation of migration diplomacy that foregrounds the interaction between domestic politics and international negotiation. Beyond its theoretical contribution, the paper proposes a clear and practical analytical framework for policymakers, designed to improve the anticipation and management of migration and refugee crises. By linking domestic political dynamics to international migration strategies, the paper provides a more comprehensive understanding of state behavior and offers policy-relevant tools for more effective and coordinated responses.